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Abstract 
Over the last century, philosophy has comprehensively criticised the 'common-
sense' view of the proposition 'God exists' as being meaningful. The purpose ofthis thesis 
is therefore to show that instances of 'God exists' can be considered meaningful, whether or 
not God does in fact exist. From the intuitive premise of compositionality - that the 
meaning of a proposition is determined by the meaning of its parts - I ask what options 
'God exists' presents. Its appearance is that of a simple subject-predicate sentence, 
restricting possible difficulties in interpreting compositionality; it appears to take a subject 
and attribute a property to that subject. However, several problems are apparent. The first 
is the concept of existence. The first chapter, therefore, compares the views of Bertrand 
Russell with recent work by Colin McGinn, arguing in favour of existence as a predicate. 
McGinn presents a challenge to allowing the predication of existence of 'God', 
centred around the concepts by which ontological arguments characterise 'God'. The 
second chapter, as an historical-theological angle on the meaningfulness of 'God exists', 
takes up this challenge in an attempt to resolve it using Anselm's Proslogion, which is 
traditionally thought to demonstrate the existence of God by using the idea of God. 
Analysis of the Proslogion and the thought underlying it do not provide an entirely 
acceptable resolution, but lay the foundations for the remainder of the thesis. 
The third chapter argues for the rejection of McGinn's challenge. Having provided 
arguments for seeing 'God exists' as a subject-predicate sentence, and noted the difficulties 
in conceiving adequately of God, I address the problem of what account to give of 'God'. 
Against a background of debate in the philosophy of language, I advocate understanding 
'God' as a name in 'God exists', and argue for a view of the meaning and reference of 'God' 
based upon the work of Jerome Gellman. 
Finally, I combine relevant elements from existence, reference and meaning -
incorporating theological suggestions arising from Anselm - to provide a model for the 
meaningfulness of 'God exists' which, I argue, demonstrates 'God exists' to be a meaningful 
proposition if God does in fact exist or if God does not in fact exist. 
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'To say that 'God exists' is to make a metaphysical 
utterance which cannot be either true or false ... [and] if 
the assertion that there is a god is nonsensical, then the 
atheist's assertion that there is no god is equally 
nonsensical ... ' 
A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic 
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Introduction 
Ontological, cosmological and teleological arguments all have 'God exists' as 
their conclusion; all aim to assert the proposition as true. The question that can -
perhaps must - be asked of each, however, does not concern so much truth or 
epistemology (although these are clearly vital) but meaningfulness. What do we mean 
when we say, think or write 'God exists'? The classical arguments for the existence of 
God might go furthest in answering the question; the ontological argument perhaps 
furthest of all, since it is traditionally held as an attempt to derive 'God exists' from the 
idea of 'God' and a concept of existence. But we may ask legitimately even of these 
'what does it mean to say that God exists?' 
The starting point of this thesis, then, is just this question of meaning. A 
common sense view might hold it as fairly obvious that 'God exists' is meaningful. On 
the other hand, influenced by reductive scientific projects and the philosophical 
pressures of logical atomism and logical positivism, a common sense view could be 
construed to be that 'God exists' is not meaningful, or perhaps is not meaningful unless 
God actually exists. The substantive argument of this thesis, however, is that 'God 
exists' is meaningful and, moreover, is meaningful whether or not God in fact exists. In 
order to achieve the aim of a model of meaningfulness for 'God exists' several issues 
need consideration. I shall outline below the structure of the thesis as regards analysis 
of the concept of existence, Anselm's Proslogion and its context, and the problem of 
meaning and reference for proper names and definite descriptions. However, there are 
broader issues which need to be addressed beforehand. 
This requires preliminary attention to the philosophy of language - more 
specifically, to theories of sentential meaning. For if we cannot say what it is for a 
proposition to be meaningful, there seems little point in attempting to show that 'God 
exists' is meaningful. Although it not within the scope of this thesis to debate the details 
of a theory of meaning for sentences, certain assessments may be considered prudent at 
the outset. The most important, which I take as a premise, is compositionality. Broadly, 
compositionality states that the meaning of a sentence is determined by the meaning of 
its parts. The precise mechanism by which this takes place, and the possibility of any 
exceptions to it, are up for debate. However, the difficulties that may arise in giving a 
comprehensive account are not, I suggest, present in the case of 'God exists'. At 
minimum, an analysis of the meaning of 'exists' and 'God' should provide some idea of 
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what it is to say that the former is conjoined with the latter. Compositionality should be 
an intuitive starting point; open to challenge, certainly, but not discarded without 
reason. 
In this introduction, I wish briefly to note several fairly influential theories of 
sentential meaning to give a sense of where I stand, and of what alternatives may 
potentially be presented to the conclusions of the thesis. In this, I will broadly follow 
the structure of William Lycan's Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary 
Introduction, which provides a more detailed treatment of the following, and other, 
theories of meaning. I choose not to cover ideational theories, verificationism and 
Quine's nihilism of sentence meaning because, under conditions of restricted space, 
they appear both the least defensible and (perhaps therefore) the least mainstream. 
The first position to be entertained is the 'propositional' theory of sentential 
meaning. 1 Essentially, this holds that a sentence is meaningful if it expresses a 
proposition. 'Propositions are entirely general and, if you like, eternal. '2 They are not 
dependent upon any specific language; 'my umbrella is green' expresses the same 
proposition as 'Mon parapluie est vert'. Propositions are truth-bearers; the two examples 
are both false because they express a proposition that is false. Propositions in this case 
are also entities. 
There are several objections to this position (Lycan provides a range of 
examples\ but all that I should like to say here is that if 'God exists' means the 
proposition that God exists, then we still need some account of 'God' and some account 
of'exists', and to that extent the loose premise and requirements of compositionality still 
hold. I would like also to note that, unless specified to the contrary, all uses of 
'proposition' in this thesis will be of the non-entity-invoking variety. 
The second position I wish briefly to consider is H. P. Grice's theory of 
'speaker-meaning'. Lycan says of it the following. 
Grice distinguished ... speaker-meaning from [a] sentence's own standard-meaning [and] 
offered an elaborate analysis of speaker-meaning in terms of speakers' intentions, 
beliefs, and other psychological states... . It is generally agreed that some version of the 
analysis must be right. 4 
1 This is also important as background to the treatments ofRussell in following chapters. 
2 Lycan, William G., Philosophy of Language a contemporary Introduction (London: Routledge, 2000), 
r.so 
Lycan, Philosophy of Language, p.83-86 
4 Lycan, Philosophy of Language, p.l 01 
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Grice further provided an account of how standard sentence-meaning could be 
understood in terms of speaker-meaning. 
I shall dwell on this only long enough to note the following points. First, the 
concept of a speaker's broad linguistic intention does indeed seem a necessary element 
of an analysis of the meaning of an utterance. Consequently, if the model developed in 
this thesis does not allow for an element of intention, then one might justifiably be 
dubious and demand some redress. Fortunately, the context of the question- what we 
mean when we state 'God exists'- holds out some hope that this sort of concern will be 
born in mind. 
Secondly, we are again fortunate in that 'God exists' is not a long, convoluted or 
grammatically ambiguous proposition (at least not on the face of it). It is not like the 
famous example from Strawson: 'This is a fine red one. ' 5 The options for confusion 
and complexity at the sententiallevel are minimised for the proposition 'God exists'; the 
number of things someone could mean by such a proposition is restricted Once again, 
it seems reasonable to ask what is meant by 'God' and what is meant by 'exists' as a 
starting point. 
The third position is that of 'use' or 'inferential' theories of sentential meaning. 
These focus upon 'the role an expression plays in human social behaviour. '6 
Wittgenstein used the ideas of 'language games' and rule-following, giving rise to a 
host of theories with accounts based upon the view that 'when we talk of [linguistic 
expressions'] meanings, we mean the functions they characteristically perform in the 
context of our current social practices.' 7 
Lycan provides two objections8 that are, and will continue to be, particularly 
pertinent. The first is that proper names are difficult to account for in such a theory; 
what are the rules or social practices for 'Ludwig Wittgenstein' for example? The 
second is that we can comprehend, and react to, new and original sentence constructions 
-implying at least some form of compositionality. 'The sentence's meaning is in large 
part a function of its internal structure as well. ' 9 
Perhaps there are some expressions for which the theory shows real insights. 
Perhaps many expressions involving 'God' fall typically within this category. 
However, I would argue that the use/inferential approach is not suitable for 'God 
s Strawson, P.F., 'On Referring', Mind 59 (1950), p.320-344 cited by Lycan, Philosophy of Language, 
f.l02 
Lycan, Philosophy of Language, p. 90 
7 Lycan, Philosophy of Language, p. 92 
8 Lycan, Philosophy of Language, p.94. For further objections and replies, see p.93-98 
9 Lycan, Philosophy of Language, p.94 
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exists', primarily because we do actually seem to be positing an entity, over and above 
anything that we say or do in practicing religion, and the 'social practice' accompanying 
it is frequently debate over whether it is actually true. It is not that 'God exists' fulfils 
some social function particularly; when we agonise over it, debate it, or compose 
arguments to prove it, we are clearly asking a question that means something, even if 
we are erroneous in our justification for asking that question. It is still meaningful to 
ask whether an entity exists. If we are in error, a good account of the meaningfulness of 
the proposition will accommodate and even explain our error. Likewise, the model I 
aim to construct in this thesis ought to show what we mean when we say 'God exists' 
and the argument over whether we are categorically mistaken in making such a 
statement will be separate from, but not incompatible with, that model. Further, as we 
have seen Lycan argue, there should still be a level of acceptance of some form of 
compositionality for the use/inferential theorist, and so the premise of my analysis is not 
adversely affected. 
The final position for consideration is Davidson's truth-conditional theory. 'On 
this view, to know a sentence's meaning is to know the conditions under which that 
sentence would be true .... '10 As Lycan says11, Davidson emphasises the requirement for 
compositionality, and argues that truth conditions are a sentence's most salient 
compositional feature. So 'God exists' would be true if God does exist - and we should 
again require an account of the meaning of 'God' and 'exists'. Lycan canvasses a 
selection of objections and I provide his summary below. 
One is that many perfectly meaningful sentences do not have truth-values: Some others 
are that his program cannot handle expressions (such as pronouns) whose referents 
depend on context, predicates which are not synonyms but happen to apply to just the 
same things, and sentences whose truth-values are not determined by those of their 
component clauses. 12 
I shall once again restrict my remarks to observing that 'God exists' IS an 
apparently simple construction, without component clauses or other difficult features. 
Its appearance is that of a subject-predicate sentence; it names an entity and attributes a 
property to that entity. Consequently, if the meaning of the subject and the meaning of 
the predicate can be demonstrated, the way in which the sentence fits together ought not 
to provide many difficulties. If the model is constructed properly, an account should be 
10 Lycan, Philosophy of Language, p.l31 
11 Lycan., Philosophy of Language, p.130 
12 Lycan., Philosophy of Language, p.130 
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available of the conditions under which the proposition is true, and also the conditions 
under which it is false. 
In conclusion, then, although the above theories of sentential meaning and their 
respective objections may have something to say about the model resulting from this 
thesis, such considerations are proper to a subsequent project. For the present, it seems 
reasonable to analyse the meaning of 'God' and 'exists' on the assumption of some 
form of compositionality, and to explore further, more complex options only if the 
analysis fails also to account for the way in which 'God' and 'exists' fit together. 
'God exists' on this analysis may not exhibit major difficulties in the 
complexity of the sentence structure, but that is not to say that there are no difficulties; 
far from it. In analysing the meaning of 'God' and 'exists' there are many problems. 
Consequently, the structure of my thesis will comprise several key elements. 
First, there is the problem of whether 'God exists' really is a subject-predicate 
sentence. In Chapter I, I shall attempt to tackle the problem of the concept of existence, 
comparing Bertrand Russell's widely accepted view that it is a second-order property (a 
property of properties, meaning that a property is instantiated) with Colin McGinn's 
recent work criticising this in favour of a first-order property view - essentially that 
existence is a property of objects which we use to distinguish those that are actual from 
those which are intentional/linguistic. With certain reservations, I shall support 
McGinn's primary theses- also noting the implications for an account of 'God exists' 
from both the Russellian and McGinnian perspectives. However, both the ramifications 
of McGinn's theses, and particular comments made by him, add to the incentive to 
examine the ontological argument. As observed above, ontological arguments for 
God's existence might be considered to provide the best opportunity to assess the 
meaning of 'God exists' on the grounds that they traditionally attempt to derive it from 
the content of those terms. 
Therefore, in Chapter Il, I turn to Anselm' s Proslogion. There are several 
reasons why this is more appropriate than other texts expounding an ontological 
argument, as will be seen, but the most important is the thought underlying the 
Proslogion. Anselm has a philosophy and theology of language that gives him a 
common ground both with McGinn and with subsequent elements of my thesis; vitally, 
he can be seen, in an historical-theological context, as contemplating strikingly similar 
challenges to those levelled by McGinn against the use and understanding of the word 
'God'. Anselm's concerns are centred upon ineffability, whilst McGinn requires that 
the concept of 'God' be well-defined, and that we should know what it would be for an 
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entity to be characterised by one or more concepts before existence can be applied. 
Analysis of Anselm's thought provides a double movement in the investigation: looking 
back in conclusion on the Proslogion, used to introduce his thought, I suggest a 
perspective from which it can be understood (without debating as to whether its 
arguments work, which would be an entirely separate task). Looking forward to a 
model of meaningfulness for 'God exists', I argue that the only reasonable direction for 
an analysis of 'God' to take is to find a way of referring to God which takes into 
account the problems described by McGinn and Anselm - i.e. a tension between the 
demand to define God and the assertion of His ineffability. 
Chapter Ill consequently engages in a discussion of meaning and reference. 
Arguing that McGinn's theses allow us to take 'God exists' as a subject-predicate 
sentence and that 'God' functions as a name in the broadest sense, I shall consider what 
account of meaning and reference could follow from this. Against a background of 
debate between the (broadly) Russellian and Kripkean positions, I shall examine a paper 
by Jerome Gellman which contends that we can fix a reference for 'God' whilst leaving 
open the semantic account of that term. Gellman further relates his position to 
Anselm's Proslogion, providing continuity with the rest of the thesis. 
In a minor critique of Gellman, I shall argue that by demarcating a Kripkean 
semantic account, to which Gellman should (in consistency) adhere, and an account of 
'associated descriptions' such as that suggested by Mark Sainsbury, it is possible to 
posit a model of 'God' - for both the meaning and reference elements - that employs 
appealing features of both. I shall also argue that McGinn's view of existence allows 
the composite theory of meaning and reference thus attained to withstand the major 
objections normally brought to bear against it. 
In Chapter IV, I shall combine the salient arguments from previous chapters into 
a model of meaningfulness for 'God exists'. This will show how 'God exists' can be 
meaningful whether or not God actually exists by employing McGinn' s view of 
existence in the context of the Chapter Ill account of meaning and reference. In the 
course of this, it should be apparent that the model both tallies with our use of language, 
fictional discourse and discussion about the existence of God, and accommodates some 
of the concerns raised in this introduction. 
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Cl1apter 1: Existence 
It is generally supposed that the status of 'existence', as either a first- or 
second-order property, has some bearing on the matter of predicating it of God. The 
classical criticism of ontological arguments, for instance, is that existence is not a 
property that can simply be 'tagged on' to a list of God's attributes; rather, existence is 
a set of attributes having an instance. 
Thus, in this chapter, I intend to deal with a famous view of existence as a 
second-order property from Bertrand Russell. I shall briefly consider how one might 
treat the issue of predicating existence of God with a second-order model, and the 
overall view that emerges demonstrates the first part of the philosophical challenge to 
the meaningfulness of 'God exists (the second Russellian part of this challenge will be 
considered in Chapter Ill). 
I shall then deal with the refutation of Russell proposed by McGinn, and finally 
shall examine and expand upon the surprising and challenging points made by 
McGinn. These combine comments on the ontological argument with a challenge 
concerning predicating existence of God with a first-order model: The core of the 
former is McGinn' s argument that our critical concern should be with the concept 
'God' as defined by proponents of the ontological argument, instead of being with the 
concept of existence. The core of the latter is the corollary point that we may allow 
God the property of existence provided His definition warrants, combined with an 
argument concerning our being able to use certain concepts to refer to God. 
Russell contra mundum? 
Russell's work arose for the most part out of the problem of grammatically 
singular negative existential sentences and their truth values. Thus, 'The golden 
mountain does not exist' is true, but for it to be meaningful, one would think that the 
term ought to refer (i.e. there should be a golden mountain), and if it referred, then the 
sentence would be false. 13 The Meinongian solution to this was to allow non-existents 
under a separate category of 'So-Being' objects14. Russell's overall response to this15 
13 See articles Mark Sainsbury, 'Philosophical Logic', in A. C. Grayling ( ed.) Philosophy 1: A Guide 
Through the Subject (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.61-122 
14 Alexius Meinong, "Ober Gegenstandstheorie" in Untersuclnmgen zur Gegenstandstheorie und 
Psychologie (Leipzig: Barth, 1904) 
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was based on his dislike for the overly permissive ontology, and also on the apparent 
allowance of contradictions - such as the being of some x-which-is-not-an-x - which 
should not even be meaningful 16• I shall only be considering Russell's proposed 
solutions concerning existence here; the problems of reference I shall leave until 
Chapter ill. 
In his fifth lecture on logical atomism17 Bertrand Russelllays out a structure for 
general propositions (e.g. 'All men are mortal') and an account of existence. He takes 
these to be 'the same topic, although it might not have seemed so at first glance.' 18 His 
first point is that general propositions can be seen in an affirmation/negation 
relationship with existential propositions. However, it is arbitrary which is the 
affirmative and which is the negative19• This brings us to Russell's first key statement: 
All general propositions deny the existence of something or other. Ifyou say "All men 
are mortal", that denies the existence of an immortal man, and so on.20 
And his second: 
I want to say emphatically that general propositions are to be interpreted as not 
involving existence. When I say, for instance, "All Greeks are men," I do not want 
you to suppose that that implies that there are Greeks.21 
There are several issues here which must be untangled. It may help if we 
introduce a little formal logic. Russell's second point is that one must specifY that there 
are Greeks separately to specifYing what proportion of them are men. Thus: (Vx)(Gx 
~ Mx) [for all x, if x is Greek then x is a man; i.e. all Greeks are men22] does not 
imply (3x)(Gx) [for some x, xis Greek]. Rather, the latter is required in order to assert 
the full (3x)(Gx & Mx), or that there is a Greek man. Russell notes that failure to 
15 According to Mark Sainsbury, 'Philosophical Logic' in A C. Grayling ( ed.) Philosophy 1: A Guide 
Through the Subject (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.87 
16 Defences ofMeinongianisrn have been attempted, for example K. Lambert, Meinong and the Principle 
of Independence, (London: CUP, 1983); Parsons, T., Nonexistent Objects, (Newhaven: Yale University 
Press, 1980) 
17 Slater, John G. ( ed.) The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russe/1, vol. 8, The Philosophy of Logical 
Atomism and Other Essays 1914-19 (London: George Alien & Unwin (Publishers) Ltd., 1986), p.201-
211. Hereafter CPBR. 
18 CPBR p.201 
19 CPBR p.201 
2° CPBR p.201 
21 CPBR p.201 
22 Note that this is different to (Vx)(Gx & MX): for all x, xis Greek and a man; roughly, all that there are 
are Greek men. 
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accept this results in fa1lacy; 'A11 A is B, and all A is C, therefore some B is Ca3_ The 
thought that a general proposition implied existence was present in the traditional 
doctrine of syllogism, and Russell observes that trust in this was the downfall of 
Leibniz in his attempts to form a mathematicallogic24. 
Russell goes on to talk about propositional functions; we have already seen 
some examples of these in the formal logic above. A propositional function is 'any 
expression containing ... undetermined constituent[ s] ... and becoming a proposition as 
soon as the undetermined constituents are determined. '25 Thus, both the formal logic 
above and my translations, where these contain 'x', are propositional functions. This 
brings us to another important point to note (to which we shall return later on): 
A propositional function is nothing, but, like most of the things one wants to talk about 
in logic, it does not lose its importance through that fact. The only thing really that 
you can do with a propositional function is to assert either that it is always true, or that 
it is sometimes true, or that it is never true. 26 
'All Greeks are men', then, says 'if x is a Greek then x is a man', and that the latter is 
always true (i.e. true for any x). It is useful to make some distinctions here that will aid 
understanding both of the conceptual structure and of the requisite formal logic. 
Russell uses the example of 'All Greeks are men' as compared with 'No Greeks are 
men'. The former is (Vx)(Gx ~ Mx), the latter is (Vx)(Gx ~ -.Mx:), not -.cvx)(Gx ~ 
Mx) - which would mean that some Greeks could be men, but at least one is not. On 
Russell's model, if there are no Greeks, then both propositions ('All Greeks ... ' and 'No 
Greeks ... ') will be true simultaneously because the class expressed by 'Gx' is empty, 
and 'All statements about all the members of a class that has no members are true, 
because the contradictory of any general statement does assert existence and is 
therefore false in this case. '27 In other words, the contradiction of 'All Greeks are men' 
is 'Some Greeks are not men', and this asserts existence28 - which is false, if there are 
no Greeks - so statements about 'all Greeks' must be technically true. This leads on 
quite naturally to a problem that Russell famously dealt with concerning properties and 
non-existents. 
23 CPBR p.202 
24 CPBR p.202 
25 CPBR p.202 
26 CPBR p.202 
27 CPBR p.202 
28 (3x)(Gx & ~Mx) 
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The question is, what is the negation of 'the present King of France is bald'? 
This traditionally has the form Bf, where B is the property of baldness and f denotes 
the present King of France, and we would at first think its negation to be 'the present 
King of France is not bald', or --,Bf. However, both of these are false because there is 
no present King of France, and the first statement says there is a bald one, whilst the 
second says that there is an hirsute one. This appears to violate the Law of Excluded 
Middle, which says that any disjunction 'P or not-P' must be true; in other words (in 
this case) something must either have a property or not have it. Russell's solution, the 
background ideas for which we can recognise above, is to say that the correct 
formulation is (3x)(Fx & (Vy)(Fy--+ x=y) & Bx)- i.e. there is exactly one thing which 
is the King of France, and that thing is bald. The negation is then ~3x)(Fx & (Vy)(Fy 
--+ x=y) & Bx) - i.e. 'it is not the case that there is exactly one thing which is the 
present King of France and which is bald'. L.E.M. applies to the new pairings, since 
one proposition in each pair is true and the other false (i.e. 'there is' versus 'there is 
not'), and does not apply to the original single pairing because there is not a 
proposition and its negation (i.e. it is not really 'P or not-P', it just seems to be at first 
glance). Working from Russell's arguments on general propositions, we can see that 
the reasoning about the L.E.M. problem fits with Russell's overall view. Propositions 
about the present King of France that begin (3x) will be false, as we have seen, and 
presumably - although this is somewhat artificial - if we spoke of 'all present Kings of 
France', all propositions would come out true on the grounds of the emptiness of the 
class 'present Kings of France'. Thus, any proposition concerning the present King of 
France of the form (3x)(Fx & ... )is false and any of the form (Vx)(Fx ~ ... )is true 
because the former falsely asserts existence, whereas the latter ('truthfully') does not 
assert existence. 
This provides us with a sketchy understanding of the question of existence and 
what Russell has to say about it, which must now be expressed more fully. Let us 
refresh our memories by going back to the idea of a propositional function as a 
proposition with an undetermined constituent. Russell goes on to say that a 
propositional function is termed 
necessary, when it is always true; 
possible, when it is sometimes true; 
impossible, when it is never true?9 
29 CPBR p.203 
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It will be helpful here to consider exactly what Russell had to say concerning this: 
Much false philosophy has arisen out of confusing propositional functions and 
propositions. There is a great deal in ordinary traditional philosophy which consists 
simply in attributing to propositions the predicates which only apply to propositional 
functions, and, still worse, sometimes in attributing to individuals predicates which 
only apply to propositional functions. This case of necessary, possible, impossible is a 
case in point. In all traditional philosophy there comes a heading of "modality," which 
discusses necessary, possible and impossible as properties of propositions, whereas in 
fact they are properties of propositional functions. Propositions are only true or false. 
If you take "x is x," that is a propositional function which is true whatever x 
may be, i.e., a necessary propositional function. If you take "x is a man," that is a 
possible one. If you take "xis a unicorn", that is an impossible one. 
Propositions can only be true or false, but propositional functions have these 
three possibilities. It is important, I think, to realise that the whole doctrine of 
modality only applies to propositional functions, not to propositions. 30 
Only one link remains before our Russellian concept of existence is complete; 
Russell says that what 'existence' means fundamentally is that a propositional function 
is sometimes true - i.e. possible. 'You may express it by saying that there is at least 
one value of x for which that propositional function is true. '31 Existence, on this 
reading, is virtually synonymous with 'possible', and is therefore a property of 
propositional functions. To assert existence is not to say anything about any 
individuals, according to Russell, and to make a claim to the contrary is to engage in 
the same sort of fallacy as to say that 'Men are numerous, Socrates is a man, therefore 
Socrates is numerous.'32 Rather, 'x is a man' is possible; true for some value of x. The 
fallacy is 'of transferring to the individual that satisfies a propositional function, a 
predicate which only applies to a propositional function. '33 (My italics). 
In summary, then, Russell's view of existence is built upon his concepts of 
propositional functions and truth values. Whilst it is allowable to say 'men exist' (if 
one accepts that it means '(x is a man) is possible, or sometimes true') it is never 
allowable to say 'Socrates exists'. This has been taken as a classical defeating concept 
for the ontological argument, along the same lines as Kanfs34. The accusation 
traditionally levelled is that the theist wants to add 'existence' to the list of properties 
defining God - in the same way as adding 'omniscient' or 'omnipotent' - and Russell 
shows that 'existence' simply does not work in this way, since it cannot be ascribed to 
3° CPBR p.203 
31 CPBR p.204 
32 CPBR p.205 
33 CPBR p.205 
34 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1929) p.505 
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individuals, only to propositional functions. It has become common to shorten the 
entirety ofRussell's view, as regards its application to the ontological argument, to the 
idea that 'existence' is not a (first order) property, but is 'instantiation', or the (second 
order) property of'having an instance'; in other words, that 'xis F' is sometimes true. 
What repercussions does this view of existence have for the question of 
meaningfully ascribing existence to God? One might choose either to treat 'God' as a 
name, or as a concept. For our purposes (and this will be made even clearer in Chapter 
Ill), either option will reduce, on Russell's view, to thinking of God in terms of a set of 
properties, of which existence cannot be one. The question of predicating existence 
will become a question of whether a statement of that set picks out any individual in 
the world- whether, in other words, the statement 'xis omnipotent, omniscient etc.' is 
true for some x. 
The issue of meaningfulness seems to have been pushed back onto the analysis 
of the description or definition of God. For instance, one might choose to undertake an 
examination of each attribute in turn. Take omnipotence: if it was demonstrable that 
every possible interpretation of the attribute was self-contradictory, then it could be 
struck from the list. By processing each attribute in a similar manner, and taking into 
account the potential inconsistencies from holding several attributes simultaneously, 
one might come up with a list of 'logically acceptable Divine attributes'. What result 
would this achieve? One could, perhaps, say that this description (or, if one was bold, 
definition) represented a logically consistent model of a divine entity. This might 
provide the sought-after conclusion that to claim for this model that it was true for 
some x - was instantiated - could be considered meaningful, or at least was logically 
consistent, which implies some level of meaningfulness. It would not demonstrate that 
there was such an x, but then a demonstration of God's existence is not required; all 
that is needed is a demonstration that the instantiation of a list of attributes in one 
entity is a consistent and meaningful proposition. 
The problems that this poses will be brought into sharp relief, both when we 
examine McGinn, and in Chapter Ill. However, to hint at the issues in advance, the 
following points might be made. First, do we really want to say that 'God exists' is in 
fact "'x is{properties}" is sometimes true'? Take the formulation 'the God of Abraham, 
Issac and Jacob'. This indicates that a statement, to the effect that this entity exists, in 
fact means "'xis the God of Abraham, Issac and Jacob" is true for some x'. Does this 
really capture the essentials of what it is to say that that entity actually existed/exists 
and is not just a 'character' in the literature of an historical period? 
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Secondly, do we want to acquiesce to the demand that we need to define, or in 
some way thoroughly describe, 'God' before we can allow that 'God exists' is 
meaningful? It might be reasonable to require that we have 'some idea' of what we are 
talking about, but that is not the same thing. 
Finally, the implication of the overall structure is that we need to know what it 
is for an entity to be God, but the way this is cashed out is distinctly empirical in 
flavour. This is entirely compatible with Russell's philosophical approach, but is not 
compatible with traditional considerations of 'God', and it may go some way to 
explaining the intuitions which underlie any scepticism about 'God exists' being 
meaningful. With these points in mind, I shall go on to examine McGinn's position. 
McGinn contra Russell. 
I shall begin by sketching the 'orthodox position' as McGinn sees it. McGinn 
expresses Russell's model in three sub-theses35. The first is ontological. The content 
of it is the claim that existence is not a property which individuals instantiate, and that 
to say that x exists is to say that a propositional function has instances, or that a 
predicate gives a truth under certain substitutions. The second thesis is semantic. It 
argues that existence statements are higher-order statements referring to properties, 
concepts, predicates or propositional functions. The third is definitional. Existence, 
according to Russell, can always be paraphrased in terms of (a) a propositional 
function and (b) 'sometimes true', or 'possibility'. 
McGinn also notes several features of the Russellian view. One is that 
'Existence is what is expressed by the existential quantifier. '36 Another is that this is 
conceived as a function from first order concepts to truth values, and further that the 
assumption is always made that, for Russell, 'Existence always means "there is an x 
such that ... "'37 Finally, for Russell, 'In a perfect language, the word ['exists'] need 
never occur.'
38 
McGinn makes four objections to Russell's theory. The first is that the notion 
of existence is 'smuggled in', the second is that the Russellian analysis of 
properties/propositional functions themselves as abstract entities leads to vicious 
regress, the third is that there are sentences which resist Russell's paraphrasing, and the 
35 McGinn, Colin, 'Existence' in Logical Properties (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.lS-51. 
(Hereafter ELP.) p.l9-20 
36 ELP, p.20 
37 ELP, p.20 
38 ELP, p.20 
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fourth is that Russell's position holds 'bare existence' to be contradictory, without 
having a supporting argument. I shall deal with the objections in order, before moving 
on to McGinn's positive thesis. 
McGinn argues foremost that the notion of 'has instances' smuggles in the 
concept of existence. He takes first the objectual account of the term; that objects (in 
the broadest sense) are required as instances of a predicate. In other words, argues 
McGinn, for some F there are (exist) instances of F. How else could we cash out 'F 
has instances'? The Russellian paraphrase drives us to think of the property 'instances 
of F' as instantiated, but this leads to regress: 'there are (i.e. exist) instances of 
instances ofF'. Thus: 
If we say that 'planets exist' is true because 'Mars is a planet' is true and 
'Vulcan is a planet' is not, that can only be because 'Mars' refers to an existent 
object while 'Vulcan' does not. 39 
In other words, because Vulcan is not an actual planet (because it doesn't exist) it 
cannot count as a verifying instance. Yet it is a planet, conceptually, and the only 
reason there can be for it not being a verifying instance of 'planets exist' is its non-
existence. Therefore 'it must be existent things that instantiate the prope~0, and in 
this way existence is 'smuggled in'. 
McGinn also considers Russell's favoured substitutional approach (exemplified 
by "'x is a unicorn" is possible'). This, as we have seen, involves the need for true 
singular propositions or sentences as instances of a propositional function (for 
example, 'Ralph is a unicorn' would instantiate 'x is a unicorn', making it 
possible/sometimes true). McGinn asks what the truth conditions for such singular 
propositio~ are. 
Clearly we cannot allow 'Vulcan is a planet' to be a substitution instance [for ('xis a 
planet' is possible)], but that can only be because the referent of 'Vulcan' does not 
exist For a singular statement to be true in the sense needed is for there to be an 
object referred to by the singular term and for that object to satisfy the attached 
predicate.41 · 
The question, then, is what it is for a property to have instances. McGinn argues that 
the Russellian view of instantiation can be reduced to the non-Russellian phrase 
'among extant objects, there is one which is F'. One option which McGinn does not 
39 ELP, p.21 
40 ELP, p.22 
41 ELP, p.22 
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cover is that of viewing existence in tenns of extension. Emphasising this element of 
Russell's view, a property is instantiated if the set of things having the property does 
not have zero content. Ifthe set of'unicorn-ness' has no members, it has no extension~ 
thus, there are no unicorns. I anticipate that McGinn might respond to this by pointing 
out that the issue is ptished back onto the ontological status of those things which do or 
do not have the property- i.e. the truth-makers once again. So, one might argue that 
the set of 'unicorn-ness' has no extension just because no unicorns exist~ it is the lack 
of extant unicorns that make true the statement that such a set is empty. 
McGinn also argues that the problem is exacerbated by reliance upon classical 
fonnal logic to resolve issues such as the problem of existence, since the existential 
quantifier can be interpreted as containing a first level or a second level predicate; a 
more unusual first level predicate interpretation of (3x)Fx would take the fonn 'for 
some x, x exists and xis F'. The Russellian way of viewing it, however, is 'there is an 
x such that x is F', and this is very much embedded in the structure of basic fonnal 
logic. Thus, says McGinn, direct argument is the only solution; anything else simply 
brings latent assumptions into the argument as conclusions. 
His second major objection to the 'orthodox' view arises out of consideration 
of properties and propositional functions themselves, as abstract entities. He argues 
that Russell's view cannot provide an account of their existence, which one might wish 
to hold if one adhered to certain metaphysical (realist) views42 - indeed, one might 
point out that if one wished to let propositional functions do as much work as Russell 
seems to demand, a realist stance regarding them might be a reasonable request. 
The objection is that a Russellian view will result in a vicious infinite regress, 
in that no property will exist without the positing of a further property to fulfil the 
instantiation requirements; and this further property will be open to the same questions 
of existence, requiring another property, and so on. McGinn qualifies that this is 
problematic only in the explanatory context ('The problem here is not that the existence 
of any given property requires the existence of infinitely many other 
properties ... indeed, something like this appears to be manifestly true for the existence 
of numbers. '43). In the explanatory case, we seem to presuppose that we know what is 
involved for the explanans to exist, but not for the expianandum- yet both of these are 
properties, so that each explanans is also an explanandum ad infinitum. McGinn 
speculates that Russell and his adherents take the existence of properties as given, and 
42 Note that Russell can also be seen as holding a propositional theory of sentential meaning which would 
commit him to propositions as entities. 
43 ELP, p.25 n. 11 
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compares this to defending a thesis of existence as spatial occupancy, thereby refusing 
to treat the area of abstract objects 44. He observes that, if properties do not exist on this 
view, then individuals cannot exist. 45 
McGinn goes on to consider a third objection46, that of sentences resistant to 
the usual paraphrasing, such as 'something exists', or 'nothing exists'. These 
sentences are meaningful, but are more problematic than singular reference (to which 
we shall return in Chapter Ill) in that 'something', for example, has no referent. 
Consequently, there is no predicate to quantify over and sheer quantification by itself is 
meaningless. 
McGinn considers47 the option of 'something exists' meaning that 'something 
is self-identical' - (.3x)(x=x)- but highlights three problems: first that there seems to be 
no mention or indication of identity in 'something exists'. Secondly, that 'Venus 
exists' entails 'something exists', so if the latter means (.3x)(x=x), then the former must 
mean (.3x)(x=Venus). This means that singular existence statements assert identity 
with a named entity, which would require that we knew what it was for the entity to 
exist, and for us to refer to it, otherwise '=Vulcan' would secure existence by itself 
The third criticism which McGinn makes of defining 'something exists' as 'something 
is self-identical', is that self-identity tends towards being treated as a property itself, 
and this 'has precisely the kind of universality Russell found objectionable in a 
predicate of existence.t48 Presumably, one can then link this point to the criticism 
concerning the existence of properties. 
There is some consideration by McGinn of the argument for bifurcating 
existence between first order for singular statements and second order for general 
statements. However, this fails, according to McGinn, on the grounds that it would 
require that a first order predicate proposition would entail a second order predicate 
proposition~ for example, 'Terrence the tiger exists' entails 'at least one tiger exists', but 
there is no common term of existence between them. To spell this out, Terrence would 
have the property of existence, whereas 'x being a tiger' would be possible, and there 
44 However, it is worth noting again, I think, that Russell only takes as his simple, indefinable, terms 
'always true' and 'sometimes true'. This leaves us with three options: (i) that propositional functions are 
also simple and undefined, but Russell thinks this so obvious that he fails to mention it concerning 
existence, (ii) that he recognised the problem of abstract existence of propositional functions, but never 
solved it, or (iii) that Russell's view of language was such that the existence of propositional functions 
was a meaningless notion, with or without good reason. McGinn's criticism is of the first of these. As I 
have suggested, there is evidence that Russell would have supported propositions as entities, and 
therefore perhaps also propositional functions. However, cf p.l2 n.26 above. 
45 ELP,8 p.25-26 
46 ELP, p.26 
47 ELP, p.27 
48 ELP, p.27 n.l3 
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does not seem to be enough in common between these for it to make sense for the 
former to entail the latter. 
The last major objection that McGinn tables against the Russellian position is 
that it rules out as contradictory the notion of 'bare existence', i.e. something which 
exists but has no (other) properties. McGinn does not find this a prima facie 
impossibility - although he does express concern that it would imply that a thing could 
exist and yet not have the property of self-identity. However, he notes that self-
identity 'seems precisely the wrong kind of property to invoke'49 to defend Russell's 
position against bare existence, in view of previous arguments. Instead of pursuing 
this argument, he turns to an adjacent problem, that of the insistence of the orthodox 
position on each extant thing having a property unique to it, which is required in order 
to individuate objects. McGinn argues: 
But this implies that in every possible world in which an individual exists that 
individual has some property that no other individual has. Surely that is a very 
strong claim, and not one that we ought to be obliged to accept just by the 
simple analysis of the concept of existence. 50 
McGinn's argument amounts to three points: first, that a theory of existence 
should be neutral over the question of the identity of indiscernables; secondly, that 
existence should not necessarily attach to that property which is unique among the 
properties of an entity, and, thirdly, that the Russellian view is committed to holding as 
contradictory the existence of objects that are distinct in no way other than 
numerically51 . 
Having laid out all of these objections, McGinn goes on to provide a thesis for 
a first-order property view of existence. The intuitive point from which he starts is 
essentially that in using 'exists', we are separating extant entities from intentional 
entities; existence is a property common to all things which exist, in the same way that 
blueness is common to all blue things. This leads to the 'traditional question' of 
whether 'exists' is a paradigm property such as blue - the oddity being that we end up 
with blue things which do not exist, using the intuitive formulation. Therefore, one 
might choose to see McGinn's positive thesis as an attempted justification of allowing 
'blue non-extant things' as well as the problem-free 'existents which are not blue'. 
49 ELP, p.28 n.l4 
50 ELP, p.29 
51 In the case of existence 'attaching' to the unique property, I would argue that McGinn is conflating the 
means of distinguishing objects from the fact of their existence. It does not seem incorrect to say that on 
the Russellian view something exists if a set of properties is instantiated, and that it is a further matter to 
differentiate one set of properties from another. 
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The sub-theses of this position, corresponding to those in Russell's position, are 
as follows. Onto logically, existence is 'always and everywhere a property of objects'52. 
It holds of extant objects but not of all conceivable objects (in this respect it differs 
from what McGinn argues for the universal property of self-identity). Semantically, 
every occurrence of 'exists' is a logical predicate, and any existential statement can be 
analysed in terms of the predicate (this is also equivalent to the definitional thesis, 
inasmuch as the definitional collapses into the semantic). 
According to McGinn, the only objection that Russell put to the argument of 
existence as a first order predicate was that it was 'too universal' to be a property, and 
that if it were first-order, it would be impossible for it not to apply. McGinn points out 
that, first, this view rules out various logical properties as being first order (such as 'not 
being red and not red simultaneously'), and indeed that Russell relies on such a 
property for his own thesis: 'being an instance of a property'53. Secondly, he notes that 
it is clearly possible for 'existence' not to apply, since that is a major part of how we 
use the term - determining which conceivable objects exist and which do not54. He 
suggests that this refutes arguments of the sort proposed by D. F. Pears55, who claimed 
that true singular existential propositions must be trivial and false ones contradictory, 
since reference presupposes existence (we shall see in Chapter Ill that the 
entanglement of reference and existence must be examined much more thoroughly than 
this). McGinn goes on to treat two major areas using existence as a property: 
quantification and non-existence. 
In the area of quantification, McGinn argues for a re-assertion of the strict 
meanings of the quantifiers, which, he claims quite reasonably, have become confused. 
The proper meanings are 'for all' and 'for some' ("i/ and 3 respectively), but whilst the 
former has been kept clear of existential import (he uses the example of 'all men are 
mortal' and its embedded material conditional- i.e. 'but are there any men?'), the latter 
has become known as the existential quantifier and (3x)(Fx) has come to be translated 
'there is an x such that it is F' in many cases. McGinn's concern is that we recognise 
that two distinct concepts have been combined in this traditional interpretation: that of 
52 ELP, p.30 
53 Although, of course, Russell is taking 'sometimes true' as an undefined foundation. 
54 ELP, p. 31. This could be seen as a progression from the work of Gareth Evans (Varieties of Reference 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982)), who utilises a fictional/actual distinction, but who arguably 
comes unstuck with non-existence statements that do not seem to reference fiction- such as 'Vulcan' as a 
once-entertained scientific hypothesis. McGinn implicitly criticises Evans on p.22, where he argues that a 
fictional/literal distinction still presupposes a notion of existence. 
55 D. F. Pears, 'Is Existence a Predicate?' in Peter F. Strawson (ed.), Philosophical Logic (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1967) 
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partial quantification, and that of existential import. He considers three options for 
interpretation of 'for some x, x is F and x exists' with respect to the existential 
quantifier (3x). It is worth making clear that any interpretation will have to provide, at 
least implicitly, an account of each part- i.e. (i) 'for some x', (ii) 'xis F, (iii) 'x exists 
- and explain what ramifications follow for the ontology and semantics of the 
proposition. This is what gives force to McGinn' s protestation that we should not rely 
on our formal logic rules to solve the problem that he is positing; such a reliance 
assumes or discards too much of the present challenge. 
The first option canvassed is a Meinongian ontology, comprising both extant 
and subsistent entities. '3x' is then a conjunction, with 'for some x' having ontological 
import (and meaning, broadly, 'for a domain of existents and subsistents'). x exists' 
then restricts the ontological domain within this. Thus, (3x)(Ex & Fx) says that some 
entities both exist (rather than subsist) and are F. 
The second option is substitutional, with '3x' involving an explicit existence 
predicate conjoined with a substitutional quantifier. Therefore 'for some x' has no 
objectual role and says that we may substitute a term for 'x' that gives 'true' as the truth 
value of the whole construction. Therefore, 'for some x, x is F and x exists' becomes 'x 
is a tiger, and x exists is true if we replace x with Terrence', to take an example 
employing our handy zoological friend. 
The third option is to introduce what McGinn calls an 'intentional quantifier'56. 
This, lx, he uses to abbreviate 'some of the things we talk/think about'57• Existence is 
then appended 'in the usual way'58, which I take to mean the way in which a predicate 
such as 'blue' is appended. Consequently, we obtain 'lx, x is F and x exists', which 
translates into 'some of the things we talk/think about are both F and exist. '59 Although 
it is not explicit in the text, I take McGinn's thought to be that normal use of 3x could 
be understood as (lx & Ex). 
It is vital to note that, for McGinn, intentional objects neither exist nor subsist -
he considers this further when discussing non-existence - and that 'some' is purely 
quantificational. Further, existence is always a property of individuals, never of 
generalities. Thus, it is not the case that 'some tigers exist' means 'Ex' where x='some 
tigers' and E is the property of existence. Rather, it would be (I.x)(Tx & Ex). There are 
several other important clarificatory points made by McGinn. First, there can be a 
56 ELP, p.33 
57 ELP, p.33 
58 ELP, p.33 
59 ELP, p.33 
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universal and a partial intentional quantifier, and more importantly a disjunctive 
addition ('for some x we do not talk/think about', presumably60) allowing it to range 
over fictional objects and objects which exist but have not been referred to. He uses 
the example of 'a]] men are mortal'; this would become 'for all things we talk/think 
about, or that we do not, if they have the property of being a man then they have the 
property of being mortal', which comes out false in virtue of immortal fictional 
characters. 
Secondly, it is not aJlowed that we infer existence from anything, except from 
the predicate of existence itself 'Some' remains simply an expression of quantity, and 
only has existential import as a result of conversational implicature. Likewise, 'object' 
only has existential import from conversational implicature; McGinn argues that we 
can use phrases like 'objects of thought' without committing ourselves ontologically61 • 
On McGinn's view, we might choose to see a Meinongian ontology as arising partly 
out of a confusion over the actual force of conversational implicature. In response to 
Russell' view of the perfect language discarding existence, McGinn emphasises62 that 
his own view shows why we need existence in both normal and constructed language: 
'some' is true to its appearance, and does not contain 'exists'; the latter is required to 
differentiate properly between quantification and ontology. 
McGinn briefly notes a comparison between his own position and that of a free 
logic which removes existence assumptions from classical logic. Free logic primarily 
removes existential generalisation: Fa ~ (3x)(Fx) is disallowed. However, McGinn 
removes existence from partial quantification: Fa ~ (3x)(Fx) is allowed, but does not 
mean that anything exists. He uses the example of 'Sherlock Holmes is a detective ~ 
someone is a detective'; on his view, this someone is not explicitly extant. 
McGinn's Resolution ofNon-existence. 
McGinn then moves on to the issue of non-existence. He summarises his 
purpose as being to ensure that non-extant objects 'don't end up existing after allr63, in 
other words to avoid a so-called 'Meinongianjungle'. 
60 One might also suggest 'for some x which is either talked about or otherwise independently exists', 
although it is unlikely that McGinn would countenance placing existence per se in the quantifier at all. 
61 Although I presume that eventually this would entail some discussion of the ontological status of 
mental events. 
62 ELP, p.36 
63 ELP, p.37 
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The argument, which he outlines on the basis of his previous quantificational 
structure, is essentially that existence and non-existence are asymmetrical: There are 
mind independent extant entities, but there are no mind independent non-extant 
entities; thus 'non-existence is representation-dependent. Existence is not. r64 The 
supporting argument which he provides for this is a comparison with Meinongian 
ontology, specifically that Meinong would have entities subsisting before they were 
conceptualised by anyone. McG:inn sees this as the sticking point, and emphasises that 
for his theory individuation is reliant upon the content of the object itself for an extant 
object, but where an object is not extant, the only grounds for individuation are the 
ideas that are associated with an individual concept. Thus he says: 
The notion of an entity not existing that has no individual concept associated with it is 
ill-defined: what is it, precisely, that does not exist't5 
The form of general non-existence statements follows from this, and from the form of 
general existence statements; thus we obtain, for example, (Ix)(Tx & -.fu). 
Thus, McGinn seems to be arguing that it is the ideas that we associate with an 
intentional object that individuate that object; yet, one might say, (Ix)(Tx & -Et) seems 
to be a meaningful proposition which corresponds to our imagining a generic tiger - if, 
for example, they were extinct - and although the formula is in the form of a particular 
proposition suitable to McGinn's structure, it does seem to pick out at best a paradigm, 
as opposed to an individual. This gives an opportunity to clarify McGinn's thought: the 
point he is making is quite restricted, and is that in order to speak of an entity as not 
existing, we require at least one concept to characterise it. This does not prevent us 
from talking about generic tigers (we simply say, logically, that there is something that 
we talk/think about that has a tiger-ish property- i.e. particularise it), nor does it require 
that we have a specific fictional tiger in mind. It only requires that if we particularise 
the proposition of generic non-extant tigers, we employ one or more individual 
concepts. It should be noted that this does seem to rule out (Ix)(-.Ex), however it should 
likewise be noted that this is not equivalent to 'we think/talk about fictional things' but 
rather 'for some x we think/talk about, that x does not exist', giving rise to the question 
'what x does not exist?' 
McGinn concludes his argument with a re-affirmation that non-existence is what 
picks out a solely intentional object from any other object, and that this is how we use 
64 ELP, p.37 
6s ELP, p.38 n.24 
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the language of existence and non-existence in general; the classification of intentional 
objects as those which refer to a state of affairs in the world, or those which are solely 
intentional. 
McGinn's Resolution for Modal Objects 
It should be noted that McGinn, in common with the majority of 
metaphysicians, does not work with the same modal concepts as Russell did in 1914. 
The main difference is the introduction - primarily thanks to Kripke - of the conceptual 
apparatus of 'possible world semantics', which has led to the use of 'possible objects', 
and propositions being 'possible', as a short-hand for a certain way of viewing things. 
Thus, in the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy article 'modal logic', written by 
Graeme Forbes, we find, for instance, that 'to say that a proposition is possible, or 
possibly true, is to say that it is not necessarily false.... Equally, to say that a 
proposition is necessary, or necessarily true, is to deny that its negation is possible . .66 
The Russell of 1914 ('necessary, possible and impossible ... are properties of 
propositional functions. Propositions are only true or false,67) may not have been 
content with such a usage. Nevertheless, 'the solution [to the problem of truth-values 
for modal operators] is to regard 0 and 0 as quantifiers over entities called possible 
worlds... . D<p is then interpreted as saying that <p is true in all possible worlds, while Ocp 
is interpreted as saying that <p is true in at least one possible world. ,<;s It is with this 
structure in mind, and not Russell's, that we should assess McGinn's use of modal 
concepts; a 'possible object', for example, would broadly correspond to an element of 
the state-of-affairs that comprises one or more possible worlds, but not the actual world 
(i.e. a counterfactual object). Although I believe that a thorough critique of McGinn's 
work would not be complete without an exploration of the ramifications of his and 
Russell's differing concepts of modality, this is not a project that falls within the remit 
of this thesis. 
McGinn goes on to treat the topic of actual and possible objects, and whether 
they exist or not on his view. His concern is twofold. First, we should remember that 
non-existence is representation-dependent, whereas existence is independent of 
66 Graeme Forbes, 'Modal Logic', in Robert Audi (ed.) The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed. 1999), p.574- this is a well-known defining feature of 
the modal operators. 
67 CPBR, p. 203 
68 Forbes, 'Modal Logic', p.575 
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representation. McGinn notes that the representation-dependence of non-existence is a 
logically separate thesis to existence as a property; thus he must maintain these 
distinctions when accounting for modal issues. Secondly, he has constructed non-
existence as synonymous with (mind-dependent) intentional objects, and this must be 
likewise maintained. 
McGinn's strategy IS to take the claim that possible objects are mind-
independent, and argue that there is a class of intentional objects which are not coherent 
possible objects. Thus, he argues that Sherlock Holmes is not one coherent 
metaphysically possible entity, because there are so many different descriptions of 
Holmes in stories that there is a glut of potential possible objects - or a lack of a single 
consistent possible object69 - and therefore no definitive, coherent candidate for 
metaphysical possibility. This example is to be contrasted with that of a possible 
sibling, which McGinn argues is a concept which is a good candidate for coherent 
metaphysical possibility, and can be argued to be mind-independene0. 
McGinn is obliged to accept that possible objects exist (on grounds of mind-
independence), which he duly does by affirming the distinction of possible and actual, 
arguing that possible objects exist - but not actually. So, my possible sibling would 
have actually existed if he/she had been actual. Despite McGinn's protestations of 
separation of theses, I think that explanation of this can be aided through the idea of 
existence as a property, inasmuch as two lists of properties, of a possible entity and of 
an actual entity, could both include existence. Confusingly, McGinn has to attribute 
existence to a possible object, which can also be intentional; existence to an actual 
object, which can also be intentional (thought or spoken of); and non-existence to 
intentional objects which are neither possible nor actual. Since existence is a property, 
it seems to make sense to say that an object having it is possible or actual, and that 
consequently, in some sense, existence itself can be possible or actual, but it sounds 
dubious. 
To clarify this, let us take a potential objection. One might ask, what happens if 
we posit a possible non-extant entity? In other words, a possible entity which is an 
intentional, Sherlock Holmes-like object. McGinn's response would be that the entity 
must be either non-extant or possible; if it is an intentional object which is a candidate 
69 Depending on whether one sees each description ofHolmes as a separate object which may turn out to 
be the same object, or as different attempts to describe a presumed single object. In the former case, there 
could be interesting repercussions for vague identity. 
70 This does not, of course, preclude my constructing various fictitious siblings with various properties, 
and which would not exist, but this is a very different entity to that which is 'a possible sibling', which is 
a simpler, modal, concept. 
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for metaphysical possibility, then it cannot be non-extant, and if it is genuinely non-
extant, it is definitionally an intentional object, and cannot also be a possible object. 
The confusion comes in our tendency to think of possible objects as intentional, and to 
confuse non-existence with contingency, thereby misconstruing the relation between 
non-existence and possibility as one of synonymity, instead of exclusivity. McGinn 
points out once again that there is an asymmetry in the property of existence, which 
could be seen as the foundation of the confusion: 
generally, ifFness is a contingent property of objects, then so is non-Fness- but not so 
in the case of existence ... genuinely possible objects do exist, though not actually, 
while genuinely non-existent objects have that status necessarily. 71 
What, then, would be the difference between a possible object and a non-extant object, 
in a situation in which both are intentional (being thought/spoken of)? McGinn's 
response, I think, would be that the former is mind-independent, whilst the latter is 
mind-dependent. We must re-emphasise that if something relies on our ideas for 
individuation, then it doesn't exist. Returning to the quote above, we note that non-
existents have that status necessarily; i.e. if something does not actually exist, one 
cannot posit an extant possible entity by negating this (remember, we require at least 
one individual concept - 'what is it, precisely, that does not exist'). Possibilia are 
counterfactual; one takes an actual state of affairs and asks what would have been the 
case if it had been other than it was. I think that this is why possibilia are mind-
independent for McGinn; they are based in actual facts and entities. 
Although McGinn makes a strong defence of the position, I find myself unable 
to agree with him on the subject of modal entities. His argument is essentially that 'it 
seems wrong to insist that all possible objects must be conceived, because this makes 
possibility into a mind-dependent matter.' 72 Since he requires mind-independent 
possible objects, his only option is to have them exist, 'but not actually.'13 In Chapter 
Ill, I will argue from certain points in philosophy of language that McGinn (and indeed, 
my own derivative arguments) would be in a far stronger position if he gave up mind-
independence of modal entities. This would entail that modal entities are also 
representation-dependent, and the position demands an account of two things: first, the 
matter of distinguishing modal entities from entirely fictional ones (since there is clearly 
some difference), and secondly, a resolution of the problem with respect to McGinn's 
71 ELP, p.39 
72 ELP, p.38 
73 ELP, p.39 
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statement that non-existents have their non-extant status necessarily. I shall address 
these in order. 
McGinn asserts that it is contingent that what actually exists does exise4, and 
necessary that what is representation-dependent does not exist. I would argue that the 
solution to the modal problem is not to reject representation-dependence, saying that the 
coherency/consistency test determines which objects exist as possibilia, but to say that 
the coherency/consistency test determines which objects are contingently 
representation-dependent and which are necessarily representation-dependenl5. For 
example (assuming representation-dependence for both fictional and modal entities): 
Sherlock Holmes is not a candidate for metaphysical possibility (this is agreed), and so 
it is necessarily the case that Sherlock Holmes could not exist. My having had a sibling 
is presumably acceptable to McGinn as a candidate for metaphysical possibility; thus, 
'my sibling' does not correspond to a representation-dependent entity in every possible 
world, although it does in the actual world. So 'Sherlock Holmes exists' is false in 
every possible world and that entity does not indeed exist in the actual world, but 'Stuart 
Foyle's sibling exists' would be true for some possible world even though that entity 
does not exist in the actual world. 
This will clearly be incompatible with McGinn's assertion that 'genuinely non-
existent objects have that status necessarily'. Fortunately, the form of the assertion 
allows (without too much violence) that we read 'genuinely non-existent' as 'not a 
candidate for metaphysical possibility', thereby showing that the new distinction does 
not require extensive redevelopment ofMcGinn's overall position. 
I suggest that McGinn's example of the truth conditions for 'Vulcan does not 
exist' requires close attention to account for the new development. His alternatives are 
first that Vulcan is a possible object, and such do not exist; secondly, that Vulcan is a 
possible object and the proposition asserts its non-actuality, and, lastly, that Vulcan is 
not a possible object and the sentence affirms its intentional - non-extant - status. He 
proposes the last view to be correct. 
If the proposition had been 'Vulcan could have existed, and explained the 
eccentricities in the orbit of Mercury, but it turns out that Vulcan does not exist', then 
this would have made explicit that Vulcan is a case of failed intentionality - of 
hypothesis - and is necessarily non-extant. However, it also demonstrates the proximity 
of some modal entities to some fictional entities. If the proposition had been 'Venusa 
74 Putting aside ideas of God as a necessary being. 
75 I.e. where R is representation-dependence and E is the existence predicate: O(Rx-+ ....,Ex) does not 
forbid o-.Rx 
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does not exist', where Venus« is a possible entity which is two miles closer to the sun (in 
a possible world W) than Venus actually is, then McGinn would presumably urge that 
Venusa exists. How different is this really from the Vulcan hypothesis-example? The 
only pertinent difference seems to be that the hypothesis comes before the actual state of 
affairs, whereas the modal object comes after the state of affairs. Yet, on McGinn's 
view, modal objects are mind-independent, so surely it should not matter when (relative 
to our experience of a state of affairs) we think/speak of them? 
There appears to be a sliding scale between modal and fictional/hypothetical 
entities on McGinn's view that would give rise to an ontological 'grey area', and if this 
can be avoided it would seem best to do so; for example, I suggest that McGinn would 
support 'Pegasus does not exist' and 'A winged horse is a modal entity', but say that the 
latter exists whilst the former does not. I would say that neither of them exists, but for 
the latter this is contingent. The issue is whether or not an entity is a candidate for 
metaphysical possibility, and as we have seen there is no intrinsic demand in this for a 
directly ontological element. The test should determine whether something which does 
not exist could have existed, rather than whether something exists or not. 
McGinn appeals to the need for precision in our treatment of such modal entities 
when he states that 
There may be an element of stipulation in this way of talking, but it serves to protect 
what otherwise seems a compelling thesis, namely the identification of non-existence 
with merely intentional objects. 76 
However, I would argue that the modifications which I have suggested remove much of 
the need for such stipulation, in favour of treating ontological and modal elements in a 
fashion more in keeping with their respective characters. We know that modal entities 
by definition are not to be found in the actual world, but might have been, so why allot 
them a property which has been defined as describing objects found in the actual world, 
when what we want to say is that they might have had this property? 
McGinn considers impossible objects as a counter-example to his arguments. A 
round square, he offers, can be considered as a mind-independent necessary non-
existent. A round square is an impossible object regardless of anyone thinking about it; 
does this make it a mind-independent non-extant object? The answer McGinn supplies 
is that impossible objects have the property of existence qua modal object, but can 
never have the property in actuality. An impossible object could never be actual. 
76 ELP, p.39 n.26 
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McGinn, I think, muddies the waters by attempting to head off accusations of Holmes 
being an impossible object and consequently existing after all. He endeavours to argue 
for extant and non-extant impossible objects, and I think that what he means to say is 
that Holmes' impossibility follows on from his non-existence conjoined with his 
inability to be metaphysically possible (from his indeterminate individuation), whereas 
the existence of a round square follows on from its conceptually determined 
individuation, and its impossibility is a separate consequence of its inability to be 
actualised. 
Once again, I would argue that the modifications suggested above remove a 
source of confusion and streamline the argument. On my account, neither Holmes nor 
the round square exists, and for both of them their non-existence is necessary. For 
Holmes the reason is that he is representation-dependent in all possible worlds -
because he lacks determinate individuation. For the round square, the reason is also that 
it is representation-dependent in every possible world - but because a mental act is 
required to conjoin the properties 'round' and 'square' (i.e. they will never be found 
conjoined in any world). 
A summary of the ontological ground covered may be a welcome interjection at 
this point. I shall incorporate the alterations that were made above into the synopsis. 
The primary distinction is that what is mind-independent exists, and what is mind-
dependent does not exist. This captures the way that we use language, particularly in 
discussing what exists and what does not. 
Sometimes, we construct a mind-dependent entity in such a particular way that it 
represents a way the actual world could have been; it does not actually exist, but it could 
have done. Consequently it is contingent that we made it up (that it does not exist), and 
we can specify a state of affairs wherein assertions of its existence could have come out 
'true'. Other mind-dependent entities are not constructed in this way, and would be 
made up by us in every possible world; there is no state of affairs wherein assertions of 
their existence could come out 'true'. 
I shall now move on to McGinn's subsequent consideration of the ascription of 
properties to intentional objects. What occurs in this process, and is it really allowable? 
He argues that it is something that we clearly do; something does not have to exist for 
us to ascribe a property to it, in a similar way to that in which something does not have 
to be actual for a property to be ascribed to it (hence possibilia). He says that 'as a 
general rule, intentional objects have just those properties our mental acts confer on 
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them'77. For the important sub-class of fiction, McGinn is more specific: 'In the case of 
fictional objects, the origin and foundation of their properties is the story that refers to 
them.'78 
What, however, is the analysis of an object failing to exist; what does predication 
mean in this context? That which makes a proposition predicating existence of x true is 
simply x having the property of existence, but that which makes a proposition 
predicating non-existence of x true is a case of failed intentionality. To explain his 
point, McGinn takes the cases of fiction and empirical postulation. In the former, we 
say 'it is a pretence that x exists', and in the latter 'it was a mistaken postulation that x 
exists'. The key concept is 'an entertaining of existence.' 79 Existence, on the other 
hand, is not intrinsically about successful intentional statements; it is about something 
having a property independent of our intentionality. Thus 'assertions of non-existence 
really are statements about mental acts, just as the representation-dependence thesis 
suggests. ' 80 
This makes non-existence radically different from other properties and their 
negations; it is asymmetrical. McGinn speculates that this is the root of our discomfort 
over the treatment of existence as a property. To say that something is not blue is not to 
say that we think of it as blue but are wrong; non-existence, on the other hand, 'really 
does have a lot more to do with misfirings of the mind. ' 81 I find this to be compatible 
with my alterations for modal entities. 
McGinn finally considers an objection to his view which Russell might have 
made from a strongly empiricist position. The essence of the point is that one cannot 
perceive existence as a property of objects; it does not, as it were, form part of our 
sense-data. How can it be a proper property, therefore? McGinn argues that this points 
to the reason why scepticism about the external world is possible: simply, because we 
cannot treat existence as a sense-data-type property but only assume or infer it. 
Blueness, squareness, vanilla-ness all make a difference to sense-data, but we can be 
induced to hallucinate experiences of all of these, and so they can be extant or non-
extant without our being able to verify them as such. The empiricist's objection is not 
so much a proof against existence being a property, as an explanation of why we have 
all sorts of problems verifying what objects have it as a property. 
77 ELP, p. 42 
78 ELP, p. 42 
79 ELP, p. 43 
80 ELP, p. 43 
81 ELP, p. 44 
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McGinn' s v1ew of existence giVes us a new option m thinking about the 
meaningfulness of 'God exists'. It can now be used as a property of objects, not of 
properties, which suggests that 'God exists' could be treated as a subject-predicate 
sentence after all. Needless to say, this would have repercussions for the ontological 
argument and makes it even more important to investigate whether ontological 
arguments could have something vital to say about the meaningfulness of 'God exists'. 
However, McGinn appends some comments concerning ontological arguments to his 
chapter on existence, and these sharpen the focus of the present enquiry, as we shall see. 
McGinn's Comments on the Ontological Argument. 
McGinn goes on to make some remarks concerning the ontological argument, 
since, as he points out, he must be committed to saying that existence can act as a first-
order property which can be appended to an entity - i.e. he must fault the original 
criticism of the ontological argument. His treatment of the ontological argument is 
separable into three criticisms of the view that the logical status of 'exists' is grounds 
for dismissing the argument, and a suggestion for a better-structured critique of the 
argument. 
McGinn's first point is that it seems odd to claim the fallacy of the argument to 
be nothing more substantive than a simple error of the order of a logical predicate 'as if 
we just hadn't noticed that "exists" is logically on a par with "numerous"'82; surely such 
a long-lived and at times complex argument would not have got off the ground if this 
were the foundation of it. 
The second, and more fascinating, point is that McGinn sees no problem with 
reformulating the basic structure of the argument to encompass the Russellian second-
order use of 'exists'. 
Thus we can ask whether it is a part of God's definition that his attributes must have at 
least one instance ... the concept 'perfect being' has to have an instance, or else it would 
not be the concept it purports to be. 83 
Finally, McGinn notes that there are so-called 'parody arguments' which assert 
the non-existence of a most imperfect conceivable being; he urges that whatever is 
wrong with the arguments must be independent of the logical status of' exists'. 
82 ELP, p.48 
83 ELP, p.49 
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McGinn makes several suggestions about critical approaches to the ontological 
argument. He begins by questioning the notion of existence as a perfection and non-
existence as an imperfection, but argues that the idea of perfection can be removed from 
the argument and other definitional concepts used instead (he cites 'most impressive' 
and 'most powerful'). Consequently, he turns his attention to the concepts involved in 
the ontological argument. 
For McGinn, allowing God the property of existence IS not problematic, 
provided that the definition of 'God' justifies the attribution. 
The problem with the [ontological argument] ... is that it trades on notions of the 
maximal forms of certain attributes, particularly perfection, that are inherently ill-
defined.84 
The key, then, for McGinn, is that conceivability and maximal attributes do not 
combine in such a way as to make sense: 
We can make sense of being the most perfect being that exists, and we know what 
conceivability is, so we think we know what is meant by combining them .... We just 
don't know what it would be to be the most perfect conceivable [item of a given type]. 85 
He uses the example of a most impressive conceivable daisy to illustrate his point; the 
ontological argument seems to be an obvious case of conjoining several concepts, of 
which we think we know the meaning - superiority, conceivability, perfection, 
existence, power - and thinking that the result is also meaningful and well-defined. 
McGinn does not explicitly argue this, but I think that at least part of his 
criticism stems from the issues of conceptual individuation discussed above (p.24). If 
there is no well-defined individual concept, then we cannot individuate an entity. If an 
entity individuates itself (by existing) we cannot refer to it without a suitable concept. 
This makes it difficult to predicate existence of it in either case (i.e. truly or falsely). 
However, what McGinn does not argue, which one might expect him to, is that his 
I 
criticism of the ontological argument makes God a fictitious entity which consequently 
does not exist. If he had argued, or even implied, that the problem with God qua well-
defined is that there are too many descriptions and individual concepts vying for 
coherent individuation, then God would be a Sherlock Holmes-type fictional entity. Yet 
McGinn's argument seems to imply more that there is a lacking individual concept 
84 ELP, p.50 
85 ELP, p.50 
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which is well-defined. If this is correct, then it is also not possible successfully to argue 
that God does not exist ('what is it, precisely, that does not exist?'86). 
What options are now available for the meaningfulness of 'God exists'? On the 
surface, they seem to be as follows. 'God exists' can be treated as a subject-predicate 
sentence, but McGinn has issued a challenge on the concept of the subject; the sort of 
concepts found in ontological arguments, he contends, do not warrant the attributing of 
existence, and even cast doubt on the meaningfulness of 'God'. So, if we assumed that 
'God' would never have a definition that is well-defined for McGinn in such a way as to 
warrant appending 'exists' then this would lead to the conclusion that 'God exists' is 
not logically meaningful. Alternatives must be found. 
First, we could look for an alternative to 'greatest conceivable being' that is 
acceptable to McGinn as well-defined87. For instance, could we argue that, ifMcGinn's 
point is well-definedness, and he says that 'we can make sense of "the most perfect 
being that exists"'88, then this resolves the matter? For we know that 'we can let God 
have that property [of existence] so long as his definition really warrants it. ' 89 It 
consequently might seem acceptable to McGinn to say that in some sense God is 
( defmitionally) the most perfect being that exists. This provides a parallel with 
Augustine, when he argues in De Libero Arbitrio ll ii §590 that if anything is higher than 
eternal truth it is God, but otherwise truth itself is God. In this case, however, we are 
arguing that whatever is the most perfect extant being is God; if God (as we think of 
God) actually exists, then He is this entity, otherwise whichever being is the most perfect 
extant, is that which is in fact 'God'. 
There are evident problems with this approach (aside from the fact that it 
produces 'the most perfect extant being exists'- i.e. meaningful, but a tautology- if we 
apply it to 'God exists'). The main one is that it is referentially arbitrary. Do we want 
to countenance some specific, contingent, epistemically transparent entity 'becoming' 
God? If it was demonstrable that the most perfect extant being was a South American 
tree, for example? Or if reference to God turned out to be reference to different things 
at different times; for instance, if the tree dies and an elephant takes its place as most 
perfect extant being? It would appear that one requires either ostensive proof of God's 
86 ELP, p.38 
87 Note that this is in many ways parallel to the 'list of attributes' quest resulting from the Russellian 
view, in that the method described of finding a 'model' of God that is logically consistent would be one 
way of going about this option. 
88 ELP, p.SO 
89 ELP, p.SO 
90 Cited by M. I. Charlesworth, St. Anselm 's Pros/ogion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), p.55, 
from the translation M. Pontifex, The Problem of Free Choice, (London, 1955), p77-78 
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existence, or an understanding of 'most perfect extant being' that removes the 
possibility that a tree or an elephant could correspond to it. This effectively means 
looking for another concept of God, and this again means submitting it to McGinn's 
challenge. However, it also hints at the problems of meaning and reference that will 
have to be addressed, and to which we shall return frequently - particularly in Chapter 
Ill. 
Secondly, we could argue against McGinn that 'greatest conceivable being' is 
logically meaningful after all, or that it leads to a concept which is, in the context of the 
Ontological Argument; this would not immediately validate the ontological argument, 
since there are many other criticisms that McGinn does not assess, but it might secure 
meaningfulness for 'God exists'. In other words, we could accept McGinn's challenge 
and find a concept to satisfY it. I shall follow this path in Chapter II, with an 
examination of Anselm' Proslogion- although, as we shall see, it leads us inexorably 
back to issues of meaning and reference, and contributes vitally to them. 
Finally, we could reject McGinn's challenge, arguing that his basis for it is 
flawed. We could argue that it should be possible for 'God exists' to be meaningful in 
the same way that 'Adolf Hitler exists' is meaningful even when we do not have a 
'well-defined concept' for Adolf Hitler - i.e. because it predicates a property of a 
referent- arguing that McGinn's challenge presupposes a position in the philosophy of 
language which may be questioned. It should be noted that in the proceeding chapters, 
we should not discard arguments for the meaningfulness of 'God exists' if they imply 
that 'God exists' is a case of failed intentionality on a McGinnian view of existence. 
This would not make the assertion 'God exists' meaningless, simply false. This has 
particular application to some points arising from discussion of Anselm's Proslogion, 
since my concern is not to 'prove' it, but to use it to explore how 'God exists' may be 
considered meaningful. 
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Chapter 11: Anselm 's Legacy 
In the previous chapter, we saw that McGinn had developed a compelling model 
of existence as a logical predicate and property of objects. However, accompanying 
this improvement on the Russellian conditions for the meaningfulness of 'God exists' 
was a challenge from McGinn concerning the concept of 'God'. He required a well-
defined concept for 'God' before he would allow the proposition 'God exists' to be 
formed. In particular, McGinn criticised ontological arguments for employing a 
concept for 'God' that was ill-defined - the greatest conceivable, or most perfect 
conceivable, object. In this chapter, I shall examine Anselm's Proslogion, probably the 
most long-lived, redeveloped and hotly debated instance of an 'ontological argument', to 
see whether McGinn's challenge is justified, and whether it can be met through an 
understanding of Anselm's thought. 
Why move to Anselm and not to Descartes, given McGinn' s freeing-up of the 
'existence as a predicate' point? Several reasons. First, Descartes' formulation seems 
to be a prime contender to run into the arms of the criticisms McGinn's view can bring 
to bear, from clear and distinct perception of the idea of the most perfect being, through 
the use of perfection in maximal attribution, to the conceivability of the entire structure 
in the first place. Anselm, on the other hand, provides more options. Quite apart from 
the scholarly debate as to what, exactly, is going on in the Proslogion, Anselm's work 
as a whole is concerned with the sort of issues in which we have an interest - i.e. 
talking about God. Descartes provides less room for manoeuvre in background 
analysis. 
Furthermore, the objectives of Anselm and Descartes are quite different. 
Descartes requires God as a non-deceiving entity that is other than himselfl1; at the end 
of the day, Descartes needs knowledge of the external world. Anselm- however we 
read him - wants to say something about God (including that God exists), and what 
McGinn's arguments have introduced is a challenge on that point~ if our concept of God 
is not well-defined, and we do not know what it would be for a being to be God, we 
cannot talk of that being as existing or not existing as far as McGinn is concerned. 
Perhaps equally important is the fact that Anselm and McGinn share the feature 
of language as a root of their arguments, suggesting that greater clarity may be available 
91 Indeed, there is some question as to whether he even succeeds in this respect; see Donald Gotterbam, 
'An Equivocation in Descartes' Prooffor Knowledge of the External World', Idealistic Studies 1 (1971), 
p.142-148. 
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in a dialogue between them than between, say, McGinn and Descartes. McGinn has his 
intentional quantifier, objects of language/thought, and most of the points made in 
discussion of ontological arguments, whilst Anselm claims that for his argument to 
work- even for the Fool- all that is required is to 'speak the words'. Indeed, as we shall 
see later on, there are many further points to be noted concerning Anselm's 'philosophy 
of language'. 
In what follows, I hope to do three things. I first aim to provide an outline of 
the most notable points of scholarship concerning the Proslogion. There has been a 
great deal of debate over the work and consequently some consideration is required of 
the differing views if one is to be fair both to Anselm and to subsequent scholars. 
Although I do not claim to make a complete resolution on all points, I hope to draw out 
what might reasonably be said and what cannot be accepted without doing violence to 
Anselm or his works. It is important to do this because applying McGinn's challenge to 
one 'model' of Anselm' s thought could have very different results from applying it to a 
separate model. 
Secondly, I shall examine Anselm's philosophy of language and the theology 
that complements it, which I think provides a far stronger insight into his thought. In 
this, I aim to accomplish two things: something more of a resolution concerning what 
Anselm does in the Proslogion, including the thought which underlies it, and 
consequently to develop Anselm's concept of God such that it can be compared with 
McGinn' s criticisms. 
Finally, I shall ask how much damage is done to Anselm by McGinn's argument 
that 'we don't know what it would be for such a being to exist'. I shall also look at 
Richard Campbell's treatment of a very similar objection to McGinn's, assessing the 
success of his response. All of these points will lead to some surprising conclusions, 
both for Anselm's project and for my own; however, it will be seen that the analysis of 
the Proslogion is central to understanding Anselm's view of language, and the latter is 
in turn essential to developing the arguments of this thesis. 
Since much of the discussion of Anselm's Proslogion centres around Proslogion 
II-IV, I quote this extract below for ready reference. 
[II] Well then, Lord, You who give understanding to faith, grant me that I may 
understand, as much as You see fit, that You exist as we believe You to exist, and that 
you are what we believe You to be. Now we believe that You are something than 
which nothing greater can be thought. Or can it be that a thing of such a nature does not 
exist, since 'the Fool has said in his heart, there is no God'? But surely, when this same 
Fool hears what I am speaking about, namely, something-than-which-nothing-greater-
can-be-thought', he understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his mind, 
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even if he does not understand that it exists. For it is one thing for an object to exist in 
the mind, and another thing to understand that an object actually exists. Thus, when a 
painter plans beforehand what he is going to execute, he has [the picture] in his mind, 
but he does not yet think that it actually exists because he has not yet executed it. 
However, when he has actually painted it, then he both has it in his mind and 
understands that it exists because he has now made it. Even the Fool, then, is forced to 
agree that something-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists in the mind, since 
he understands this when he hears it, and whatever is understood is in the mind. And 
surely that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought cannot exist in the mind alone. For 
if it exists solely in the mind, it can be thought to exist in reality also, which is greater. 
If then that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists in the mind alone, this same 
that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought is that-than-which-a-greater-can-be-
thought. But this is obviously impossible. Therefore there is absolutely no doubt that 
something-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists both in the mind and in 
reality. 
[ill] And certainly this being so truly exists that it cannot be even thought not to 
exist. For something can be thought to exist that cannot be thought not to exist Hence 
if that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought can be thought not to exist then that-
than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought is not the same as that-than-which-a-greater-
cannot-be-thought, which is absurd. Something-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-
thought exists so truly then, that it cannot even be thought not to exist. 
And You, Lord our God, are this being. You exist so truly, Lord my God, that 
You cannot even be thought not to exist. And this is as it should be, for if some 
intelligence could think of something better than You, the creature would be above its 
creator, and would judge its creator - and that is completely absurd. In fact, everything 
else there is, except You alone, can be thought of as not existing. You alone, then, of 
all things most truly exist and therefore of all things possess existence to the highest 
degree; for anything else does not exist as truly, and so possesses existence to a lesser 
degree. Why then did 'the Fool say in his heart, there is no God' when it is so evident to 
any rational mind that You of all things exist to the highest degree? Why indeed, unless 
because he was stupid and a fool? 
[IV] How indeed has he 'said in his heart' what he could not think; or how could 
he not think what he 'said in his heart', since to 'say in one's heart' and to 'think' are the 
same? But if he really (indeed, since he really) both thought because he 'said in his 
heart' and did not 'say in his heart' because he could not think, there is not only one 
sense in which something is 'said in one's heart' or thought. For in one sense a thing is 
thought when the word signifying it is thought; in another sense when the very object 
which the thing is is understood. In the first sense, then, God can be thought not to 
exist, but not at all in the second sense. No one, indeed, understanding what God is can 
think that God does not exist, even though he may say these words in his heart either 
without any [objective] signification or with some peculiar signification. For God is 
that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought. Whoever really understands this 
understands clearly that this same being so exists that not even in thought can it not 
exist. Thus, whoever understands that God exists in such a way cannot think of him as 
not existing. 
I give thanks, good Lord, I give thanks to You, since what I believed before 
through Your free gift I now so understand through your illumination, that if I did not 
want to believe that You existed, I should nevertheless be unable not to understand it. 92 
It has been variously noted that the argument was not originally divided into 
chapters, but that 'chapters' were listed at the beginning of the manuscript, 
92 Anselm, Proslogion, trans. M.J. Charlesworth, in Charlesworth, St. Anselm 's Proslogion, p.117-121 
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corresponding to marginalia, as a means of quick reference for readers. 93 Consequently, 
I have printed the extract without full chapter divisions. There have been several 
opinions expressed as to how many and what length of arguments are employed by 
Anselm. Early research tended to concentrate upon 'chapter two' as the proof of God's 
existence; subsequently, it was suggested that the first part of 'chapter three' was an 
alternative superior form of this argument which demonstrated God's necessary 
existence94. At the same time as Plantinga was famously developing a modal form of 
ontological argument from that starting point, a new turn of research suggested that 
'chapters' two and three were three stages of a single argument, whilst one scholar 
claimed that the single argument was not in fact properly begun until Pros/ogion V95• I 
shall present below what I take to be the best arguments concerning the structure of the 
Proslogion, although the focus of that which follows will be the need to respond to 
McGinn's points. Nevertheless, some overall view is essential for placing the 
arguments in context. 
McGill observes that there are three angles that have been taken in interpreting 
Anselm's Proslogion; those of the rational Anselm, the Anselm of faith and the mystical 
Anselm96. Arguments of the first camp attempt to portray Anselm as wishing to provide 
a straight rational proof of God's existence accessible to all; arguments of the second 
camp contend that Anselm is working within the faith, presupposes God's existence, and 
wishes to provide a fuller understanding of God. The third camp, represented most 
strongly (if not entirely) by Stolz97, believes that Anselm is engaged in a search for an 
experience of God. It should be noted at the outset that, with respect to McGinn's 
challenge, all of these angles (whether exclusively or partially correct) must contend 
with the same challenge if they claim that Anselm is working with 'something-/that-
than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought' as a meaning, concept, or definition of 
'God'. 
93 E.g. Anslem Stolz, 'Anselm's Theology in theProslogion' in J. Hick & Arthur C. McGill (ed.) The 
Many-Faced Argument (London: Macmillan Press, 1968), p.205 citing a letter from Fr. Francis S. 
Schmitt 
94 See Arthur C. McGill, 'Recent Discussions of the Argument' in J. Hick & Arthur C. McGill (ed.) The 
Many-Faced Argument, p.39 
95 Richard J. Campbell, From Belief to Understanding: A Study of Anse/m 's Proslogion Argument on the 
Existence of God (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1976), p.21, identifies R La Croix as 
having argued this. 
% McGill, 'Recent Discussions', p.S0-51 
97 Stolz, 'Anselm's Theology', p.185-186 provides the clearest statement 
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Anselm: Faith or Reason? 
I shall consider each of the three views in turn, evaluating their evidence and 
arguments. First, I shall examine the arguments for the rationalistic Anselm. Scholars 
have pointed to Anselm's overall respect for reason; his immediately prior work, the 
Monologion, he describes as being purposed to demonstrate certain truths about God by 
reason, and not by reliance on Scriptural or Church authority98. Further, in the same 
text he says 
If someone - either because he has not heard or does not believe - is ignorant of the one 
supreme nature . . . and of the many other matters which we necessarily believe about 
God and his creatures, I think that such a person, even if he has only a mediocre mind, 
can still in a large measure convince himself of these by reason alone.99 
Indeed, in the Epistola de Incarnatione verbi he states that the Proslogion aims to prove 
Christian beliefs concerning God 'by necessary reasons without the authority of 
Scripture'100• Likewise, in many of his other works, particularly the Cur Deus Homo?, 
Anselm places his trust and effort in the realm of reason. More importantly, his 
approach to heretics and schismatics is to attack their reason and to propound doctrine 
by rational progress from what all can accept to what they claim they cannot; for 
instance, against Roscelin, 'his error must be demonstrated by the very reason on which 
he relies'101 . His biographer Eadmer wrote, of the Monologion, 'he inquired and 
discovered by reason alone what God is.'102 
Again, with respect to the Proslogion itself, evidence can be found in his use of 
the formulation that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought and his claim that it is 
accessible to anyone, and in his reply to Gaunilo where he provides an account of it 
formed from non-Christian premises103. 
As McGill observes104, there is a problem in the rationalistic interpretation of 
Anselm, in that he often makes reference to the primacy of faith. He canvasses two 
responses to this from rationalistic interpreters. The first is that Anselm's 'faith' is 
98 We also know that Lanfranc was concerned about this emphasis on reason; see Southern Saint Anselm: 
A Portrait in a Landscape (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) p.119 for example. 
99 Monologion I (1.13.5-11), cited by.McGill, 'Recent Discussions', p.51. All such bracketed references 
refer to Dom Francis de Sales Schmitt (ed.) Opera Omnia, 5 volumes (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson, 1945-
1951) 
100 Anselm, Epistola de Jncarnatione verbi VI (II. 20.17-19) 
101 Epist. De Incarn. Verbi ll (ll. 11.5-8) 
102 McGil~ 'Recent Discussions', p.54-55. Note that McGill cites this without observing its scope (i.e. 
Monologion) 
103 Anselm, Reply VII in Charlesworth, St. Anselm 's Proslogion, p.187 
104 McGill, 'Recent Discussions', p.55 
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rectitude voluntatis, or 'right willing' - in other words 'wanting what the faith teaches 
and seeking it with humility and purity ofheart.'105 Such right willing is received from 
God, and precedes Christian understanding only in so much as it precedes the making of 
what is understood by reason a part of Christian life - i.e. it precedes a Christian form of 
life, but not a rational understanding of Christian intellectual propositions. 
The mind's conceiving [of the meaning of the preacher's words] by itself does not 
produce faith . . . but faith is produced through grace, when rectitude of will is added to 
conceiving. 106 
The second response is to claim that in practice Anselm is 'rationalist' in an 
Aristotelian fashion but that this overlaps with older patristic notion of theology, leading 
him occasionally to portray his work in those terms107• 
Having now presented the evidence for the rationalistic Anselm, I shall consider 
the opposing arguments for the Anselm of faith. Scholars have pointed to passages 
insisting on the primacy of faith, particularly his views expressing the need to believe in 
Christian doctrines before going on to examine and achieve understanding of them. In 
several places, Anselm argues that sin (particularly original sin) darkens the reason, a 
major example being his statement in Cur Deus Homo? that 'the right order demands 
that we must first believe the deep matters of the Christian faith before we presume to 
examine them by means of reason.'108 More persuasively still, the Proslogion itself 
seems to claim that it is 'faith seeking understanding'109• He also says 
Certainly if I, a contemptible little man, attempt to write something to reinforce the 
strength of the Christian faith, as if it needed my defence with so many wise and holy 
men present everywhere, we may preswne that I will definitely appear, and be judged to 
be, ridiculous.uo 
The key theologian involved in propounding the 'Anselm of faith' has been Karl 
Barth111 . Earth's salient arguments can be given in several points. Primarily, he argues 
105 McGiiL 'Recent Discussions', p.55. McGill cites Epist. De Incam. Verbi, rev. ed. I (II. 7.10 - 9.19), De 
Concordia praesc. Ill.2 (II. 264.26- 265.7) and AdolfKopling, Anselms Proslogion-Beweis der Existenz 
Gottes im Zusammenghang seines spekulativen Programms: Fides Quaerens Intellectum (Bonn: 
Hanstein, 1939), p. 15-20 
106 De Concordia praesc. III.6 (II. 271.7-9) 
107 McGill cites Charlesworth, St. Anselm 's Proslogion, p.34-40 and Dom Vagaggini's remarks in 
S!/sicilegium Becccense (Paris: J. Vrin, 1959), p.l 06 
1 8 Cur Deus Homo? I. I (II.48.16f), cited in McGill p.57 
109 Proslogion I in Charlesworth, St. Anselm 's Proslogion, p.lll-5 
110 Epist. De Incam. Verbi, rev. ed., I (115.7-19), cited in McGill p.58 
lll See Karl Barth, Anselm: Fides quaerens intellectum, trans. Ian Robertson (London: SCM Press and 
Richmond, V a.: John Knox Press, 1960), re-printed in John Hick and Arthur C. McGill ( eds.) The MaJTy-
FacedArgument. Page references are to this re-print. 
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that Anselm is interested in proving the existence of God and then the nature of God, by 
presupposing a 'Name of God' 112 (i.e. that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought). 
Secondly, Barth argues that this concept says who God is, couched 'in the form of a 
prohibition that man can understand'113; it is consequently not a definition114. Indeed, a 
second premise is required: some concept of God's existence and Nature attained from 
another (presumably revelatory) source. In summary, therefore, Anselm's formula 
. . . is a genuine description (significatio ), a Name of God, selected from among the 
various revealed Names of God for this occasion and for this particular purpose, in such 
a way that to reach a knowledge of God, the revelation of this same God from some 
other source is clearly assumed. All that can possibly be expected from this Name is 
that, in conformity with the program of Anselm's theology, it should demonstrate that 
between the Name of God and the revelation ofhis Existence and Nature from the other 
source there exists a strong and discernable connection. Only in that way and to that 
extent will statements about the existence and Nature of God inevitably follow from an 
understanding ofthis Name.Il5 
Subsequently, Barth provides further evidence for his model, first by citing the 
'introduction' of the formula in Proslogion ll ('and we believe that You are ... '116), then 
by citing Anselm's reply to Gaunilo concerning the challenged validity of the formula ('I 
use your faith and conscience as a most certain argument that this is false'117). He then 
reaffirms both that the Name of God is an article of faith, and that the context of the 
naming is of a creature/Creator relationship which prohibits, through the content of 
faith, conceiving of a greater being. Barth places the absurdity of the reductio in the 
absurdity of the creature thinking above the Creator. 118 
McGill notes that Barth's thesis concerning the Fool is that Anselm refuses to 
have anything to do with him; the Fool and the believer 'march along side by side with 
nothing in common, and once this is recognised, they can both save themselves all the 
trouble and excitement involved.'119 McGill recounts that the basics of the Barthian line 
have been well-received by many scholars, but that it has been argued to ignore the 
evidence from the rationalistic camp. Certain scholars have argued that '[Anselm's] 
search for the intellectus fidei will not be true or complete as long as it excludes the 
112 Barth, Fides, p.ll9 
113 Barth, Fides, p .121 
l1 4 cfCampbell's arguments p.(below) concerning whether Anselm argues from a definition. 
115 Barth, Fides, p.l21 
116 Proslogion II, Charlseworth, St, Amelm :5 Proslogion, p. 117 
117 Reply I, Charlseworth, St. Anselm 's Proslogion, p.l70 
118 McGill p.l23, cfCampbell's more explicit reasoning later w.r.t. m part ii. 
l19 McGill p.63 n.IOS, citing Ian Robertson's translation ofBarth, Fides, p.65 (see n.lll above) 
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fool' 120; thus the Proslogion can be seen as an 'advertisement' for God's revelation, but 
not an exercise in apologetics. 
However, one might think that the evidence available from the rationalist camp 
requires more of a challenge than has been posed thus far. Charlesworth makes several 
apt points in favour of a more balanced approach to faith and reason in Anselm 121 . 
These can be divided into two categories: first, direct responses to Barth, using analysis 
of Proslogion and of the historical context; secondly, general arguments concerning 
faith and reason based mostly upon Cur Deus Homo? and Anselm's Augustinian 
background. I shall take these in reverse order. 
Charlesworth argues that Anselm wishes to remain close to Augustine, citing his 
words in Monologion 1122, and notes that Augustine himself has a complex position on 
'faith and reason'. On the one hand, Augustine says 'So, therefore, if it is rational that 
faith precedes reason in the case of certain great matters which cannot be grasped, there 
cannot be the least doubt that reason which persuades us on this precept - that faith 
precedes reason- itself precedes faith.' 123 On the other hand, he says 'Understand my 
word in order to believe it; but believe the word of God in order to understand it.' 124 
Charlesworth speculates that one might make a distinction between 'notional assent' 
(theoretical understanding) and 'real assent' (understanding through a form of life), but 
argues that the most one might conclude concerning Augustine is that the primacy of 
faith is restricted to revealed truths and not necessarily applicable to God's existence and 
attributes or other 'preambles of faith'. At a later point, Charlesworth demonstrates that 
Augustine 'clearly admits the possibility of a rational justification of belief in God'125. 
Charlesworth builds upon this by drawing attention to the conflict between 
'dialecticians' and 'anti-dialecticians' in the early eleventh century. He characterises the 
camps essentially as systematicists and Scripturalists respectively and places Anselm 
firmly in the camp of the former, on the grounds of his insistence upon not basing his 
works in Scripture or Church authority directly. In doing this, Charlseworth implicitly 
argues that, given the choice between the 'faith' and 'reason' of the time, Anselm chose 
reason. 
120 Andre Hayen, 'The Role of the Fool in St. Anselm and the necessarily apostolic character of true 
Christian Reflection', trans. Arthur C. McGill, in J. Hick & Arthur C. McGill The Many-Faced Argument, 
r:.I66; cited by McGill p.63. 
21 Charlesworth, St. Anse/m's Pros/ogion, p.22-48 ('St. Anselm's System') 
122 Charsleworth, St. Anse/m's Proslogion, p.23 
12..1 Epist. 120; P.L. xxxiii. 453.; cited in Charlesworth, St. Anselm~'> Proslogion, p.27 
124 Sermon 43; P.L. xxxviii.257-8; cited in Charlesworth, St. Anselm's Proslogion, p.27 
125 Charlesworth, St. Anse/m's Pros/ogion, p.56 
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Finally, Charlesworth looks at Anselm's Cur Dew• Homo? He notes that it was 
written somewhat later than the Proslogion, but argues that 'Anselm did not begin 
writing his formal treatises until he was forty-three, and the main lines of his thought 
seem to have been well and truly laid by then and to have remained constant,'126 
consequently, 'there is no reason to think that Anselm's position on faith and reason had 
changed or developed in any radical way in that period oftime.'127 Charlesworth argues 
that Anselm is aiming to convince the unbeliever and to confirm the believer in their 
faith, but that the main direction of the work is to win over the 'unbeliever' (who accepts 
some of the Christian assumptions, e.g. the Jewish faith) and the 'pagan' (who accepts 
none of the Christian assumptions) 'by reason alone'. Thus, the Christian believer must 
'believe before he understands', but the non-Christian can be satisfied 'by reason alone 
... that the Old and New Testaments are true. '128 Charlesworth argues that the Cur Deus 
Homo? is primarily concerned with the unbeliever, and is consequently more 
rationalistic, ~ut he seems to apply this to all Anselm's works, a point that I shall raise 
again below. 
Against Barth, Charlesworth makes three distinct points. First, he argues that 
Barth takes Anselm anachronistically, and assumes he has 'faced the question of the 
relationship between faith and reason and to have resolved it unequivocally in a neo-
Barthian way.'129 Charlesworth contends that, far from it, if one had to take Anselm in 
any one direction, a Thomist one would fit most with his aims. 130 
Secondly, he argues that Barth's interpretation disregards Anselm's theological 
program (as Charlesworth sees it expressed in Cur Deus Homo?) of convincing the 
unbeliever and the pagan. He observes that in Anselm's reply to Gaunilo, he 
distinguishes between appealing to the 'faith and conscience' of the believer, and using 
rational means of demonstration for the unbeliever, to show that that-than-which-
nothing-greater-can-be-thought is a meaningful concept131 • As we have seen, Barth 
only cites the first part of this distinction to support his own argument, without 
supplying an explanation of the second part. 132 
126 Charlesworth, St. Anse/m's Proslogion, p.30-31 
127 Charlesworth, St. An.selm's Pros/ogion, p.30 
128 Cur Deus Homo?, 11. xxii; 133, cited by Charlesworth, St. Anselm's Proslogion, p.32 
129 Charlesworth, St. Anselm's Proslogion, p.41 
13° Charlesworth, St. Anselm's Pros/ogion, p.41-2 
131 Charlesworth, St. Anselm's Proslogion, p.42 cites Reply VIII 
132 Although it should be noted that Anselm appears to re-state a position he took in the Mono. at this 
point in his Reply; is Charlesworth therefore putting too much weight on this point than can support a 
'rationalistic Proslogion'? 
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Thirdly, Charlesworth argues that on Barth's interpretation, Gaunilo is primarily 
mistaken in criticising Anselm's argument qua 'rational argument for the existence of 
God'~ yet Anselm 'confronts Gaunilo's objections on Gaunilo's own ground and attempts 
to show that they are invalid.'133 Thus, concludes Charlesworth, Anselm is agreeing 
with Gaunilo's treatment of the Proslogion as a rational argument for the existence of 
God. This criticism stems from the previous one in that, if, with Barth, we omit the 
'rational means of demonstration' and rely upon the 'faith and conscience' half of the 
distinction, then we find Anselm disagreeing with Gaunilo's interpretation - however, 
we are hard pressed to explain the rest of Anselm's reply. 
Charlesworth also gestures to the circumstantial evidence of Anselm's 
Augustinian background, and the concerns of, for instance, Lanfranc, that Anselm was 
putting too much emphasis on reason. 134 He argues that there is nothing to suggest that 
a Lutheran (i.e. a Barthian- for that is how Charlesworth sees it) doctrine of reason's 
corruption by the Fall has any place in the eleventh or twelfth centuries, and that 
Anselm's contemporary supporters and disciples expressed no thoughts that Anselm was 
innovative in a fideistic fashion. 135 
In considering these criticisms, we should note that Charlesworth's comments 
seem to presuppose a single coherent theological program, that Anselm's comments on 
Augustine are taken from the Monologion, that his 'position' on faith and reason is 
extracted from the Cur Deus Homo?, and that Charlesworth asserts that the "'rationalist" 
strain ... became more and more pronounced in his thinking.'136 Yet the Proslogion 
represents a part of what Southern calls 'The first peak'137 of his early work, in particular 
it was written about twenty years before Cur Deus Homo? and came at the end of his 
literary output of Prayers and Meditations. Although Charlesworth argues that 'the 
main lines of his thought seem to have been well and truly laid by then and to have 
remained constant,'138 he does not give this the foundations that one might prefer for 
such a statement. Southern writes that 'the Monologion is presented as a philosophical 
meditation based on Augustine, while the Proslogion is a meditation arising from prayer 
addressed to God .... The Monologion was a highly original work in form, but in 
substance it had the authority of Augustine behind it. ... But in the Proslogion, [Anselm] 
133 Charlesworth, St. Anselm's Proslogion,p.42-43 
134 Charlesworth, St. Anselm's Pros/ogion,p.43-4, and p.43 n.1 citing Epist. 77 
135 Charlesworth, St. Anselm's Proslogion, p.44-5 
136 Charlesworth, St. Anselm's Pros/ogion, p.37 
137 Richard W. Southern, Saint Anse/m: A Portrait in a Landscape (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), p.113 
13& Charlesworth, St. Anselm's Proslogion, p.J0-1 
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was on his own.'139 Further, Charlesworth's assertion that Barth is reading Lutheran 
thought into Anselm is not entirely well-placed in the manner of its expression, since 
Anselm does indeed repeatedly state that the rational faculties are darkened as a result 
of the Fall. 140 
Nevertheless, the broad bifurcation of the primacy of faith for the Christian and 
the primacy of reason for apologetics, an analysis which can be charitably extracted 
from Charlesworth, is fairly attractive. In Epistola de lncarnatione verbi, Anselm says 
'May it happen that . . . those who first try to ascend the ladder of faith by means of their 
understanding be forced to descend into all sorts of error because of the defectiveness of 
their understanding.'141 This has a remarkable echo in the Proslogion, where Anselm 
says at chapter XVlli, 'I strove to ascend to God's light and I have fallen back into my 
own darkness. Indeed, not only have I fallen back into it, but I feel myself enclosed 
within it.' It is worth noting that Anselm says 'those who first try to ascend'; this implies 
that, as we have seen the 'Anselm of faith' and mixed models to propose, he believes 
that understanding can enrich Christian life, but only if one first believes. In the context 
of the Proslogion, where the 'Anselm of faith' presumably is working in the 'right order' 
of Cur Deus Homo?, does the bifurcated model give a good account of any emphases 
placed on reason? 
We have three points to consider which might be put under the heading of 
'reason'. First, the argument that, from his reply to Gaunilo, Anselm thinks that that-
than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought can be made meaningful to one who does 
not accept sacred authority. Secondly, he replies to Gaunilo by using rational argument, 
and treats Gaunilo as having replied to reasoning by reasoning. The former can be 
understood in terms of the accessibility of the work for the unbeliever or pagan, the 
latter in terms of Southern's observation of Anselm's preferred methodology, which I 
expound below. 
Thirdly, Anselm insists that all that is required for his argument is for the (non-
technical) words to be heard and that 'if it is spoken in a known language and [the Fool] 
does not understand it, then either he has no intelligence at all, or a completely obtuse 
one'. 142 This, too, may be seen as the employment of reason for the purpose of 
apologetics. Incidentally, it rather dampens Hayen's assertion that Anselm's 'search for 
139 Southern, Saint Anselm, p.ll8 
140 E.g. Proslogion I, Proslogion XIV 
141 Epist. De Incam. Verbi rev. ed. I (II. 7.10- 8.1) cited in McGilL p.55 
142 Reply II; Charlseworth, p.173 
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the intel/ectus fidei will not be true or complete as long as it excludes the fool,' 143 by 
which, McGill reasonably explains, he means that Anselm wishes to 'engage the 
thinking of all actual men'144• However, it also does not warrant Barth's assertion that 
Anselm will have nothing to do with the fool. 145 
There are certain elements of the historical and intellectual context of the 
Proslogion that, whilst supporting what is considered above, also lead to another 
perspective on it. Anselm writes that the Proslogion follows on from the Monologion in 
the sense that he wanted to fmd a single argument, rather than the complex of arguments 
in the Monologion. Southern goes so far as to call the Proslogion 'A supplement to the 
Monologion', the result of'the task of consolidating the argument of the Monologion by 
formulating it in a way that was both simple and complete.'146 
Southern argues that Anselm used a fairly uniform method of enquiry from the 
beginning of the Monologion onwards. His works were developed by discussion, he 
and his students wanted to proceed such that 'nothing should be put forward on the 
authority of Scripture', also that 'whatever conclusion was reached in the course of each 
investigation should be expressed in plain language with intelligible arguments and 
simple disputation.'147 Finally, he commits himself to answering all objections. 
Southern also discusses the form, structure and approach of Anselm's meditations148. 
The most vital element of this is expressed by Southern thus: 
This is the whole aim of meditation: to lead the inquirer fmward along the road towards 
the final beatitude of the immediate experience of the object of faith. Until this final 
beatitude is enjoyed, reason will continue to have a contribution to make to faith. 149 
Given that Southern classifies Anselm's Monologion and Pros/ogion 
distinctively as 'meditations', there is clearly an aspect in the study of Anselm's thought 
which has been lacking thus far. We are aptly reminded of Anselm's religious context, 
and this is the basis for much of Stolz' argumentation, which emphasises elements of 
Anselm's work in the light of his distinctively Christian, and moreover monastic, 
involvement. 
143 Hayen, 'The Role of the Fool', p.l67, cited by McGill p.63 
144 McGilL 'Recent Discussions', p.63 
145 
cfp.42 n.119 above. 
146 Southern, Saint Anselm, p.l27 
147 Southern, Saint Anse/m, p.ll8-9 
148 See particularly Southern, Saint AIISelm, p.126-127, but more broadly p.120-125 
149 Southern, Saint An<;e/m, p.l27 
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A mystical Anselm? 
The third interpretative option is that of Anselm as searching for an experience 
of God. Stolz argues that there are several elements of the Proslogion which allow us to 
conclude that it 'is essentially a piece of mystical theology,' and that 'Anselm wants to 
attain a vision of God through an understanding of what the faith says about God.'150 
Stolz' work is primarily written in response to Barth. 151 
His first argument compares the Monologion and the Proslogion as depicted by 
Anselm in the preface to the Proslogion. This says of the Monologion that it is 'a little 
work produced as an example of a meditation on the rationality of the faith, in the 
person of someone who investigates what he does not know by silent reasoning with 
himself'152 Of the Proslogion it says 'Judging therefore that what I rejoiced to have 
found about this and certain other matters would, if written, be welcome to some 
readers, I have written the following little work, in the person of someone striving to 
elevate his mind to the contemplation of God and seeking to understand what he 
believes.'153 Stolz interprets the former statement as 'a silent meditation which should 
lead to understanding't54 and the latter statement as 'an effort of the soul to raise itself to 
a kind of vision of God.'155 He goes on to say that 'Anselm specifies the How of this 
quest for God: "seeking to understand what he believes." Thus a general insight into the 
teaching of the faith is not at all intended.'156 Stolz places emphasis on Anselm's 
tendency to provide preliminary comments on the purpose and method of his works, 
setting this over against Barth's view (and indeed Charlesworth's) of an Anselm with a 
general theological program. However, it may be worth bearing in mind a distinction at 
this point between the individual form of each work and his theological aims; if Barth 
stresses the latter to the neglect of the former, is it possible that Stolz is stressing the 
former as a replacement for the latter, rather than a complement to it? 
Stolz proceeds in his argument by drawing attention to the original title of the 
Proslogion; Alloquium, or address, which Stolz correlates with the sense of an address 
150 Stolz, 'Anselm's Theology', p.l85-6 
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to God, and also with the prefatory remarks and the first chapter. The first chapter, he 
claims, is woefully ill-attended by scholarship. In it, he finds the aim and plan for the 
work: an exhortation to the soul to seek God, an appeal to God for revelation and aid, a 
lament over the loss of direct experience of God through the Fall, and a further appeal to 
God to renew His image in the human soul to enable its experience of Him. 157 
Stolz then argues that Anselm writes the Pros/ogion as a Christian, not as a 
philosopher. His evidence for this is that Anselm makes several theological 
'recognitions' (God as creator and redeemer, original sin, reliance upon God for 
attaining the happiness for which we were meant in Adam, and the introduction in 
Pros/ogion XXIII of the Trinity)158. Based on this, Stolz argues that Anselm's aim is 'to 
attain that for which he was created; the vision of God,' but that Chapter I notes that this 
is not possible because of original sin, and that therefore all that may be attained is 'an 
experience ofGod'159. Thus, claims Stolz, the following passage can be understood as a 
presupposition of God's existence, and, moreover, of God presence within us: 
Enter into the inner chmnber of your mind; shut out everything except God and what 
can help you in seeking him ... 160 
The form of Proslogion I is echoed in Proslogion XN, instigating a second 
phase of the search; Stolz argues that this adds weight to the thought that the intervening 
chapters have indeed been attempting to cultivate an experience of God. 161 Finally, 
Stolz claims that there is a theme of joy- sought and eventually found- which explains 
the hymn/prayer of joy concluding the Pros/ogion and connects it with the first chapter, 
thereby showing that Anselm finally succeeds in his aim of experiencing God. 162 
Stolz argues that Pros/ogion XN is key in understanding the Proslogion as a 
whole; it reviews the previous chapters, finds them unequal to the challenge of finding 
an experience of God and heralds a new attempt. He cites 
You have sought God and you have discovered that He is the supreme good, than which 
nothing better can be conceived; that this good is life itself, light itself, wisdom itself, 
goodness itself, eternal beatitude itself and beatific eternity itself; and that this is 
everywhere and always. 163 
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Stolz argues that the second clause corresponds to Proslogion V-XII, the third 
clause corresponds to Pros/ogion xm, and that the first clause must therefore 
correspond to Proslogion I-IV. This statement of content does not mention having 
proven God's existence, and so, concludes Stolz, that cannot be the concern in those 
chapters; rather they demonstrate that an extant God is that-than-which-nothing-greater-
can-be-thought. 164 
Stolz' third major contention is that Proslogion II-IV do demonstrate something 
concerning God's existence, as previewed in the preface, but that this is, as the preface 
says, an argument 'which would be sufficient by itself for proving that God truly 
is ... '165. Stolz consequently makes two points. 
Firstly, he argues that 'vere esse' ('true being') means a form of existence that 
cannot be thought of as not existing. This point is extended by Campbell, who argues 
that vere esse was a technical term, found in Augustine's work, which denotes a manner 
of existence more akin to 'immutability'. 166 
Secondly, Stolz argues that all that can be deduced from the text- especially of 
Proslogion XIV- is that Proslogion II-IV wishes to prove that God truly is (vere esse), 
and that he is that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought, and not anything about 
the existence of God in general. 167 
Stolz' final major contention is that the form of an address takes precedence in 
the text, and that prayer and reasoning cannot be separated in the way that a modern 
writer might wish. He observes that, at minimum, the introduction of a thesis is in the 
form of addressing God, and the conclusion of each piece of reasoning shifts back to 
that form; 'thus, the result secured by the reasoning is fully used for the contemplation 
of God'168. In some cases (e.g. Proslogion VIII) the reasoning is confluent with the 
address. As McGill points out, 'Stolz' view collides with the modern assumption that 
logic and prayer are completely distinct and mutually exclusive areas of discourse. 
People today so objectivise logic and so sentimentalise prayer that each can only be 
seen as the negation of the other.'169 Stolz concludes his contention by demonstrating 
that the opening of Proslogion Il is in the address form, whilst the closure of the 
argument in Proslogion IV returns to that form, showing that the argument in IT-IV is a 
single argument. Proslogion IV represents a sub-section of reasoning answering the 
164 Stolz, 'Anselm' s Theology', p.l95-7 
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problem of how the Fool could have said what he did, giving the conclusion that ll & m 
form the main (single) argument. 170 
It should be noted that this provides a strong reason for seeing Proslogion ll and 
m (and possibly including IV qua objection) as a single argument, as against a great 
deal of scholarship (including Barth) which has chosen to take ll as a separate argument 
toll. 
This does not, however, demonstrate that Anselm did not also have as an aim a 
rational argument with which to address the unbeliever; this is clear from his reply to 
Gaunilo, and from his insistence that all that is required is to hear the words which he 
speaks (i.e. that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought). Thus, if Anselm aimed 
primarily for an experience of God through increased understanding of belief, this does 
not preclude a demonstration that some nature (necessarily) exists, and that God is this 
nature. Stolz argues that the Reply shows that Anselm sees the reasoning as important, 
but does not show that the reasoning does not have a mystical aim, but, even taking this 
into account, the fact remains that Anselm (purportedly) demonstrates that that-than-
which-nothing-greater -can-be-thought exists, and truly exists, and is God. This, 
essentially, is the argument employed by Campbell. 171 
Campbell also argues that Anselm makes an initial identification of God with 
that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought, but that this is the first thesis to be 
proven in the work; it therefore cannot be a definitional starting point or premise. 
Campbell cites Proslogion XV where Anselm moves on to God as greater than can be 
conceived, arguing that this would be denying his previous argument if that-than-which-
nothing-greater-can-be-thought were definitional. 172 He also cites the last paragraph of 
Proslogion I, where Anselm says 'I am not trying, 0 Lord, to penetrate your loftiness, 
for my understanding is in no way equal to it, but I desire in some measure to 
understand your truth,' and argues that '[t]his is not the way a man arguing from a 
definition of God speaks.' 173 Finally, he argues that 'logical consistency would require 
that claims about such a thing and claims about God must be both accepted or both 
rejected' 174 if the formula is definitional. In Reply Vll, Anselm points out that one 
cannot deny certain claims about that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought as an 
entailment of denying those claims about God. He also, observes Campbell, argues that 
one can understand that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought without 
170 Stolz, 'Anselm's Theology', p.200f 
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understanding 'God'. Campbell concludes that ifthat-than-which-nothing-greater-can-
be-thought were definitional of God, then Anselm would be stating wholly 
unreasonable points in these passages. 175 
One of Campbell's main theses, therefore, is that Anselm moves from 'can it be 
that such a nature does not exist?' as a starting point, to 'when the fool hears what I 
speak' as the first premise. This, he argues, explains why Anselm maintains that all that 
is required is for someone to speak the words. 
Synopsis 
How can we characterise the issues and arguments at stake? First, I would argue 
that it is important to distinguish between Anselm's 'theological program', his 'methods' 
and his 'aims'. It seems reasonable to assert that he did not intend, or accomplish, a 
systematically worked out dogmatics or metaphysics; in this sense, he did not have a 
Barthian 'theological program'. It also seems reasonable to assert, concomitantly, that 
each work he produced had a specific aim, and that he chose a structure to suit that aim; 
in this sense, he had different methods and aims. However, neither of these imply that 
he did not have a characteristic approach to his work; namely, that identified by 
Southern as 'an origin in talking . . . and the questions arising therefrom; a method which 
excluded the quotation of authorities; and a determination to leave no objection 
unanswered.' Likewise, the following might be taken as an expression of his approach 
regarding faith and reason: 
Our faith is to be defended by reason against unbelievers, not against those professing to 
rejoice in the name of Christians... . The Christian ought to progress through faith to 
understanding, and not through understanding to faith. 176 
Neither of these run counter to the two assertions about 'aims' and 'a theological 
program' made above, but they do warrant the capacity to identify elements in Anselm's 
work as being rational - as opposed to rationalistic or fideistic - and distinctively 
Christian-theological (as opposed to purely philosophical), without seeing these as 
being in tension. 
There is also the issue of the structure of the Proslogion. It seems reasonable to 
assert here that Proslogion II-ill, with IV as 'mopping up' an outstanding point of 
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criticism, represent a single argument in several stages; Campbell's evidence from the 
logical structure is compelling, and Stolz' evidence from the structure of prayer and 
address - whether or not we accept his overall argument - is also compelling. 
Most importantly for understanding the Proslogion as a whole is that Stolz and 
Campbell hint that there is more to understanding it than deciphering the first four 
'chapters'. This should indicate to us that more attention needs to be paid to the entirety 
of the Proslogion, and also to its context in Anselm's thought - not only to discover 
what Anselm is really doing in the Proslogion, but also to discover what concepts he is 
using for 'God', and why. This is underlined by Campbell's arguments against 'that-
than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought' being taken as definitional rather than, as it 
were, descriptive or conceptual. What is required, then, if we are to understand 
Anselm's concept of God, is to look at the context of thought which gave rise to the 
Proslogion. It is this to which I now turn. 
Anselm's Views on Language and Theology 
In what follows, I shall explore Anselm's philosophy and theology of language, 
thereby providing a basis for two concepts of God; that of God as in some sense the 
source of thought, and that of God as that which is found at the limit of human 
understanding. I shall link these findings into what has been said of the Proslogion, 
providing a more substantial conclusion to the debate than the observations gathered 
above. 
Clearly, I also hope to show how critical engagement with Anselm's views 
provides some useful material to further the current discussion of predicating existence 
of God, with particular reference to McGinn's challenge of well-definedness. 
G.R. Evans observes that Anselm's efforts tended to be focused upon particular 
issues, with attendant or tangential themes being addressed as and when the need 
arose. 177 Consequently, Anselm does not develop 'a philosophy of language' in much 
the same way as he does not develop 'a metaphysics' 178• In this way, Anselm differs 
from Augustine (whom he follows in many respects), who specifically asks in the De 
Magistro, 'What do we do when we talk?' 179 However, Evans argues that Anselm has 
177 G. R. Evans, Anse/m and Talking About God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p.15- cfprevious 
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points of commonality with Augustine, and debts both to him and to Boethius (through 
his technical principles of language and dialectics). 
As has previously been hinted, Anselm builds upon Augustine in many ways, 
not least in the Neoplatonic aspects of his theology and his view on faith and reason. 
Evans, however, chooses to concentrate, for her own purposes, upon Anselm's and 
Augustine's common goal; to 'attempt to glimpse something of the working of the 
Divine mind upon which they believe the human mind to be modelled. ' 180 Anselm, 
says Evans, assumes that God's rationality and human rationality are the same 'in kind 
if not in degree.' 181 These two points can form an anchor for understanding Anselm's 
philosophy of language. 
One of Evans' key contentions is that Anselm 's model of language splits it into 
three levels. At the third level, there are 'bodily signs'; sounds, gestures and symbols; 
for example, the word or sound 'tree'. At the second level there is 'thinking the signs'; 
when reading the example above, one operates at this level (unless one says or writes 
'tree' as one reads it). At the first level, which Evans calls 'primary language' and 
Anselm calls 'naturalia verba', there are what one might term 'images', 'concepts' or 
perhaps 'universals'. Evans points out that Anselm was restricted in his descriptive 
capabilities by the lack of technical vocabulary available for a concept or idea 
conceived; 'he is obliged to fall back on verbs which describe the act of conceiving .... 
His use of pronouns (id; aliquid) would also appear to suggest that he is trying to avoid 
the use of nouns.' 182 Indeed, 'this lack of technical terminology helps to distinguish his 
account of the naturalia verba from the more familiar Platonic theory of Ideas. 
Anselm's images are, essentially, verba; they underlie all conventional human 
languages and they provide him with a foundation not only for his theory of knowledge, 
but also for his theory of language.' 183 
Furthermore, Evans argues that because the same set of natura/ia verba underlie 
all human languages, they must be common to all humans, although 'nowhere does 
Anselm consider how we know that all our mental images are alike; the first principles 
of his theory of language entail that they must be alike' 184. The foundations that 
Anselm lays work from the premises that creation is ex nihilo, and that God must have 
thought out/planned his creation; hence Anselm's uses of the maker analogy in the 
Monologion and the painter analogy in the Proslogion. In both, the argument is that the 
180 Evans, Anselm and Talking AbmJt God, p.20 
181 Evans, Anselm and Talking About God, p.18 
182 Evans, Anselm and Talking About God, p.28 
183 Evans, Anselm and Talking About God, p.28 
184 Evans, Anselm and Talking About God, p.25 
55 
agent has an image in mind of that which they wish to bring about. In the case of God, 
whose thoughts are as eternal as God Himself, this means that there is a set of eternal 
images (naturalia verba), which may be apprehended by human minds, and in which 
consi~t 'primary language'. Creation is then understood as God 'speaking' the 
naturalia verba. 185 
Thus, following Evans, human apprehension of the naturalia verba comes from 
empirical experience (i.e. observation of that which has been created, which is spoken 
naturalia verba) or from the mind of God directly through some unspecified 
intuition186. Therefore, partially contra Evans, one might argue that we can know a 
priori that our mental images are all alike so long as we accept that God is the author of 
the complete set of naturalia verba, that humans are capable of apprehending them, and 
that they are the foundation of human language instead of an alternative to or derivation 
from it. In order to question this knowledge, an extra premise would have to be 
introduced concerning veridical perception (e.g. that the Fall resulted in faulty 
perception or intuition, giving rise to warped mental concepts/images), or the 
justification for Anselm's other premises questioned, which is a separate issue. There is 
some suggestion by Evans that a questioning of perceptual verity is present in Anselm 
when she paraphrases 'such images [in which our primary language consist] are more or 
less true, depending on how closely they approximate to the res they imitate.' 187 
Nevertheless, under these circumstances, it is difficult to see how Anselm would 
respond to someone asking him how we can know all our mental images are alike, 
except by re-stating what has already been said. After all, Evans asks how we could 
know that our mental images are alike, not how we could know that they are the same, 
and it is unclear that Anselm's theory demands that they be identical. 
One point that Evans observes188 to be entailed by Anselm's view of language is 
that it is not possible for humans to invent original concepts; we can only work with that 
which is present: 'a man who speaks merely reviews in his mind the ideas that God has 
put there ... he can be a craftsman only' 189. This allows Anselm to provide a clear 
Creator/creature distinction, since a creature cannot 'create' what God has not already 
thought. 
Anselm was also well aware of the need to reconcile his 'spoken creation' model 
with the orthodox view of the accomplishment of creation through a single Word of 
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God, expressing the single Truth, which is God. There is an obvious tension between a 
'spoken' set of naturalia verba and the accomplishment of creation through a single 
Word (which also becomes incarnate in Jesus). Anselm's solution is to argue that 
limited human understanding means that we are unable to grasp the Word as a whole, 
and therefore grasp it through a plurality of images. 
At this point the model being advanced seems to have become less coherent; a 
summary of the salient points is desirable. The key points are, first, that human primary 
language (mental concept-images) is closest to God's 'language' of naturalia verba, in 
a similar way to that in which divine and human rationality are close. Secondly, that 
these are the basis of all other human language. Thirdly, that humans cannot therefore 
originate concepts~ they can only be 'conceptual craftsmen'. Fourthly, that the 
foundational nature of primary 1anguagelnaturalia verba is characterised through 
human apprehension of it by empirical experience or direct intuition of God's thoughts. 
Fifthly, that the previous points are dependent on the idea that God 'spoke' what we are 
only able to understand as a set of naturalia verba, in a single Word, thereby effecting 
Creation. 
There are three points of confusion which arise. Evans is clear that Anselm 
admits that we cannot speak of God in His essence: 'Anselm ultimately concedes, in the 
Monologion, that God is ineffabilis, beyond speaking of The admission follows 
perfectly consistently from his earlier arguments. Only God possesses command of a 
language in which it is possible to speak fully and accurately of Himself' 190 Again, 
'There is simply no means, in the resources of language available to man, of devising a 
system of expression apart from God, by means of which we can talk about him. God 
can, quite literally, be described only in His own terms.' 191 
However, 'every created nature ascends the ladder of Being as it approaches 
more closely to the Word. To talk about God in his own terms is to come closer to 
God.' 192 Additionally, 'In God's mind there are many universal verba, spoken or 
thought by God Himself But there can be only one Word of God.' 193 Finally, 'when 
God speaks, he speaks "to himself', or he may be said to "speak himself'.' 194 The three 
questions that consequently arise address a confusion over the consistency of these 
points within the overall structure. Can we speak of/apprehend God or not? If the 
Word is the means of creation and God speaks Himself entirely, does God therefore 
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'create Himself? Even if God does not, if God speaks Himself why can we not 
apprehend God? 
I would be inclined to offer the following account. God expresses everything 
through God's Word, only some of which is creation (i.e. everything that was made was 
made through the Word but the Word is not restricted to everything that was made). 
God can only be spoken of in God's own terms, but we should affirm the distinction 
between talking about God and apprehending naturalia verba from God. As a result of 
limited human understanding, we cannot apprehend God's essence but since 'every 
created nature ascends the ladder of Being as it approaches more closely to the Word ... 
[t]o talk about God in his own terms is to come closer to God,' 195 we might conclude 
that we can apprehend some things about God (e.g. relations between God and 
creation). However, this does not mean that we are able to reach God, and neither does 
it mean that a spoken/written human language is able to fulfil the same function as 
naturalia verba. This maintains the consistency of Anselm's statement that God is 
ultimately ineffable. This account would appear to make the position coherent, 
although, strangely, Evans does not seem to offer anything in the way of a similar 
attempt to resolve these tensions. 
Anselm: Language and the Pros/ogion 
This overall account of Anselm's philosophy of language, with its theological 
points of note, allows a keener analysis of certain elements of the Pros/ogion. 
Preliminarily, it provides some explanation for Anselm's concept in the Pros/ogion of 
'apprehending the thing itself. It also explains the universality which Anselm sees in 
the argument, since on his model he can be assured that everyone who grasps 'that-than-
which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought' will grasp the same concept-entity. 
The main Proslogion argument can be seen in the following structure: (i) 
Anselm sets up in tertiary language 'that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought'; 
i.e. by speaking the words. (ii) He transfers this through secondary structure ('in the 
mind') to primary language; thinking the concept of the thing itself, or grasping what 
that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought is instead of only understanding the 
word syntax. Thus the thing itself- i.e. the concept rather than the meaning of the 
words- is 'in the mind'. (iii) Anselm argues that this naturalia verba must correspond 
to an actually extant thing, and then (iv) argues that this thing cannot be thought not to 
195 Evans, Anselm and Talking About God, p.32 
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exist. Finally, (v) he argues that God is that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-
thought. Vitally, we can see from this why Anselm must go further and later state that 
the argument demands that God be greater than can be conceived~ if God is 
definitionally that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought and we can grasp the 
naturalia verba of this, then we have understood God's essence. Thus, that-than-which-
nothing-greater-can-be-thought must, first, be considered as a relational concept (not 
God's essence but God in relation to human thought), and, secondly, be able to derive 
God's ineffability as a result (hence that which is greater than can be thought). 
It is important to note that the primary reason for the identification of God with 
that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought is that if it were not the case then the 
creature could 'think something above the Creator, which is absurd.' We can now see 
that, whereas for the modem reader this may carry the limited weight of a distinction 
between creature and Creator, perhaps in terms of contingent creation versus necessary 
Creator, for Anselm it is a far stronger statement of his theology and philosophy of 
language. For him, it is absurd because all of our concepts come from God. If that-
than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought were a human-originated concept, that this 
was not God would be absurd to the point of impossibility; the only alternative is that 
that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought originates with God, but refers not to 
God but to some other entity. By definition (at least in Anselm's historical context) 
there is nothing ontologically prior to the Creator but the Creator Himself, and since 
Anselm's theology quite reasonably precludes a Creator that creates something greater 
than Himself (such an entity would be contingent, for example, whereas God would be 
necessary), God must therefore be that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought. 
A key part of the Proslogion is Anselm's claim that he has reached 'the light in 
which God dwells' but has been unable to penetrate it: 'Therefore, Lord, not only are 
You that than which a greater cannot be thought, but You are also something greater 
than can be thought.... Truly, Lord, this is the inaccessible light in which You 
dwell. ' 1% Here once again we can see Anselm laying out in the Proslogion format 
some of the points we have seen in his linguistic philosophy and theology~ ideas of 
God's ultimate ineffability and our inability to use our language to describe Him. 
Indeed, the conclusion to the Proslogion is quite surprising. Having discerned 
God's inaccessible dwelling place and that He is greater than can be thought, Anselm 
braces himself for another attempt at apprehending some form of concept of God: 'In 
You I move and in You I have my being and I cannot come near to You. You are 
196 Proslogion XV-XVI in Charlesworth, St. Anselm 's Proslogion, p.137 
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within me and around me and I do not have any experience of You.' 197; iet my soul 
gather its strength again and with all its understanding strive once more towards You, 
Lord. What are You, Lord, what are You; what shall my heart understand You to 
be?' 198. Anselm then moves on from the attributes that he has already demonstrated 
using that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought, first arguing for God's eternity 
and then using this to reinforce his model of God's existence in the Augustinian vere 
esse mould. He then makes a switch, during XXII, to the affirmation that God is 'the 
one and supreme good'. The final part of Proslogion uses this as its basis; a new 
argument is signified at the beginning of XXIV 'Now, my soul, rouse and lift up your 
whole understanding and think as much as you can on what kind and how great this 
good is.' 199 He continues 'For if particular goods are enjoyable, consider carefully how 
enjoyable is that good which contains the joyfulness of all goods; not [a joy] such as we 
have experienced in created things, but as different from this as the Creator differs from 
the creature. ' 200 Anselm makes further analogies to illustrate this difference, in each 
case moving from a human experience to a 'projected value' of the goodness of God in 
that respect He enumerates the goods and joys that will be available when we reach 
God in Heaven, concluding with 
Indeed, to the degree that each one loves some other, so he will rejoice in the good of 
that other; therefore, just as each one in that perfect happiness will love God 
incomparably more than himself and all others with him, so he will rejoice 
immeasurably more over the happiness of God than over his own happiness and that of 
all the others with him. But if they love God with their whole heart, their whole mind, 
their whole soul, while yet their whole mind, their whole heart, their whole soul, is not 
equal to the grandeur of this love, they will assuredly so rejoice with their whole heart, 
their whole mind, their whole soul, that their whole heart, their whole mind, their whole 
soul will not be equal to the fullness of their joy.201 
Thus Anselm is able to conclude that he has 'discovered a joy that is complete 
and more than complete.' Thus he prays 'that I may know You and love You, so that I 
may rejoice in You. And if I cannot do so fully in this life may I progress gradually until 
it comes to fullness. Let the knowledge of You . . . [and] Your love grow in me here and 
[in heaven] be made complete, so that my joy may be great in hope, and there be 
complete in reality. ' 202 
197 Proslogion XVI, in Charlesworth, St. Anselm 's Proslogion, p.137 
198 Proslogion XVIll in Charlesworth, St. Anselm 's Proslogion, p.l39-141 
199 Charlesworth, St. Anselm 's Pros/ogion, p.l4 7 
200 Proslogion XXV in Charlesworth, St. Anselm 's Pros/ogion, p.l47 
201 Pros/ogion XXV in Charlesworth, St. Anselm 's Proslogion, p.l51 
202 Proslogion XXVI in Charlesworth, St. Anselm 's Proslogion, p.l53 
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We can see Anselm's 'fonnula' in the Proslogion to be based upon the limit of 
thought. Evans argues that Anselm' s fonnula is the 'a+x' -ness of God in each respect, 
but I would argue that this only partially grasps Anselm's intentions; in fact, this should 
be applied to human experience, such that where a is maximal human experience or 
conception, God is always just beyond it by a value x. That-than-which-nothing-
greater-can-be-thought is useful as a tool to accomplish most of what Anselm wants, 
and as an illustration of method. The true innovation begins, however, when he applies 
the method to that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought itself, giving 'God is 
greater than can be thought'. Having made this iteration, he reaches a conclusion 
commensurable with his philosophy of language (i.e. that God in His essence is 
ineffable in that we cannot devise a language to describe Him; He is at the boundary of 
our thought and understanding), and proceeds in a different line. Having related human 
experience to different goods, and established that God is the supreme good, he uses his 
formula to illustrate how we can use our experiences to understand how God might be 
experienced. Since his philosophy of language portrays each human concept as in a 
sense an 'echo' of the pure concept in God's mind, he is able finally to work the 
formula backwards, arguing that we can experience a lesser form of the joys of God's 
goodness now in a creaturely way through our experiences, since these are a lesser form 
of what we may experience in the presence of God. 
Stolz does not quite perceive what is happening in the Proslogion, therefore. He 
says that Anselm is after an experience of God. This is true, although we should note 
that this has a wider import given Anselm's philosophy of language; such an experience 
is one step away from a concept of God's essence (which cannot of course be 
apprehended itself). Stolz also says that at the end of the Pros/ogion Anselm expresses 
joy at having had an experience of God, resulting from his meditation. However, it is 
actually the case that Anselm's joy is itself the experience of God for which he is 
searching; his other option (experiencing God through apprehending God's essence) 
having been removed by his discovery of God's ineffability. This also makes the 
Proslogion a great deal more than an example of meditation and prayer that might give 
one an experience of God. It is actually a direct teaching and demonstration on what 
experience is available to us and why it is available to us, together with a justification of 
why other methods will not work. 
Despite all of this, it is possible to argue that, gtven Anselm's linguistic 
philosophy, we can by-pass the Proslogion and argue directly for that which Anselm 
wants. Interestingly, this comes out looking more like a cosmological argument than an 
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ontological one. It runs as follows: (i) where does human language come from? (ii) We 
seem to have a set of concepts, most of which are common to several constructed 
languages. (iii) Therefore, the most reasonable question seems to be of where our 
concepts originate. (iv) We could say that they originate through experience of the 
natural world, or we could support a form of innatism and say that they were introduced 
into the human mind (either directly or through a biological explanation) by some other 
agent. In the latter case, one ends up with a God/Creator, since one requires an 
originator of concepts that is not itself given those concepts, in order to halt the regress. 
In the former case, one ends up with a God/Creator as a First Cause of the natural 
world. (v) If we attribute agency to this first cause, it seems reasonable to assert that 
intention is involved, and thus one might reasonably argue that planning is required. 
(vi) If the concepts planned are expressed in the objects created, then one might argue 
that sentient beings that only had their experience to work from would only apprehend 
concepts resulting from that creation. (vii) since the first cause would not itself be a 
part of that set of concepts (being uncreated), it would be correspondingly difficult to 
apprehend the first cause. This results in an ineffable Creator, and we have already seen 
that Anselm certainly ends up with this in the Proslogion, regardless of whether we opt 
in to the account of the subsequent 'experience of God' considered above. 
This argument has remarkable similarities to one put forward by John 
Haldane203, which he calls the 'First Thinker' argument, and in expressing what can be 
extracted from Anselm I have made use of Haldane's terminology and structure 
(especially in the earlier points) to emphasise the connection between contemporary 
thought and terms, and the thought of Anselm. 
The key concept arising from the discussion, which I would like to argue is very 
clearly presented in Anselm, is that the more accessible concepts of God as Creator, and 
God as source of thought, are inextricably linked with the idea of thinking of God in 
terms of a boundary, or 'limit of thought'. Although it is not immediately obvious that 
this is the sort of thing Anselm is aiming for, particularly when he uses 'that-than-
which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought', previOus points made concermng his 
philosophy of language can be called upon as evidence. First, we have seen that 
Anselm has a Neoplatonic tendency to his thought, and is inclined therefore to present 
things in terms of a hierarchy. In the Monologion, he asks his readers to think of God as 
the highest good - the summum bonum - in other words, the limit in the sense of apex. 
203 John Haldane, 'The Source and Destination of Thought', in Referring to God, Paul Helm (ed.), 
(Richmond: Curzon Press, 2000), p.lS-33 
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Secondly, if we see Mono/ogion and Proslogion as companion works, or even if 
the latter is seen merely as resulting from a search for a single argumentum with which 
to do the work of the forme?04, it thereby inclines us to the view that that-than-which-
nothing-greater-can-be-thought - or even better 'that-which-is-greater-than-can-be-
conceived' - is expressing the same sort of 'limit' from a different viewpoint. Evans 
sees the Monologion as a 'bottom up' argument, establishing a hierarchy of goods based 
in experience and then asking readers to imagine the 'highest' of these, and then 
demonstrating certain theological points about it. The Proslogion, on the other hand, is 
a 'top down' approach, beginning with an abstract idea of that-than-which-nothing-
greater-can-be-thought, and subsequently that-which-is-greater-than-can-be-thought, 
and basing the arguments on that. 
Thirdly, as Evans points out, Anselm's philosophy of language says that humans 
can apprehend the created hierarchy of goods, but cannot apprehend God (as we have 
seen, this has to do with the nature and origins of language, and of creation). Evans 
argues, following Anselm, that there cannot be anything in between the created 
hierarchy - which we can apprehend - and God, since this would demand either 
something not created by God, or something which was part of creation but not (at least 
abstractly, as a part of the hierarchy) graspable by humans. Likewise, if we could grasp 
the nature of God, it would violate the distinction between Creator and creature. This 
again implies that God is found at the limit of human understanding. 
Campbell directly addresses his own version of McGinn's contention that the 
combination of terms 'that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought' is not 
meaningful. Campbell says 'The fact that all the words which comprise a complex 
expression each have a use in public language, it may be pointed out with justice, is not 
enough to guarantee that the expression as a whole is intelligible. ' 205 Campbell argues 
that Anselm' s formula is intelligible, because it is 'derived by nominalisation of a 
structure of the form "something x (not (it can be thought (something y (y is greater 
than x))))", where the brackets mark scope; no-one who knew how to use these words 
could reasonably deny that they are here put together acceptably. ' 206 Indeed, this may 
be placed within McGinn's formal logic structure, whence (Ix)-{Iy)(y>x) provides 
something like the required form. Of this two things may be noted. First of all, the 
formulation is not quite the same, since Campbell's is not 'something x we talk/think 
204 Incidentally, this supports the importance of the movement to the highest good in the last section of the 
Proslogion. 
203 Camp bell, From Belief to Understanding, p. 40 
206 Campbell, From Belief to Understanding, p.41 
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about'. However, this could be the place for McGinn's 'disjunctive addition', which 
has been suggested by McGinn and which I took (in Chapter I) to be 'for some x that we 
talk/think about or that we do not' thereby covering things which exist but which have 
not been referred to. If so, we obtain something very similar to Campbell 's formulation. 
The second point of note is that the McGinnian formulation employs '-'(Iy)', 
which is an unresolved issue not considered by McGinn. In this instance, problems, 
which might arise from talking about a set of properties that we specify as not 
spoken/thought of, do not appear to arise because that which is stated is a relation, not a 
property per se. Likewise, possible problems with the disjunctive addition are 
weakened because a relation is used rather than a property. Taking into account the 
disjunctive addition, this gives us 'for some x that we talk/think about or that we do not 
talk/think about, it is not the case that for some y that we talk/think about y is greater 
thanx'. 
Interestingly, this leaves open the possibility that there is something that we do 
not talk/think about that exists and than which x is not greater. Even if we choose to 
remove this by making the y-quantifier disjunctive, this does not capture the sense in 
Anselm of what it is possible to think. Now, it is not within the scope of a project such 
as this to speculate over the application of modal logic to McGinn' s quantifiers, but 
intuitively what seems to be required is something like 'for some x that we talk/think 
about or that we do not talk/think about, it is not the case that it is possible that for some 
y that we talk/think about, y is greater than x.' Note that I have not used the disjunct for 
the y-quantifier. This is for two reasons; first, that this would make the formulation 
equivalent to 'greater than all', which Anselm berates Gaunilo for using because it 
weakens his argumenr07. Secondly, it consequently makes clearer the connection to the 
concept of the 'limit of thought'. Analysis of whether this formulation would be 
acceptable to McGinn would rest upon the proper development of his thought for modal 
logic and for his suggested disjunct. Nevertheless, what I have argued above goes some 
way to showing how Anselm's concept could be considered 'well-defined'. 
However well this analysis addresses the challenge of needing a well-defined 
concept for God, it does not engage with the thrust of McGinn wider challenge that we 
do not know what it would be for such an entity to exist. Indeed, in this respect 
207 Anselm argues that this is because 'greater than all' does not fulfil the same function; first, 'that-than-
which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought' will be 'greater than all', but it is not necessarily the case that 
'greater than all' will be 'that-than-which-nothing-greater -can-be-thought'. Secondly, 'greater than all' 
does not have the advantage of'that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought' in that it exists 
contingently and attributes such as being without beginning or end follow from it less directly than from 
'that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought'. 
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McGinn and Anselm seem to be considering the same problem from very different 
angles. Anselm is concerned about God's ineffability: we cannot conceptualise God's 
essence, only God in relation to the created universe and human thought. For McG.inn, 
if we cannot know what it is for something to exist we have difficulty in predicating 
existence of it. However, for McGinn this goes deeper. The implicit challenge in his 
phrasing is, I think, a challenge over reference, not just over meaning (well-definedness, 
or conceptualisation of an entity). The argument could be seen as 'if we do not know 
what exactly we are getting at when we use the term 'God', how can we use it -
especially to predicate existence of it?' 
This issue is directly confronted by the second option that I canvassed briefly at 
the end of Chapter I, because the use of the word 'God' in McGinn's structure is shaped 
by the view of language underpinning that structure. I suggested that we might in some 
way attempt to reject McGinn's challenge on the basis of the view of language that 
underlies it~ that 'God exists' is meaningful because it predicates a property of a 
referent. Now we are in a position to see more clearly what form an argument against 
McGinn should take, and why our consideration of Anselm does not accomplish all that 
is required: Anselm seems in part to be trying to make available a way of referring to 
God, even though God is ineffable. In the next chapter, we shall see that his arguments 
can form a vital element in such an enterprise, but that in order to overcome McGinn' s 
position, a more precise consideration oflanguage will be necessary. 
In Chapter Ill, therefore, I shall consider the treatment of 'God' as a name, 
exammmg the key positions, concerning names, available in the philosophy of 
language. Examining in particular a paper by Jerome Gellman208, who rejects 
McGinn's view of reference, I shall argue that a fusion of his position (slightly 
modified) with McGinn's metaphysics (slightly modified) results in a coherent 
approach to the meaning and reference of proper names, and the concept of existence, 
which overcomes the problems faced thus far and secures meaningfulness for 'God 
exists' whether or not God in fact exists. The role of theology in this process will 
become readily apparent through the example of Anselm' s thought and work. 
208 Gellman, Jerome, 'Naming and Naming God', Religious Studies 29 (1993), p.l93-216 (Hereafter 
NNG) 
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Chapter Ill: Referring to God 
In previous chapters, we have engaged with the problems inherent in the concept 
of existence, and those arising from predicating existence of God. Although a 
resolution of the former through McGinn's model of existence was posited, the latter 
remained intractable due to recurring challenges to our ability to speak of God at all -
challenges which pushed us deeper into the philosophy and theology of language. 
In this chapter, I shall consider the core issue that, if 'God exists' is a subject-
predicate sentence, then some model of meaning and reference is required for the 
subject. In other words, how are we to understand 'God' in 'God exists'? This requires 
engagement with the debate concerning the nature of proper names in language, as well 
as a wider appreciation of issues of meaning and reference. However, given both the 
constraints of space and the need to focus the treatment of the issue at hand, I shall 
endeavour to provide only the necessary elements of the structure. Fortuitously, Jerome 
Gellman's paper Naming and Naming God brings together several of the most pertinent 
points, as well as constructing an argument for the proper treatment of'God', criticising 
McGinn's position, and even linking the arguments to Anselm's Proslogion by way of 
example. 
Therefore, the chapter will consider the following topics. First, I shall sketch 
another 'Russellian orthodoxy', this time concerning a theory of reference and naming. 
I shall then outline the response to this by, primarily, Kripke and Donnellan, and explain 
the salient features of the debate between the two models. Subsequently, I shall discuss 
Gellman's argument- which is based upon the Kripke-Donnellan side of the debate-
relating it to the context of the debate as a whole. Finally, I shall examine the 
consequences ofGellman's argument for the discussion at hand; first, does it succeed in 
securing successful reference for 'God', and secondly, does it thereby contribute to the 
overall aim of describing/attaining the conditions of meaningfulness for 'God exists'? 
Another 'Russellian Orthodoxy'? 
There are three elements which constitute a discussion of Russell's theory. It is 
important to separate his theory of definite descriptions from his application of its ideas 
to proper names; further, one should consider the possibility that the latter has been 
misrepresented, and that consequently some criticisms do not engage fully with it. 
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As has already been seen, Russell responded to the problem of seemingly non-
referring negative existential statements (such as 'the golden mountain does not exist') 
by arguing that these have a logical form based upon quantification; it is not the case 
that there is precisely one thing which is the present King of France and is bald, for 
example. Existence for Russell is simply saying that a propositional function is 
sometimes true. However, this is part of a wider enterprise which takes definite 
descriptions ('the such-and-such') and uncovers their logical form, thereby removing 
'the', and, more importantly, demonstrating that singular terms do not refer. 
Take an example such as 'The Prime Minister is English'. Russell's treatment 
of this is to say that, instead of picking out a person (the Prime Minister) and claiming 
that that person has a property (English-ness), what in fact is happening is that we are 
saying 'At least one person is Prime Minister, and at most one person is Prime Minister, 
and whoever is Prime Minister is English'. I.e. we have three general statements. 
Formally: (3x)(Px & ((3y)(Py ~ y=x) & Ex)). 
William Lycan provides an ideal way to combine what we have previously seen 
of Russell's ideas with the present issue. He takes the sentence ' ( 1) The present King of 
France is bald', and then proposes a set of statements: 
Kl (1) is meaningful (significant, not meaningless). 
K2 (1) is a subject-predicate sentence. 
K3 A meaningful subject-predicate sentence is meaningful (only) in virtue of its picking out 
some individual thing and ascribing some property to that thing. 
K4 (l)'s subject term fails to pick out or denote anything that exists. 
K5 lf(l) is meaningful only in virtue of picking out a thing and ascribing a property to that thing 
(K I, K2, K3 ), and if (I)'s subject term fails to pick out anything that exists (K 4 ), then either ( 1) 
is not meaningful after all (contrary to KI) or (I) picks out a thing that does not exist. But: 
K6 There is no such thing as a "non-existent thing."209 
Meinong had rejected K6 directly. McGinn, as we have seen, could be 
considered to affirm the second part of K5 and reject K6 in a modified form 'there is no 
such thing as a non-existent object.' Frege rejected K3, arguing that subject-predicate 
sentences have a sense as well as a reference210. 
Russell, however, could be seen as rejecting K2 on the grounds that 'The present 
King of France' is not a singular term, but paraphrases three general statements, as 
noted above. None of the three statements denote a particular individual. Lycan notes 
that an alternative schema is that K2 is accepted on the proviso that it is about 
209 Lycan, Philosophy of Language, p.I3-14 
210 See for example Gottlob Frege, 'On Sense and Reference', in A W. Moore ( ed. ), Meaning and 
Reference (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) 
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'superficial grammatical form' 211 but K3 is thereby rejected 'on the grounds that a 
superficially subject-predicate sentence can be meaningful without picking out any 
particular individual because it abbreviates a trio of purely general statements. ' 212 
Russell explains a number of things with this view. In (1) above, 'there is 
exactly one thing which is the present King of France' is false, which makes the whole 
proposition false. As we have previously seen, 'the golden mountain does not exist' 
comes out as 'it is not the case that there is exactly one thing which is golden and a 
mountain' or '(xis a golden mountain) is false' if one wishes to accentuate his remarks 
on existence over those on definite descriptions213 . 
As Sainsbury notes, Russell says 'If you understand the English language, you 
would understand the meaning of the phrase . . . if you had never heard it before, 
whereas you would not understand the meaning of [the name] if you had never heard it 
before because to know the meaning of a name is to know who it is applied to' 214. 
Sainsbury also gives the more direct argument that 'Since "a" is to be understood in 
terms of the existential quantifier, so that "I met a man" is analysed as "there is 
something human which I met," "the" must be the existential quantifier with uniqueness 
added; which is just what Russell's theoryoffers.' 215 
One might summarise the ground covered m Russell's position as a 
demonstration that, although perhaps singular terms refer, definite descriptions, despite 
their appearance as singular terms (e.g. the present king of France) are not in fact 
singular terms. Hence they do not denote anything (i.e. pick out an individual in the 
world). 
Given this background of definite descriptions, providing a link with what has 
already been said of existence on Russell's view, I shall move on to Russell's theory of 
names. 
Lycan observes the important separation of what he calls Russell's 'Name 
Claim' from the theory of definite descriptions216. However, they often seem to merge 
due to the similarity of technique that Russell employs to argue for them - that is, he 
shows how they solve logical 'puzzles', such as the problem of negative existentials. 
211 Lycan, Philosophy of Language, p.l8 
212 Lycan. Philosophy of Language, p.l8 
213 Note that this essentially means discarding uniqueness, but shows the interconnectedness of his 
various arguments. 
214 Sainsbwy, 'Philosophical Logic', p. 78 
215 Sainsbury, 'Philosophical Logic', p.78 
216 Lycan. Philosophy of Language, p.38 
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The content of Russell's 'Name Claim' is purportedly that, just as definite 
descriptions turned out to have a different logical grammar to their 'surface grammar', 
so names, which appear to act as designators of objects and therefore semantically 
, denote 'their object' in propositions, are not in fact any such thing. Indeed, Russell 
argues that the only logically proper names were 'this' and 'that' - in other words, 
denoting terms functioning in the role of immediate ostension.217 
The intuitive element of Russell's view might be illustrated by a .game of 
charades. The player doing a mime may choose to make use of objects in the room, 
usually through a process of pointing at them and hoping the other players will say the 
right word as a result. Now, this essentially maps to a person picking an object (a 
statuette, say) up and saying 'This ... ' in the hope that someone else will say 'is white', 
'is a horse', 'is winged', 'is Pegasus'. This provides a key to Russell's theory, because 
although 'this' functions as a proper name, 'Pegasus' functions as an abbreviation for a 
list of properties and/or relations. Thus, the mime may need the word 'white' or 'horse' 
or 'wings' for the clue- or the word for all of them stuck together ('Pegasus'). 
At this point it is important to raise the concerns voiced by Sainsbury. He 
argues that there are two versions of Russell's theory for proper names: one a 'myth', 
the other the 'real' theoif18. The 'myth' is that Russell means to equate each name 
with a corresponding definite description. Sainsbury sources this from Russell's 
comment 'Common words, even proper names, are usually really descriptions. ' 219 
Thus, the relation between 'Pegasus' and 'winged horse', say, is one of synonymity. It 
is as if we had a thesaurus of proper names combined with a dictionary of ordinary 
names: we could look up 'Pegasus' and find the synonym 'winged horse', and then look 
up 'wing' and 'horse', if we did not know what they meant, to find their descriptions. 
Sainsbury emphasises, however, that if one reads on from the above comment, 
one will find 'That is to say, the thought in the mind of a person using a proper name 
correctly can generally only be expressed explicitly if we replace the proper name by a 
description. ' 220 Sainsbury asks whether this implies that the 'thought in the mind' will 
be a common, public one- which one might expect for a 'meaningful' proper name- or 
whether something else is being argued entirely. He goes on to quote 'Moreover, the 
description required to express the thought will vary for different people, or for the 
217 CPBR p.201, cited by Sainsbury, 'Philosophical Logic', p.70 
218 Sainsbury, 'Philosophical Logic', p. 70-72 
219 Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press, 1912), p.29 cited by 
Sainsbury, 'Philosophical Logic', p. 70 
220 RusseiL The Problems of Philosophy, p.29 cited by Sainsbury, 'Philosophical Logic', p. 70 
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same person at different times. The only thing constant (so long as the name is rightly 
used) is the object to which the name applies. ' 221 
Sainsbury argues that 'this variability shows that the descriptions cannot, for 
Russell, give the public meaning of the name, for meaning should be common to the 
linguistic community.'222 Russell's solution (or, more uncharitably, the solution which 
may be extracted from Russell) according to Sainsbury is that a name has a public 
reference in a community if an object 'satisfies all (or most) of the descriptions 
associated with it. '223 
This gives rise to some confusion, which I shall attempt to straighten out here. 
The following we know can be attributed to Russell: 
(1) Proper names have 'the narrow logical sense of a word whose meaning is a 
particular.' 'The only words one does use as names in the logical sense are 
words like "this" or "that". ' 224 
(2) Descriptions express the thoughts in the minds of name-users, and vary with 
time and user. 
(3) 'The only thing constant (so long the name is rightly used) is the object to 
which the name applies. ' 225 
There is an apparent conflict between ( 1) and (3 ), which can be resolved through 
specifYing that a name does not mean a particular (i.e. denote an object), but that if the 
name is used correctly, the object is the only thing constant about the mechanism of 
name-use. The conjunction of this with (2) gives the impression that a name means a 
description (or a cluster of them), although since descriptions change the object named 
is the only constant. This leads to the 'mythical' Russell, or a similar theory to it. 
Sainsbury wants to work this into a 'real Russell' theory by adding the 
following. 
(4) 'Public reference ... has the stability and constancy to be the meaning of a 
proper name. '226 
221 Russell The Problems of Philosophy, p.29-30, cited by Sainsbury, 'Philosophical Logic', p. 71 
222 Sainsbury, 'Philosophical Logic', p.71 
223 Sainsbury, 'Philosophical Logic', p.71 
224 CPBR, p.l78-179 
225 Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, p.29-30 
226 Sainsbury, 'Philosophical Logic', p. 72 
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(5) 'A name can be said to have public reference ... provided that something 
satisfies all (or most) of the descriptions the users of the name associate with 
it. ,227 
(6) '[Descriptions] are not required to have any semantic role of their own. ' 228 
This requires very fine distinctions. (4) and (5) seem to give us the statement that a 
name can be said to have meaning if an object satisfies all/most descriptions associated 
with the name, yet adding (6) gives the proviso that these descriptions have no semantic 
role. So, either we are no closer to finding out what the meaning of a proper name is, 
because we only have the conditions for public reference and not what public reference 
actually is, or we are less pernickety and allow that public reference is its conditions, 
which gives 'the meaning of a name is the object satisfying all/most descriptions 
associated with the name. ' 229 Yet, if the meaning is the satisfying-object we are thrown 
against the wall of Russell's statement (1): the meaning cannot be the object, rather the 
object is the only constant in correct use of a name. There is only one other option: the 
meaning of a name is that an object satisfies all/most descriptions associated with the 
name. To give an example, 'Pegasus flew to Athens' can be considered in the following 
ways23o_ 
(i) 'Pegasus' stands directly for a unique object, and the object flew to Athens. 
(ii) It means 'The winged horse flew to Athens.' 
(iii) 'Pegasus' means the unique object satisfying several descriptions associated 
with 'Pegasus', and says that it flew to Athens. 
(iv) It means that an object satisfies all/most descriptions associated with 
'Pegasus', and it flew to Athens. 
(i) is the simple view Russell wants to throw out, (ii) is the 'mythical' theory, according 
to Sainsbury. (iii) is what Sainsbury seems to want to replace the 'myth' with. (iv) is 
what can be charitably extracted from Sainsbury, and neither picks out an object 
directly, nor says that a name means one or more descriptions. The only thing constant 
in the use of the name is the object (Pegasus) but the name does not mean the object; the 
object can be referred to on the basis of it satisfying descriptions, but the name does not 
227 Sainsbury, 'Philosophical Logic', p.71 
228 Sainsbury, 'Philosophical Logic', p.72 
229 Sainsbury, 'Philosophical Logic', p. 71 
230 We assume that it is a true statement for simplicity. 
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mean the descriptions. Unfortunately, this becomes unworkable, not least because it 
seems to include information about existence, and we should be concerned if a name 
means that something exists. Even if we take McGinn's 'objects oflanguage' view (i.e. 
the satisfying object does not have to be an existing object; it can be an object of 
language, or mental object), there are further problems: how can we understand a name 
meaning that an object satisfies descriptions? We can understand 'that a name is used 
means that an object satisfies associated descriptions' because this is seen in terms of 
conditions for correct name use, but, as in the example above, there is a need to 
'smuggle in' a reference to the object beyond the meaning as given ('an object. .. it flew 
to Athens') in order to make sense of the whole proposition. This places us back in 
Sainsbury's original position. 
All that we have left, therefore, is to attempt a defence of Sainsbury' s position 
that removes it from its contravention of Russell's main statement that a name does not 
mean a particular. Take the example that Sainsbury himself gives: Russell's example of 
'Bismarck was an astute diplomat. ' 231 Sainsbury asks us to imagine a situation where 
person A says to person B 'Bismarck was an astute diplomat,' and A and B have 
different descriptions - x and y, say - for Bismarck. Then A is not attempting to 
'imprint' his whole thought - x was an astute diplomat - on to B; only that, of B's 
thought y, the individual it describes was an astute diplomat. The contention would be 
that the only way that this could work is if there is an object that satisfies x and y. 
'Bismarck' does not mean x, or y. It refers to the object satisfying x and y. One is 
tempted to say that a name means a description to an individual, but that it means a 
particular in public. Yet the particular is determined by the descriptions; perhaps the 
best we can do, therefore, is to say that a name means a 'satisfier'; after all, whilst an 
object which satisfies a set of descriptions is a particular, it is possible to use 'the object 
satisfying x and y' without knowing the object beforehand: thus a name does not 
directly mean (stand for) a particular object232 . 
Thus, subjective descriptions do not have a direct semantic function, but they 
could be said to provide the boundaries for the reference: the attribution of a property to 
a name is meaningful if the object publicly referred to by the name has the property 
cited. An object is publicly referred to if it satisfies most of the descriptions the public 
associate with the name. This is again supported by the quotation above: 'to know the 
231 RusselL The Problems of Philosophy, p.Jl, cited by Sainsbury, 'Philosophical Logic', p.71 
232 Although, as we shall see, this gives rise to serious objections to the position. If Sainsbury does not 
support it, however, it appears that he faces greater problems of compatibility with quotations from 
Russell which he himself uses. 
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meaning of a name is to know who it is applied to. ' 233 So, the 'myth' is that a name 
means a description; each name abbreviates a description, or, as Lycan puts it, 'the 
weaker contention that names are somehow equivalent in meaning to descriptions. ' 234 
Sainsbury's 'reality' is that each name may loosely 'mean' (be associated with) a 
description for each individual who uses it, but meaning 'should be common through 
the linguistic community,'235 so that the name means the satisfier of all/most 
descriptions associated with the name. There are several examples which may be used 
to illustrate this. Let us take each of Russell's puzzles and show how the 'myth' and 
'reality' each treat them. 
( 1) 'Pegasus is a roan stallion.' (Reference to non-existents.) 
(2) 'Pegasus does not exist.' (Assertions of non-existence.) 
On the 'myth' version, (1) becomes 'There is exactly one thing which is winged, 
and a horse, and that thing is a roan stallion,' which comes out false by virtue of the first 
clause being false. Likewise, (2) -{3x)(Px) is true, where P abbreviates (Wx & Hx). 
What becomes of them in. the 'real' version? Presumably, people can have 
different descriptions of Pegasus (for instance, 'winged horse', 'mythical beast from 
Greek literature', 'creature ridden by Bellerophon'). However, it is not guaranteed that 
there will be a description in common, or that any description will pick out an object in 
the world (if we lay aside fictional discourse for the time being). In other words, if we 
cannot guarantee a bearer for a name, we cannot guarantee a public reference, and if we 
cannot guarantee a public reference, then we cannot guarantee meaning. We might 
want to say that the name is subjectively 'meaningful' inasmuch as individuals associate 
descriptions with the name. So (2) relies upon -{xis a Pegasus)236 being true for all x, 
whereas (1) would be false because there is nothing (description, existent) to anchor the 
name to the world, and because (x is a Pegasus) is false for all x, which makes the 
whole proposition come out false. Possible room for manoeuvre is introduced through 
the idea of including fiction as a possible domain, although this has its own problems. 
(3) Frege's puzzle: 'Hesperus =Phosphorous' 
233 Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, p.29-30 
234 Lycan, Philosophy of Language, p.40 
2..lS Sainsbury, 'Philosophical Logic', p.71 
236 Or, more correctly, -(xis an object which satisfies all/most descriptions associated with 'Pegasus'). 
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The problem is that this seems to be both informative and contingent; so one or 
more of the terms must be meaningful beyond simply picking out an object in the world 
(since they both pick out the same object, and yet are not trivial in the way that Venus= 
Venus is). The 'mythical' Russell would have each of them as equivalent to a definite 
description ('The evening star' and 'the morning star' respectively); we can then see 
that the statement is saying that the two descriptions are of the same object. The 'real' 
Russell can say that the 'satisfier' is the same object for both, but that there are different 
descriptions associated with each name (giving cognitive values, but not semantic or 
referential values); this accounts for how the names can be placed in an identity 
statement and for how that statement can be informative. 
Note that the semantic account of a name as 'that an object exists which satisfies 
associated descriptions' again creates problems here, in that again it is difficult to 
understand the identity statement without importing several extra terms which do not 
seem to be present. 237 
( 4) Substitutivity: 'Alf believes that Hesperus is best seen on a clear evening.' 
If we use 'Hesperus =Phosphorous' to remind ourselves that they are the same entity, 
then we can say of(4) on a purely denotative model that Alfbelieves Phosphorous- by 
substitution - to be best seen on a clear evening, which is false (he believes Phosphorous 
is best seen on a clear morning). The mythical Russell explains this by demonstrating 
that two different beliefs are attributed to Alf through the substitution and that this is 
why the truth value of the sentence changes. I.e. 'Alf believes that there is exactly one 
thing which is a star appearing in the evening, and which can best be seen on a clear 
evening' and 'Alfbelieves that there is exactly one thing which is a star appearing in the 
morning and which can best be seen on a clear evening.' 
The 'real' Russell will have to use a similar explanation as for the identity 
example: because the two terms Hesperus and Phosphorous differ in cognitive value 
(i.e. the descriptions associated with the names), beliefs involving the names will differ 
from one another- even though there is only one 'satisfier'. 
Where does this put us in respect of referring to God? Well clearly, on the 
'mythical' Russell's theory, 'God' equates to a definite description. This provides a 
point of comparison with his comments on existence; however, the 'real' Russell 
237 
'The fact that there is an object which satisfies "planet seen in the evening" is equivalent to the fact 
that there is an object which satisfies "planet seen in the morning" in virtue of the satisfying object being 
the same in each case.' 
74 
removes the option of simply checking a description of God for logical consistency, 
because the referential demands of the position are far more empirical in flavour. 
Before, remembering that existence was not a property, we could find a logically 
consistent description and did not require a demonstration that it was instantiated. Now, 
it seems that we cannot guarantee a public semantics for 'God' unless we can be sure 
that there is an entity satisfying the description. The situation becomes even more 
difficult, since the public meaning - the public reference - is the satisfier of all/most 
descriptions associated with the name. Given the number of descriptions (many of them 
incompatible, at least on the face of it) associated with 'God', one would be inclined to 
conclude that 'God' is the name most likely to be devoid of any public semantics, and 
must be beyond reference. Yet people spend a lot of time talking about what 'God' is 
like, and whether or not 'God' exists. 
I shall go on now to discuss the objections to Russell (myth and reality), and to 
examine the main alternative available, keeping in mind the problem above in the hope 
of providing a model which explains its occurrence. 
Objections 
Searle238 proposed changes to Russell's theory on the basis that often there is no 
single definite description that a person has in mind when they form a proposition about 
someone. Lycan uses the example of the proposition 'Wilfred Sellars is an honest 
man. '
239 He observes that the objection picks out a curious feature; given that the 
proposition abbreviates 'There is exactly one x such that x is ... [a list of predicates 
forming the complete description of Sellars]', 'Wilfred Sellars is an honest man' entails 
'There is at least one philosopher with whom I had a fairly violent argument in George 
Pappas' living room in 1979.'240 
Searle's solution was to adapt the theory such that a cluster of descriptions 
pertain to each name; the name refers to the thing instantiating most of these 
descriptions and communication is achieved when a sufficient number of the 
descriptions are shared. Note that this has both striking similarities and marked 
differences from Sainsbury's version of Russell's theory. In the latter, each person has 
a description in mind, and reference and meaning are secured if there is an object 
satisfying most of the descriptions the public use. In the former, each individual has a 
238 John Searle, 'ProperNames',Mind67 (1958), p.l66~73 
239 Lycan, Philosophy of Language, p.40 
240 Lycan, Philosophy of Language, p.40 
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cluster of descriptions in mind, and correct naming of an object is achieved when a 
sufficient number of the descriptions are satisfied by the object. What Sainsbury calls 
public meaning/reference only arises when a sufficient number of the descriptions are 
shared by users of the name (i.e. when clusters overlap by a minimum number of 
descriptions). 
Lycan canvasses an objection to Sainsbury's 'myth' theory, which also lends 
credence to Sainsbury's claim for the 'real' theory. Lycan shows241 that if two people 
had different descriptions for a name, given that each will be a generalisation according 
to the theory of definite descriptions, it would be possible for them to contradict one 
another and yet not logically contradict one another. For instance, take the Bismarck 
example. If A's description of Bismarck is 'First Chancellor of Germany' and B's 
description is 'The best diplomat of the 19th century', and they have a disagreement over 
whether Bismarck was fond of yodelling in the bath, this comes out as 
(i) There was exactly one x such that x was first chancellor of Germany, and x 
enjoyed yodelling in the bath. 
(ii) There was exactly one x such that x was the best diplomat of the 19th century, 
and x did not enjoy yodelling in the bath. 
These are quite compatible logically, and yet A and B certainly disagree, and there is a 
fair chance that they are both thinking of Bismarck. Given Russell's enthusiasm for 
building his theories on the logical form of language, it seems unlikely that he would 
have missed something this glaring, and the inclination is consequently towards 
Sainsbury's view, which provides the necessary mechanism for public meaning. 
Donnellan gives two criticisms based on definite descriptions and reference242 . 
The first is essentially that we can succeed in referring even if all the descriptions we 
use are wrong. He gives the example of someone at a party talking to a friend about 
'the man drinking the martini'. In fact, no-one in the room is drinking a martini, and the 
individual in question is drinking water out of a martini glass. Reference is successful, 
however. In the instance of names, Donnellan uses the example of a child who is 
woken up at night and introduced to a person they have never met ('Tom'). In the 
morning, the child only remembers the name and that 'Tom was a nice man.' Even if 
the latter is completely false, and the child has no other descriptions associated with the 
individual, the child still succeeds in referring to the person they met, argues Donnellan. 
241 Lycan, Philosophy of Language, p.41-42 
242 Keith Donnellan, 'Reference and Definite Descriptions', Philosophical Review LXXV (1966), p.28l-
394 & Keith Donnellan, 'Speaking of Nothing', Philosophical Review LXXXIll (1974), p.J-32 
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The second criticism is that we can refer to something that has descriptions 
associated with it even if something else happens to satisfy the descriptions. Donnellan 
considers the case of someone being discovered at the North Pole who matches all the 
descriptions associated with Santa Claus; he argues that this does not entail that this is 
the person we have been talking about up to the discovery, even though the descriptions 
have been satisfied. Rather, we have been talking about the fictional entity Santa Claus. 
In both of these objections, the responses available to Russell or Sainsbury are 
severely limited. The first demonstrates successful reference without satisfaction of 
associated descriptions, the second shows how satisfaction of associated descriptions 
does not guarantee reference. 
Kripke makes several criticisms of Russell's theory. One of his most famous 
concerns successful reference under false descriptive conditions243. He asks us to 
suppose that Godel's Incompleteness Theorem was stolen by Godel from a 
mathematician named Schmidt, who then died. Kripke's argument is that, when we 
speak of Godel and his work on the Incompleteness Theorem, we really are speaking of 
Godel; yet Russell's theory seems to demand that when we speak of Godel, we are 
actually talking about Schmidt; it is the description that is doing the work, not the name 
(since the name abbreviates the description). Kripke goes a step further, imagining that 
'the proof simply materialised by a random scattering of atoms on a piece of paper. ' 244 
Russell's theory, he argues, demands that if the definite description 'there was exactly 
one x such that x proved the incompleteness of arithmetic, and x is ... F' is the logical 
form of'Godel is ... F', then any statement of this form comes out false, because no-one 
proved the incompleteness of arithmetic. Surely, however, we want to say that we are 
talking about Godel and that the proposition will be true or false depending on whether 
or not ' ... F' applies to him? 
Once again, we must ask what effect this has on the 'real' Russell. In this case, 
it can be considered fairly forceful. He would want to say that public reference is 
achieved when an object satisfies most associated descriptions. Kripke's objection is 
constructed from our intuition that if we only have one description corresponding to an 
entity and that description is false, then we can still refer successfully to the entity. 245 
There are three further objections. First, Kripke takes the proposition 'some 
people are unaware that Cicero is Tully' and argues that Russell cannot properly 
243 Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity, p.83-4 
244 Kripke, Naming and Necessity, p.86 
245 This will be taken up again later, since Sainsbury attempts a defence of Russell's position using an idea 
that will arise more directly in considering Gellman's paper. 
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interpret ir46. Primarily, Cicero and Tully could have different descriptions associated 
with them, so no single fact is forthcoming of which people may be unaware. Further, 
if as Lycan points out, 'I know that Cicero is Tully, [then] I associate the same set of 
descriptions (whatever they may be) with both names.' One ends up with 'Some people 
are not aware that one and only one person was a famous Roman orator . . . [etc.] and 
one and only one person was a famous Roman orator ... [etc.] and whoever was a 
famous Roman orator ... [etc.] was a famous Roman orator ... [etc.]'247 which does not 
communicate the meaning of the sentence. 
The 'real' Russell could argue (as covered by the Hesperus/Phosphorous 
example) that the different descriptions will both be true of the same object. Thus, the 
fact that different descriptions are true of the same object constitutes the fact of which 
some people are not aware. In the second case, it seems to me that one is clear to argue 
that, even if the descriptions were 'merged', there would be an outstanding element of 
each which individuated them- namely, that the description for Cicero would include 
'also known as Tully' and that of Tully would include 'also known as Cicero'. 
Therefore the resultant would be 'some people are not aware that one and only one 
person was a famous Roman orator known as both Cicero and Tully,' which seems 
quite reasonable. 
The second objection is that if every name is founded on a unique description 
(or a description applying uniquely to the referent), then people would not be able to 
succeed in using names for which they had only very general descriptions. Kripke uses 
the example of 'Feynman is a leading contemporary theoretical physicist'248. He argues 
that people still succeed in referring, even though there is more than one person 
satisfying the description. Does this stand up against the 'real' Russell model? Russell 
can argue that, provided the satisfier satisfies the description, it is successfully referred 
to publicly. However, the ability of the Russelian model to provide individuation is still 
questionable, because there is no structure beyond reliance on satisfaction of 
descriptions. Kripke's own position seems to offer a better fit in this respect, as will be 
seen. 
The last objection I wish to look at concerns counterfactuals. If 'Nixon' 
abbreviates 'The winner of the 1968 US presidential election' and we ask what might 
have been the case if Nixon did not win - if it was possible that he might not have won 
- we are presented with a problem: 'Is it possible that: one and only one person won the 
246 Kripke, cited by Lycan, Philosophy of Language, p.45-46 
247 Lycan, Philosophy of Language, p. 46 
248 Kripke, Naming and Necessity, p.81 
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1968 election and whoever won the 1968 election lost the 1968 election?'249 To 
eliminate a Searlean response (i.e. considering the question in terms of the possibility of 
one description among a cluster- 'the winner ... &c.' - being false instead of true, where 
the remains of the cluster provide reference) Kripke argues that Nix on might not have 
done any of the things normally associated with him. The final force of the argument, 
then, is that if a name means one or more descriptions, then counterfactual 
considerations cannot make sense. 
There are two defences of the position. The first (attributed by Lycan to 
Dummett250, and presumably assuming the 'mythical' Russell) is that there is a scope 
problem to be arbitrated, and that Kripke assumes the 'wrong' scope. Thus, the proper 
alternative is 'It is the ,case that exactly one person won the 1968 election and of 
whoever won is it possible that they could have lost?' This makes perfect sense, and 
treats 'Nixon' as meaning 'The winner of the 1968 election.' 
The second reply, specifically from the 'real' Russell's perspective, succeeds but 
leads on to the criticism grounding Kripke's positive thesis. 'The winner of the 1968 
election' will perhaps only be one description (as per the Searlean response) but, unlike 
the Searlean position, the name does not mean the associated descriptions. So Nixon is 
the satisfier of most descriptions associated with 'Nixon', and plugging this into 
Dummett's reply above gives a correct reading for 'the satisfier of most descriptions 
associated with "Nixon".' However, what about Kripke's point that Nixon might not 
have done any of the things commonly associated with him? The scope issue defends 
the point, because the associated descriptions still provide the reference for the 
individual before the counterfactual question is put, but intuitively there is something 
about the area ofKripke's criticism that has been left unexpressed and unanswered. 
Kripke's positive thesis is grounded in another specific criticism of Russell, 
developing out of the problems assessed above251 . In a modal context, he observes, the 
referent of a Russellian definite description changes with variations in possible world. 
For example, if 'Nixon' is 'the winner of the 1968 US election,' then in some possible 
worlds the referent of 'the winner of the 1968 US election' will not be Nixon. Indeed, 
the fact that the last sentence was comprehensible seems to support the argument that 
'Nixon' is not functioning in the way that Russell suggests252. To make this more 
applicable to the 'real' Russell, one might say that the satisfier of the descriptions 
249 Kripke; cited by Lycan, Philosophy of Langauge, p.43 
250 Lycan, Philosophy of Language, p.44 
251 Kripke, Naming and Necessity, p.41-49 
252 Note the resonance between this and Donellan's Santa Claus example. 
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associated with 'Nixon' changes with respect to possible world, even though the name 
means the satisfier and not the associated descriptions. 
Kripke contra Russell 
The main thrust of Kripke's counter-thesis is that names are 'rigid designators' 
in a way that descriptions are not. Rigid designators pick out the same entity across all 
possible worlds, and the result is that a name means (picks out, stands for) an entity. 
This is what enables us to say 'Nix on might not have won the 1968 US election,' or, 
even better, 'Nixon might not have been [called] "Nixon".' Likewise it enables us to 
consider what might have happened if Nixon had never been born and his father, say, 
won the 1968 election. In this instance, it would be true that 'the winner of the 1968 US 
election was Nixon' but false that the 'Nixon' of this proposition was Nixon- i.e. the 
entity that we wish to talk about in our counterfactual statements. You can imagine a 
conversation (say a conspiracy theory that Yeltsin had been replaced by a robot) in 
which someone might say 'yes, but of course at that time Yeltsin wasn't Yeltsin.' This 
seems to be a good example of language users making a rigid/non-rigid designator split 
wherein the first occurrence of the name is made non-rigid by what appears to be a 
denial of self-identity, thereby securing the second occurrence as the rigid designator 
(the first name is being used to mean 'the President', or the person called Y eltsin). The 
conversation might continue by speakers using 'Yeltsin' as the rigid designator and 
employing some other term (robo-Yeltsin, perhaps) to pick out the new entity, which in 
turn becomes a rigid designator for that entity ('what would have happened if robo-
y eltsin looked more like Bill Clinton, so they sold him to the Americans to replace 
Clinton?' and so on). Russell's theory simply does not allow for this sort of linguistic 
and conceptual work - at least, not without a good deal of extra effort and argument. 
It does not appear that Sainsbury could give a reply that would vindicate Russell 
on this ground, because both the mythical and the real theories depend upon 
descriptions- in the former, they provide the semantics directly, in the latter the object 
of reference is the 'satisfier'. One wants to say that the descriptions that should be 
associated with the satisfier have changed, rather than that a different object now 
satisfies the associated descriptions. Particularly on a referential point (i.e. not 
necessarily what we mean to say, but about what we wish to say it) Kripke has made a 
persuasive case. 
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As Lycan observes, there is a semantic and a referential element to Kripke's 
thesis. The semantic element is straightforward: a name means its referent; names pick 
out entities. The mechanism of reference needs to be made clearer than it has been thus 
far, however. Kripke's view is often called 'causal-historical', because the mechanism 
is essentially one of initial baptism and referential practice. An entity is named (initial 
baptism) by ostension or perhaps the satisfaction of some contingent description, 
whereupon it becomes a rigid designator. This initiates a practice of using the name to 
pick out the entity, which spreads throughout the linguistic community 'from link to 
link as if by a chain. ' 253 Ambiguous names are differentiated by their initial baptism 
(e.g. Manchester, UK compared with Manchester, USA). 
Lycan canvasses several objections. The first is reference to non-existents; he 
suggests that the best way to deal with this is to make the naming of the fictional entity 
the grounding of the referential practice (as opposed to the entity itself, which does not 
exist- again, McGinn's model will help as explained below). 
The second is attributed to Evans and claims that Kripke's view cannot account 
for a name changing its reference; for example 'Madagascar' once named a portion of 
the mainland. 
The third involves initial baptism of an imposter followed by a referential 
practice referring to the intended recipient (Lycan uses the example of acquiring a pet 
wherein the wrong cat is named 'Liz' but is subsequently switched with the intended 
cat, who is taken home and referred to by the name 'Liz'). 
The final objection, also from Evans, cites the example of people making 
category errors about the referent of a name; 'Evans cites E.K. Chambers' Arthur of 
Britain as asserting that King Arthur had a son Anir "whom legend has perhaps 
confused with his burial place."' Yet Kripke's model would entail that any use of 
'Anir' is grounded in the birth of Arthur' s son (or in the naming of a fictional character 
as such). 
It occurs to me that the latter three objections could all be addressed in a way 
that is commensurate with how we employ language, particularly names. In the second 
and third objections, presumably there will be a first instance of someone calling the 
new entity by the relevant name (i.e. the first use of 'Madagascar' for the island and the 
first use of 'Liz' for the correct cat). Why should this not be considered an initial 
baptism? It cannot be because something else already has the name, because ambiguous 
names have already been accounted for and the initial baptism grounds the new 
253 Kripke, Naming and Necessity, p.91, cited in Lycan, Philosophy of Language, p.60 
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referential practice. Perhaps the problem springs from the idea that initial baptism is 
more of a 'ceremony' than it is. Put another way, what I am arguing from is the fact 
that 'we just name things'. Mistakes occur; the same object receives more than one 
name or two objects receive the same name (the bases of many theatrical farces) but 
problems often have to do with the properties (I deliberately avoid using 'descriptions' 
although the properties describe the entity) associated with an entity or a name. In the 
case of the 'Anir' objection, we shall see that Gellman's model of rigid designation 
would allow us to argue that 'Anir' is a rigid designator for both Arthur's son and his 
burial place, and that both will have received an initial baptism at some point; however, 
the initial baptism of the burial place makes that 'Anir' a failed rigid designator because 
the path by which it occurred will have been faulty. 
How does Kripke's account treat Russell's puzzles? After all, it is not enough 
for one theory to criticise another with a view to replacing it if there is no account given 
of what the old theory was trying to explain in the first place. It seems that the strength 
of Kripke's thesis is the model it provides of how names act in counterfactual/modal 
situations, and how names individuate entities. Kripke's thesis on its own encounters 
major difficulties. The problem of bearerless names (reference to non-existents, 
statements of non-existence) is highly problematic, since if a name means and refers to 
its bearer, and the bearer does not exist, then the name should be meaningless (this will 
be dealt with below by use ofMcGinn, to anticipate the obvious question). 
Then there are the identity puzzles: 'Hesperus =Phosphorous' and 'Alfbelieves 
Hesperus can be seen on a clear evening'. As Russell put it (in response to a theory by 
MiJI) 'Now George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of "Waverley"; 
and in fact Scott was the author of "Waverley". Hence we may substitute Scott for the 
author of "Waverley" and thereby prove that George IV wished to know whether Scott 
was Scott. Yet an interest in the law of identity can hardly be attributed to the first 
gentleman of Europe.' If two terms just pick out the same referent, then such cases are 
a conundrum. Kripke could appeal to the circumstances of the initial baptism, but this 
runs the risk of falling into a 'satisfier' model, with all the objections and counter-
examples that this carries. 
It appears that a major part of the problem could be resolved by allowing that 
there are associated descriptions (as canvassed by Sainsbury, but without any mention 
of satisfaction) and appending them directly to Kripke's model. There does not seem to 
be any immediate difficulties thrown up by this procedure, since the descriptions are 
cognitive, not semantic, and we are not talking about satisfaction as a way of 
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determining meaning or reference. After all, is it not the case that essentially what we 
do when we state a subject-predicate proposition is to 'try out' a description against a 
referent? 'Anna is blonde' tries out the description 'blonde' against the referent of 
'Anna'; but if the proposition is true, we do not take 'blonde' as part of the meaning of 
'Anna', neither do we assume that 'Anna' is (i.e. definitionally) the satisfier of 'is 
blonde' (she might frequently dye her hair). This would resolve the identity puzzles in 
a similar way to that which Sainsbury suggests for the 'real' Russell (i.e. the 
informative content of 'Hesperus =Phosphorous' is explained by the fact of realisation 
that two separate sets of associated properties actually apply to the same object) but 
without the problems of'satisfiers'. 
For cases involving non-existents (i.e. reference to non-existents and statements 
I 
of non-existence) Kripke's theory works particularly well with McGinn's.254 For 
example, 'Pegasus is a roan stallion' can be treated as denoting the object of thought 
'Pegasus'. The truth conditions for the proposition will depend upon the mental acts of 
name-users (i.e. associated descriptions composed by name-users), because there is no 
actual entity to act as truth-maker. In the case of Pegasus, there is also a body of written 
work representing the mental acts of the initial baptiser of Pegasus and this could be 
seen as a precedent of set truth-conditions for certain propositions about Pegasus. It 
does not mean that 'Pegasus' means any or all of the descriptions in that work. Thus, 
we have employed McGinn's thesis of representation-dependence, Kripke's model of 
meaning/reference and Sainsbury's concept of associated descriptions with solely 
cognitive value, to resolve the issue. Likewise, 'Pegasus does not exist' takes an object 
of thought- denotes an object of thought- and says that it is only intentional. 
This structure of meaning and reference hints that there may be a way of looking 
at the subject 'God' in the subject-predicate sentence 'God exists' which removes the 
problems encountered through the Russellian models. However, there are plenty of 
unresolved issues to be addressed. After all, one cannot simply conclude that a name 
stands for an entity and refers to it rigidly and that therefore 'God' refers to God and 
'God exists' correctly supplies the fact of His existence - this is just the sort of move that 
has been pinned onto ontological arguments, to the detriment of most of the works 
(friendly and hostile) involved. Can we, then, obtain reference without affixing to it an 
empirical content? After all, McGinn has argued that we use existence to separate 
2s4 I believe that this is due to parallel inherent tensions between the areas of'existence' and 
'meaning/reference'. The tension in the latter is between pure denotation, and the need to explain our 
experience of name-use. The tension in the former is between pure correlation of object to existent, and 
the need to explain our experience of fictional discourse. 
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actual objects from fictional objects, and fictional objects have names. The first step is 
provided by Jerome Gellman. 
Gellman and Naming God 
Gellman's paper is split into several sections. In the first, he examines what he 
calls 'the descriptive theory of names' and the objections available from rigid designator 
theory. He divides the descriptive theory into a theory about the meaning of names, and 
the reference of names. The former he expresses as 
For every name N, there is a definite description 'the F' such that: 
(1) 'N is G' means 'the F is G' and 
(2) N in 'N is G' refers, if at all, to the object, if any, satisfying 'the F'.255 
The latter he expresses as 
For every N, there is a definite description 'the F' such that 
(1) N in 'N is G' refers, if at all, to the object, if any, satisfying 'the F'. 
(2) N does not mean 'the F'.256 
Gellman characterises these as follows: the first model introduces N into language as 
any other term is introduced, and subsequent users learn to employ it with its given 
meaning. The second model uses a ceremony-like 'initial baptism' to fix N's use as 
being to refer to whatever satisfies a particular description that the first speaker 'has in 
mind'. 
In contrast, Gellman characterises rigid designator theory through the 
phenomenon that having 'the F' in mind does not guarantee that a speaker is using N in 
the way that either of the descriptive models specify. Further 
(1) An initial baptism involves the choice of N to refer to an object 0 that 
presents itself. 
(2) N names 0 directly, and not on account of any definite description being 
satisfied. 
(3) N continues to refer to 0 even if all definite descriptions employed fail to be 
satisfied. 
255 NNG, p.193 
256 NNG, p.193 
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Gellman lists the following objections257 to descriptive theories, with their concomitant 
examples. First, we often use a name to refer to an individual for all counterfactual 
considerations, regardless of which definite descriptions are satisfied by which objects. 
Although Gellman uses a different example, this is essentially the same point as 
Kripke's, concerning Nixon as 'The winner of the 1968 US election.' 
Secondly, names often designate an entity successfully when a speaker has no 
definite description in mind. Although Gellman uses a different example, the Kripkean 
objection employing Feynman as 'a leading contemporary theoretical physicist' is an 
ideal case in point; as we have seen, the argument is that it is still possible to 
communicate about him and successfully to refer to him. 
Thirdly, we can succeed in referring to some entity even when our definite 
description for the entity picks out a different entity. For example, Kripke's Godel 
argument, wherein he contends that we still talk about Godel and truly/falsely predicate 
properties of him even though our description of him picks out Schmidt and the 
predications' truth-values would seem to rest on Schmidt' s properties. 
Fourthly, reference to an entity can be successful even when the definite 
description for the entity picks out nothing at all. For example, Donnellan's 'man with 
the martini' argument, wherein two speakers successfully refer to an individual at a 
party using 'the man with the martini' even though no-one present has a martini. 
Finally, when naming fictional entities, if a real entity satisfies the definite 
description for a fictional entity, reference is still to the fictional entity. For example, 
Donnellan's 'Santa Claus' argument, wherein a man is discovered living at the North 
Pole dressed in red and white furs and driving a sleigh filled with gifts, but 
conversations about Santa Claus still refer successfully to the fictional character 
(presuming that the new discovery is not dubbed 'Santa Claus', in which case the 
argument would apply with the proviso of making a distinction between Santa Claus 
and 'Santa Claus'). 
Gellman goes on to relate the criticisms to the two descriptive theories, showing 
what damage is done by each criticism. However, he also makes a vital distinction 
between semantics and pragmatics (this is equivalent to the distinction between 
meaning proper and reference proper, since pragmatics has a slightly different technical 
attribution in philosophy of language, but I shall retain the distinction for ease of 
understanding quotations). 
257 NNG, p.195-6 
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The semantics of a name has to do with the contribution that a name makes to the 
meaning of a sentence type, what knowers of a language have to know in order to 
understand a sentence type of the language in which the name appears. The pragmatics 
of names includes how a speaker uses a name to refer on the occasion of utterance of a 
sentence token. 258 
A sentence type, notes Gellman, passes on its semantics to all tokens, but it does 
not necessarily pass on its pragmatics, because they are reliant on the intentions of the 
speaker to refer. 
Thus, Gellman identifies the third, fourth and fifth objections as the key 
arguments for rigid designator theory. These criticisms, he argues, show that the 
reference of a name is not dependent on satisfaction of 'the F' - however, this does not 
show that N does not mean 'the F'. In other words, descriptive theory applies to 
semantics, but rigid designator theory applies to pragmatics: 
The meaning of a name as a descriRtion does not determine the pragmatic issue of how 
the speaker intends to use the name. 59 
Note that this clarifies the 'real' Russell problem, since as Lycan observes, 
Russell and Searle seem to collapse the semantics/reference distinction. For the 'real' 
Russell, the pragmatics demand that reference is secured by satisfaction of descriptions, 
whilst meaning is the satisfier. Gellman here shows that thus far there is no reason to 
suppose that names cannot mean descriptions, whilst at the same time pointing out that 
description-satisfaction is too restrictive a model for reference. 
Gellman argues that the third and fourth objections show that an entity can be 
referred to even through a false sentence. There is no restriction in using the name to 
refer to the description-satisfier, but this does not entail that the name does not mean the 
description; the semantic/pragmatic distinction is upheld. 
Likewise, he argues for the fifth objection that the issue turns on whether one 
intends really to refer, or to pretend to refer, and this is an issue of pragmatics. When 
employing a name 'I need not be referring to whatever happens to satisfy the relevant 
description. ' 260 This again removes the 'satisfaction conditions' mechanism, but again 
does not disprove the semantic point because 'Santa Claus' could mean 'The ... F' 
although I choose my reference as fictional rather than real. 
258 NNG, p.l97 
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Gellman claims that the first objection can be accepted and incorporated by the 
descriptive theorist; indeed, he argues in a similar line to that provided by Dummet and 
Lycan above: 'The object which is in fact [the F] is such that it might not have been 
[the F]. '261 
Finally, Gellman considers the second objection. He believes that this defeats 'N 
is G means "the F is G",' adding that 'even when people do know of definite 
descriptions true of an object referred to, it seems implausible to suppose that we would 
get a uniformity in their descriptions that could account for uniformity of meaning.' 
This seems to fall into the trap of assuming the 'mythical' Russell; we shall see later 
how this might affect Gellman's arguments overall. Gellman concludes with the 
observation that all that has been shown is that it is not normative that names behave as 
the descriptive theory states. This does not, however, show that a name cannot behave 
in this way: 'There may be some special names that come . . . together with a given 
description.' 
Gellman does canvass a response to (2) by Kent Bach, who argues that all names 
have a description that means the name, which is 'N means "the object having the name 
N".' Such 'nominal descriptions are 'thin and uninteresting,' claims Gellman, and he 
for the remainder of his paper takes (2) to be correct. However, it should be noted that 
Sainsbury considers a response to the Godel objection based upon this. He introduces 
the idea of 'weighting' of descriptions, wherein some descriptions carry more weight, or 
do more work in the public semantics of a name, and argues that the Godel example 
could be an instance where 'the entity called Godel' dominates all other associated 
descriptions, thereby removing the problem that Schmidt satisfies 'the author of the 
Incompleteness Theorem'. This tactic, as a whole, attempts to move Russell's work 
towards Kripke's by trying to get Russellian satsfiers to function as rigid designators. 
We have also seen that objection two could be countered on the 'real' Russell theory by 
allowing that the satisfier of 'a leading contemporary theoretical physicist' provides the 
public semantics for Feynman.262 
Regardless of whether Gellman succeeds in his semantic aims, the most 
important point to carry through to the later stages of the paper is the 
semantic/pragmatic distinction; it is both what Gellman himself is most interested in, 
261 NNG, p.I96 
262 Compare the Bach/Sainsbury response with my example about Yeltsin above, p.79. Is it not the case 
that 'Yes but at that time Y eltsin wasn't Y eltsin' defeats the point, since it means 'the entity having the 
name Y eltsin wasn't [rigid designator] Y eltsin'? 
87 
and also what this chapter is seeking in terms of the meaningfulness of statements of 
God's existence. 
In the second section of his paper, Gellman considers the conditions for initial 
baptism. The issue at stake is the relationship between speaker, name and object, when 
the speaker first rigidly designates an object by employing a name. The debate 
consequently centres around acquaintance, perception and ostension. It must be noted 
that Gellman wishes to go further than Kripke in two respects. In the first place, he 
develops an account of the conditions for initial baptism; about this he is very clear. 
However, he also takes a correlative position distinct from Kripke's which he does not 
make clear. In Naming and Necessity, Kripke requires that some description be used to 
fix a name as a rigid designator, and in this respect Sainsbury is right to argue that his 
version ofRussell is really not that far off ofK.ripke's own theory, save presumably that 
the 'real' Russell does not distinguish between initial baptism and subsequent use. 
Gellman, on the other hand, is pushing towards a model of pragmatic reference that is as 
free of descriptive baggage in initial baptism as it is in subsequent referential practice. 
Gellman claims that Kripke's view is unclear, but that he seems to require 
perception and ostension for rigid baptism: 'usually, a baptiser is acquainted in some 
sense with the object he names and is able to name it ostensively. ' 263 As we have 
already seen, Russell's model of naming is restricted to logically proper names, 'this' 
and 'that', which clearly requires immediate perception and ostension, but Gellman 
cites Jaegwon Kim as a rigid designation theory inheritor of Russell's view (without the 
restriction to logically proper names). 'The possibility of reference presupposes the 
possibility of direct ostensive reference,' which 'is possible only if some sort of direct 
cognitive contact is established with the object of ostension.' Thus 'perception is our 
only cognitive window on the outside world, and any epistemological contact with it 
must be mediated by perception.' 
Thus far, then, models for reference seem to require an initial ostensive 
designation mediated by perception. However, Gellman goes on to consider the work 
ofMichael Devitt, who contends that perception/ostension is not required at the time of 
the baptism. A 'grounding thought' (i.e. a mental representation) is required for 
baptism, but this means that the object could be perceived at timet and not 'baptised' 
until t1• Further, a representation of the object can provide the mental representation 
grounding the baptism (for example, a photograph). 
263 This makes sense ifKripke requires some description-satisfaction process in initial baptism. 
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Gellman asks whether a representation (mental or actual) must be faithful to the 
object represented. He argues that if rigid designator theory can provide arguments 
where reference is successful even though definite descriptions are incorrect, then surely 
it should not matter whether the representation is faithful. All that could be demanded 
would be a representation of the 'it' which is to be rigidly designated. 
Gellman therefore follows up on this line of inquiry by asking what work is 
being done by the representation requirement. His conclusion (given the various 
examples of ways in which the representation can be faulty (lighting, distance, mirrors, 
distortions and so on), is that the representation essentially serves as a way of accessing 
the object, 'the possibility [of thinking] that it is that (calling up to mind the 
representation) object that [we mean] to be designating. '264 Nevertheless, Devitt's view 
seems to be 'perception, not ostension'. 
By contrast, Gellman cites McGinn's views265 on reference as an example of 
'ostension, not perception.' McGinn's argument for this position uses several examples 
to show that perception and reference can become detached whereas reference and 
ostension remain linked together. Gellman uses the general example of being able to 
ostend an object without seeing it. McGinn's key contention is that 'indexical pointings 
out over-ride descriptions, which explains how one can refer to an object that one 
misdescribes.' A major element of McGinn's view, as Gellman is swift to observe, is 
that entities outside space-time cannot be named/rigidly designated because they cannot 
be ostended. Notably, this goes some way to explaining why McGinn holds the view 
that he does concerning 'God' terminologically, and why he cannot see 'God exists' as 
predicating existence of a referent instead of predicating it of a well-defined concept. 
The two criticisms which Gellman makes of Devitt and McGinn respectively, 
and on which he constructs his own position, are, first, that representations are 
'generated' by the object, and that consequently any referential access yielding 
uniqueness (i.e. the capability of individuating an object) should be adequate to achieve 
rigid designation in an initial baptism. Secondly, in order to achieve rigid designation 
through ostension, it is not necessary for the object of ostension to be the object named. 
Gellman begins his positive thesis by returning to rigid designator theory and 
observing the structure for reference subsequent to initial baptism. The requirement is 
that the speaker connects to a referential path which has the initial baptism as its starting 
point. So, when I talk about Russell, there is no perception, ostension or representation, 
264 NNG, p.200 
265 Colin McGinn, 'The Mechanism of Reference', in Knowledge and Reality (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), p.197-221 
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but I partake in a referential practice which began when someone first called Russell 
'Russell'. 
What Gellman wishes to argue is that initial baptisms can follow the same 
structure: 'initial baptisms of rigid names succeed because an object has been picked out 
with the intention to refer to it. In order to be picked out, it is sufficient if the baptising 
act has a way of ending up at, or leading to, the unique object named' Thus, a 
referential path is enough for reference, provided it leads to the object. Perception or 
ostension of the object are not required; 'in fact, there needs to be no real connection 
between the links of the 'chain' in the path. It need only be a way of, as it were, getting 
from the namer to the object.' 
Gellman makes the following points about reference and rigid baptism. First, 
success depends upon the namer' s awareness of the path; the namer can be erroneous 
about the path, but for reference there must actually be a path and the namer must be 
aware of its existence. Secondly, 'rigid reference is to be thought of as a category of the 
use of language for reference purposes'. Thus, thirdly, successful baptism requires the 
namer's intention to include both the path and the unique object, and that the path exist 
and lead to the unique object. Finally, failed baptism occurs when the intention 
conditions are fulfilled but there is no path, or no object, or no unique object. 
He then provides six examples to illustrate his theory. The first pair involve 
perception previous to baptism, the second pair involve perception by persons other 
than the namer previous to baptism. The fifth involves future, or anticipated, 
perception, and the last involves no perception or ostension. 
Example (ai66: One is in a room amongst a group of strangers, and one ofthem 
leaves. That person is then referred to by name for the first time. The memory links the 
namer to the referent, and although this can be representational, it can also be the 
memory that a person was recently here and that that person is to be named. Therefore, 
the memory is the first link of a causal referential chain leading to the entity to be 
named, but the entity itself is neither perceived nor ostended at the initial baptism. 
Example (b )267 : One person in a conversing group talks about a drug dealer he 
knows, and decides to call the drug dealer 'Marty' to protect his identity. The group 
succeed in conversing and referring to 'Marty', even if it is subsequently revealed to all 
of them that the individual was not a drug dealer. Everyone still understands that it is 
266 NNG, p.203 
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'Marty' who was not after all a drug dealer. Thus, rigid designation was successfully 
initiated in the absence of the referent. 
Example (ci68: Someone decides to rename Socrates 'Frederich'. They intend, 
and succeed, in linking this to the referential practice of' Socrates' -use which leads back 
to the man himself. Although perception has never occurred and ostension is not 
presently occurring, rigid reference is still achieved. In order to remove the problem 
that the namer is simply using 'Frederich' as a synonym and thereby employing the 
same referential practice in continuation, Gellman supposes that an evil demon has 
tricked the namer into experiencing 'Socrates' for every occurrence of 'Thates'. Thus, 
even though there is no awareness of the name 'Thates', the referential chain for 
'Thates' is successfully employed (the speaker is aware of a path, there is a path, and 
the end object is the individual intended by the speaker). Although 'Frederich' is used 
as a synonym for 'Socrates', it does not affect the success of the rigid baptism 
'Frederich' which uses the path for the referent 'Thates'. 
Example (d): 
I read of someone in a newspaper story. I read, say, that John Smith is being held on 
charges of murder, and an interview is provided about how he was born in Lincoln, 
Nebraska, raised in Chicago, etc. I decide to call John Smith, "Bob", because his story 
reminds me of a departed friend I once had of that name. Suppose it turns out that Bob 
(not my departed friend) was really not being held, but that a reporter believed the story 
of a psychologist who was in the jail to study criminal behaviour, and who told a 
fabricated story about himself to the reporter. Bob, it turns out, was not named "John 
Smith", was not born in Nebraska, and other details of the interview were all wrong. 
The supposition just raised is coherent, which shows that reference is rigid, though I 
never perceived or ostended Bob. 269 
Example (ei70: Gellman argues that the referential path can be future-based as 
well as past-based. He gives the example of a Midrash which tells that 'in Messianic 
times the righteous will dance a circle around God and point to God saying: "This."' 
Gellman argues that if no-one perceives or ostends God until that point, why should a 
name not be coined to refer to the entity that will be ostended in a 'final baptism'? 
Example (f)271 : Gellman argues that lacking perception or ostension, past, 
present or future, can still allow rigid baptism independent of descriptive theory's 
satisfaction conditions - provided a path and object exist and are intended by the namer. 
He uses the example of a new chain reaction, the activating agent of which has never 
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been observed, but which a scientist has decided to devise an experiment to observe. 
The scientist calls the agent 'Boris' in lieu of its as yet unknown formula. Although 
'Boris' could be synonymous with a description, it could also be a rigid designator 
picked out via the path of the chain reaction. The description could turn out to be 
wrong ('the activating agent of reaction number 13889'272 when someone had 
mislabelled the experiment, for instance), but reference would still be achieved, and if 
Boris ceased to exist before anyone perceived or ostended it, reference would still be 
achieved. 
Gellman provides a contrasting example273 by using 'Mario' as 'the world's 
greatest baritone', when the namer does not know who the world's greatest baritone is, 
has no referential practice and no other path to follow. In this case, the referent of the 
name is whoever satisfies the description, and the namer could not discover that he had 
been mistaken as to the satisfying entity, because whoever satisfies the description will 
'become' Mario. 
Gellrnan summarises his points274 as follows. First, reference in initial baptism 
where the object named is presented to experience or ostended is direct reference. 
Secondly, reference in initial baptism where the object named is presented at some other 
time is indirect reference. Thirdly, reference in initial baptism where the object named 
is never presented is deferred reference. Finally, initial baptism of a rigid designator is 
the same as subsequent use of rigid designators in that it ties in to a causal, or other 
varietal, path. It differs in that it does not have to employ a path of referential practice 
(which subsequent reference does), although it can employ such - as demonstrated by 
the Socrates example. 
In the third section of his paper, Gellman considers 'the logic of "God". ' 275 He 
uses Anselm' s Proslogion as an example, which fits with the purposes of this thesis 
quite welL Since the Pros/ogion has already been discussed, and Gellman's treatment is 
as likely to confuse as to elucidate, I shall concentrate upon his arguments concerning 
reference, and bring in Proslogion comments only when absolutely necessary. The 
essential thrust ofGellman's use of the Proslogion as an example is that the Pros/ogion 
depends upon taking 'God' as a rigid designator, and 'that-than-which-nothing-greater-
can-be-thought' as non-rigid. Thus, he suggests that for the Fool, 'God' is a failed rigid 
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designator, and the referential path does not lead an)'where276. The second part of 
Proslogion Ill is therefore an argument that 'God' the rigid designator 'is as we believe 
Him to be'; i.e. is 'that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought', and since the Fool 
cannot deny that 'that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought' exists (according to 
Proslogion ll), then if 'that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought' describes God, 
the Fool must admit God's existence. 
What is particularly of interest is Gellman's treatment of 'God' as rigid 
designator, and of the question of whether 'God' could also have semantic meaning. He 
makes the following points. He begins by noting that his arguments in his paper's 
second section mean that 'God' could be a rigid designator regardless of previous 
commitments to His existence: 'being a rigid designator is a category of the use of 
language for referential purposes. ' 277 
Secondly, if 'God' is to be a rigid designator, Gellman observes that we need a 
path. He asks what Anselm' s path is in the Proslogion, and cites the opening chapter, 
where Anselm laments never having had an experience of God; as we have seen, there 
is a claim present in Anselm that perception of God has been lost on account of the 
Fall278. Gellman seizes on this to argue that since 'Anselm trusts that Adam had a 
vision of God,' the referential path can be established 'and we may suppose that Anselm 
intends to use "God" to refer rigidly to God via the referential chain that reaches back to 
Adam's original vision ofGod'279. 
Gellman asks whether 'God' is the sort of name which also has semantic 
meaning (not nominal description meaningi80. He suggests that Anselm, or someone in 
his circumstances, would have been initiated into a referential practice and only later 
would learn possible definite descriptions of God281 . Does this imply that 'God' is 
really, or primarily, referential, rather than semantic? Gellman argues that we cannot 
draw this conclusion simply from the temporal priority; it is consistent with the situation 
that the name be both semantic and referentiae82. He goes on to give the examples 'the 
Creator' and 'that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought' as candidates for the 
semantic meaning of 'God', and then attempts a text-based demonstration of the way in 
which 'Anselm could have been systematically using the name "God" both rigidly and 
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as synonymous with 'that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought' [and indeed with 
'the Creator'].' He is careful to note that if 'that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-
thought' is not the semantic meaning of 'God', then Anselm's argument still stands (in 
this respect) in that 'God' as a rigid designator could still satisfY 'that-than-which-
nothing-greater-can-be-thought', which is the minimum that Anselm requires. 283 
However, it is the following discussion of the arguments and objections for 
allowing 'God' as rigid designator, or as semantically meaningful, that is most 
interesting for current purposes. Gellman starts his discussion with an observation on 
the difficulties involved in attributing semantic meaning to a rigidly designated 'God': 
'we cannot turn to satisfaction conditions of a proposed semantically equivalent 
description in order to test whether substitution of the description yields the same truth 
values as the original. '284 This is because a rigid designator can refer to something that 
fails to satisfy the description. So, this is the difference between Donnelan's 'man with 
the martini' (corresponding to the 'God' case), and, say, 'bachelor' being 'the 
unmarried man', where the satisfaction conditions of 'the unmarried man' will, if 
satisfied, ensure the correct use of the term 'bachelor' for that individual. 
Furthermore, Gellman observes that we cannot test for 'N means "the G"' by 
testing 'N is not "the G"' for necessary falsehood, because, first, 'a token of "N is not 
the G" can be necessarily false, not because N means "the G" but because that very 
being which N names rigidly is necessarily G. '285 For example, 'Peagsus is not the 
winged horse' could be false because Pegasus is the winged horse, but not because 
'Pegasus' means 'the winged horse.' 
Secondly, 'A token of "N is not the G" may be true even when N means "the 
G". This can happen because N is being used rigidly. ' 286 For example, if 'Fred' means 
'the man with the martini' for someone at Donnellan's party, who then says 'there's 
Fred' (in the circumstances ofDonnellan's example) then reference is successful even 
though Fred has a glass of water. I.e. 'Fred is not the man with the martini' is true. 
Finally, Gellman argues287 that the issue of whether 'God' has semantic meaning 
would have to be settled before we decide the truth value of 'God is not the G,' 
presumably (he does not make it explicit) because on a common-or-garden 
compositional model of semantics, a separate account must be given of the meaning of 
the subject, the meaning of the predicate and the meaning of the negation operator. 
283 NNG, p.213 
284 NNG, p.213 
285 NNG, p.214 
286 NNG, p.214 
287 NNG, p.214 
94 
Gellman suggests that the main reason for the thought that 'God' must have 
semantic meaning is that many philosophers are unwilling to allow that 'God' could be 
a rigid designator. He provides two motivations for this position. First, he suggests that 
many philosophers 'do not think that God exists and hence prefer to think of 'God' as 
meaning a description rather than as referring rigidly. ' 288 Gellman points out, in line 
with his previous arguments, that God not existing is no reason for 'God' not to be a 
member of 'the pragmatic category of rigid designators'289 since failure of existence 
would simply mean that it was a failed rigid designator, rather than not a rigid 
designator at all. 
Secondly, Gellman suggests that the Russellian demand for acquaintance to 
enable reference leads to the following argument: 
( 1) "God" is a rigid designator for S only ifS perceives or ostends what God designates. 
(2) No one can perceive or ostend what "God" designates. 
(3) Therefore "God" is not a rigid designator for S. 
And then they conclude that "God" must have semantic meaning, otherwise it could not 
function in language at all.290 
Gellman provides two major objections to thi~ position291 . The first is that (2) 
could be rejected if we upheld an argument for perceiving God, such as Alston's theory 
of non-sensory perception of God. The second is that (1) could be rejected on the basis 
that perception and ostension are not required to achieve rigid reference; i.e. (1) can be 
rejected if we uphold deferred reference, in Geiiman's terms. 
Gellman concludes his article with a consideration of what possibilities are 
available for 'God' as a rigid designator292. He begins by noting that partaking in a 
referential practice is sufficient for 'a "path" from the believer to God.' He goes on to 
argue for three options for deferred reference initial baptisms grounding such referential 
practices. 
The first option is an incident experienced as a miracle. 'God would be picked 
out as being the very being who was the cause of this miracle. ' 293 
288 NNG, p.214 
289 NNG, p.214 
290 NNG, p.215 
291 NNG, p.215 
292 NNG, p.215-6 
293 NNG, p.215 
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The second option is 'mediated expenence of God'; when one percetves 
something and 'hears' or 'sees' God 'through' or 'in' it (music, perhaps, or landscape). 
'God is thus being thought of as that very being who stands at the start of this path. '294 
Gellman' s strongest option, which in some sense encompasses the previous two, 
is God as creator. In terms of other examples from the previous chapter, the 'first 
cause' and 'first thinker' arguments could both be examples of a suitable path for 
Gellman. However, as he is swift to point out, 'it is not necessary that the believer be 
right about there existing a being [as source of an experience such as those above], in 
order for "God" to function as a rigid designator. It is sufficient that the name "God" be 
intended to refer in this way in order for it to function as a rigid designator. If God were 
not to exist, it would be a rigid designator that failed. '295 
Gellman's conclusion, therefore, is that 'God' can function as a rigid designator, 
and that there is no clear position consequent to this as to whether or not 'God' has 
semantic meaning. 
I would argue that an extra option for a referential path is provided by the ideas 
of God as being at the limit of human understanding, discussed in the previous chapter. 
Presumably, the limit of human understanding is not something which can be perceived, 
and possibly not even ostended. Human understanding itself, however, is present to 
experience almost by definition. I would argue that this provides a suitable path to God, 
allowing 'God' as a rigid designator under Gellman's conditions- i.e. this cannot be 
allowed to state anything about the semantics of 'God', only to secure reference. 
Referring to God? 
The overall import of Gellman's paper for the current discussion centres 
essentially around his appreciation of the distinction between meaning and reference 
(what he calls semantics and pragmatics), and the demonstration that reference 
understood 'pragmatically' can provide us with a way of referring to God independently 
of settling on a semantics of 'God'. 
This brings us back to McGinn's challenge to ontological arguments. I argued 
that McGinn would be unhappy attributing existence to an entity that was not properly 
individuated. As we have seen above, McGinn's position on reference demands 
ostension, and these two elements are fully compatible. However, it would appear that 
294 NNG, p.216 
295 NNG, p.216 
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McGinn is an example of Gellman's philosophers who 'prefer to think of "God" as 
meaning a description rather than referring rigidly. '296 Indeed, McGinn's concern was 
over whether 'God' was well-defined, and whether we could 'know what it would be'297 
for an entity to be defined by certain concepts. 
This provides us with two options. The first is that McGinn thinks of 'God' as a 
concept, not as a name; the second is that McGinn would similarly be concerned with 
any instance of ' {name} exists'. The former puts him in a position to be criticised by 
Gellman's objections, but the latter is potentially more dangerous to him. This is 
because it pushes him in the direction of Russell's account of proper name meaning: if 
' {name} exists' is to be allowed, the subject terms must be well-defined, which 
presumably involves a (consistent) description of some sort. He says of fictional 
entities that the reason they cannot exist is that there is no coherent/consistent 
description/definition as a candidate for metaphysical possibililf98. Yet this begins to 
sound as if McGinn is smuggling in a Russellian view of existence, at least for modal 
objects, in that an object exists only if there is a coherent metaphysical entity - that 
coherence being provided by a consistent description-set of properties individuating the 
entity. So a modal object exists if a description could be true of something. 
I contend- following up on the arguments I constructed in Chapter I on this 
point - that McGinn could avoid this entanglement by retreating on the point of modal 
existents: by arguing that modal entities are fictional but derive their properties from 
actual entities. In other words, we- our mental acts- individuate modal entities (say, in 
counterfactual examples) but we base this individuation upon existing entities, which 
explains why modal/counterfactual objects are better defined and less often a source of 
confusion in language-use than are fictional entities. For example, imagining what 
would have happened if Nixon lost the 1978 US election is easier than imagining what 
would have happened if Hamlet's father had not been murdered - not because loser-
Nixon exists and Hamlet's father doesn't, but because it is easier to keep a mental grasp 
on loser-Nixon given that we have actual-Nixon's life and works to consult. 
Subsequent to this, we affirm that names are rigid designators and allow that 
names can pick out fictional objects as well as actual objects. A rigid designator for a 
non-existent will succeed on the same grounds as Gellrnan's model of initial baptism, 
except that a path can be virtually instantaneous because individuation of the non-
existent relies on the mental acts of the baptiser. This could be presented as 'I choose to 
296 NNG, p.214 
297 ELP, p.50 
298 ELP, p.38 
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invent a new fictional character, and its name is {name} ' such that the path and 
uniqueness of the object are provided by just this thought. The exception to this is a re-
naming of a fictional character, which requires a path as supplied by a referential 
practice ( cf Gellman's Socrates example299). 
The rigid designator will fail for a non-existent if there is no object with that 
name, or no path of referential practice, and no intention to compose a fiction through 
initial baptism (e.g. if I make a statement about 'Osrik' but have no idea who 'Osrik' is 
and have no intention of founding a fiction about 'Osrik', then, even if there is a fictional 
character called 'Osrik', the reference fails. Indeed, if there is a fictional character called 
'Osrik', the previous sentence proves the point, since in general I might as well have 
used ' {name}' because the only function fulfilled is that of a grammatical place-
holder300). 
It should be remembered that names are still rigid designators, but that they can 
be successful or failed rigid designators. We already have an account from Gellman as 
to how rigid designators for actual entities can succeed or fail. To this has been added 
an account of how rigid designators for fictional entities can succeed or fail. As a result, 
I aim to construct a model of how 'God exists' can be considered meaningful whether or 
not God actually does exist. This is the task of Chapter IV, to which I now turn. 
299 NNG, p.204 
300 I suggest that a good way of understanding this view of names is to contrast an entity-invoking (in the 
broadest sense) use with the use of a name as a grammatical place-holder. A good example of the latter 
would be the phrase 'You wouldn't know him from Adam.' The intention of course is for the name-use to 
be equivalent to 'any named person', but it is not as if we expect to have a conversation in which 'Adam' 
will stand for an entity. 
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Chapter IV: The Meaningfulness of 'God exists' 
I began this dissertation by proposing an intuitive semantic requirement of 
compositionality for the meaningfulness of 'God exists'; since compositionality was 
both straightforward and appealing, the outstanding question was one of how to 
understand it. Fortunately, 'God exists' has the surface form, at least, of a simple 
subject-predicate sentence which reduces the possibilities of structural difficulty. 
Nevertheless, difficulties became immediately apparent: most importantly, how to treat 
'God', but more immediately what account to give of 'exists' - and this demanded that a 
solution be given, primarily, for the traditionally thorny problem of the property of 
existence, since first- and second-order views would give rather different accounts of 
the composition of 'God exists'. In the course of investigating this issue, a challenge 
was presented concerning the remaining element (i.e. 'God') and the conditions for 
applying the property of existence to it, which was grounded in a criticism of 
ontological arguments. This dovetailed with an area already worth looking at, since the 
traditional remit of ontological arguments is meaningfully to join together the terms 
'God' and 'exists' with minimal appeal to anything outside of those terms. The first 
response, then, to the demand for one or more well-defined and comprehensible 
concepts of 'God', was to examine Anselm as a target of that demand, in an attempt 
meet it. 
Having turned to a study of Anselm's position, a number of interesting ideas 
emerged. First, I moved away from the issue of proof (since this thesis is interested in 
the meaningfulness of 'God exists' and not in proving that proposition) in an attempt to 
get beyond the entangled debate and examine what thought underlay Anselm's 
arguments in the Proslogion. This uncovered Anselm's philosophy (and theology) of 
language, and the struggle he himself had had in talking about God. More importantly, 
it seemed to affirm and clarify the challenge found in Chapter I, for Anselm himself was 
forced to conclude that God was to be found at the limit of human understanding; was, 
in terms of essence, ineffable - although it might be possible to speak of God in terms of 
relation to the created order. This emphasised the elements of McGinn's view that 
barred meaningful predication of existence to any entity for which we did not have an 
essential characterising concept that we understood. Everything pointed to the problem 
of locating a non-relative account for the reference and meaning of 'God' (i.e. one 
unlike 'the most perfect existing entity,' which is referentially arbitrary) that would 
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provide a foundation for being able to predicate things of God - preferably without 
already presupposing God's existence. 
The third chapter, therefore, introduced an attempt to find some way of fixing 
the reference for 'God', providing an individuated subject of which to allow the 
predication of existence, thereby holding out some hope that 'God exists' could be 
considered meaningful. A possible solution was discovered in the form of Gellman's 
'deferred reference' theory of pragmatic (referential) rigid designation. This supposedly 
left open the semantic (meaning) account of 'God', but in any case did allow us to fix a 
reference for 'God' in order to explore the semantics; in using, for instance, 'God 
exists', we are pragmatically picking out an entity and attributing a property to it, but 
this does not necessarily tell us what the subject term means; it could simply stand for 
the entity, it could abbreviate a description and so on. However, the challenge levelled 
by McGinn was partly answered - essentially by replacing his conceptual demands with 
the idea of referential 'paths'. An account was given of how rigid designators could 
function for fictional entities, a problem that needed addressing if McGinn's view of 
existence as a first-order property was to be countenanced in conjunction with such a 
view of reference. This brings us to the present chapter of the thesis. 
I aim to do a number of things. Primarily, I wish to explore the idea that God 
could have a Kripkean-based semantics, in such a way as to leave open the issue of 
God's existence. I shall note that this is compatible with 'God' having associated 
descriptions, provided that we keep these at a cognitive level. This first strand of 
argument will be grounded in a demand for clarification of Gellman's commitments to 
meaning as well as reference. 
Subsequently, I wish to sketch a structure for meaningfulness using what has 
been covered so far, bringing together Gellman's critique of reference with McGinn's 
defence of first-order existence, which (contra Russell) gives the ability to talk 
meaningfully of God existing without having to demonstrate - or even commit to -
'God exists' as a fact. 
Finally, I would like to offer an addendum concemmg some potential 
applications and ramifications of the thesis for philosophical theology and philosophy of 
religion. The discussion of these points will necessarily be brief, but some treatment is 
required in order to explore the issues arising and the way in which they fit together. 
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'God': A Semantic Suggestion 
As we have seen, Gellman argues that 'the meaning of a name as a description 
does not determine the pragmatic issue of how a speaker intends to use the name. '301 In 
other words, meaning does not determine reference. He also suggests at the end of his 
paper that some names of God could have semantic meaning and others might only 
refer (he cites a Jewish tradition of 'Elohim' and 'Adonai' having semantic content, and 
'YHVH' not having semantic contene02). However, we have also seen that the Kripkean 
basis for Gellman's work has a meaning and a reference strand to it; a rigid designator 
means the object it picks out, and that is how we can talk about the same entity across 
possible worlds. If we are strict with Gellman, we should demand that he take this into 
account, or risk accusations of a faulty understanding of Kripke's position. This 
demand leads most directly to the view that all names mean the entity that they pick out, 
but some names might also have 'extra meaning'. There appear to be two options for 
this 'extra meaning'; the first is that a name actually means both the entity it picks out 
and some further description, say. I think this would be problematic; it risks dragging 
us back into the whole debate about meaning of names by demanding, for instance, 
some explanation of the way in which some names act in the Kripkean fashion whereas 
others also act in a more Russellian fashion. 
The second option, which I suggest is the most stable one, is to link the 'extra 
meaning' to the associated descriptions already posited, by arguing that some names 
lead language users to assume certain associated descriptions on the grounds, for 
example, that the name is also a separately functioning word. The sort of name I am 
thinking of here is, for example, 'Mr Baker'; historically, one could probably find a 
period in which the majority of language users would think that 'Mr Baker' denoted an 
individual, but that that individual was a baker. At present this is unlikely; 'Mr Baker' 
would usually be treated as a rigidly designating name. At some time long past, 
perhaps, 'Master Baker' was not yet used as a name (was not a rigid designator). 303 
301 NNG, p.l97 
302 NNG, p.216 
303 It should be noted that this does not represent a concession to an 'inferential theory' of meaning; at best 
it shows that if one supports such a theory then the class of expressions which cause difficulties (i.e. 
provision of rules for proper names) could be curtailed in this way. Of course, this might demand that the 
inferential theorist accept a Kripkean account of proper names first. (We have already seen in the 
Introduction why the inferential theory is unappealing as a basis for analysing 'God exists'). ' 
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This has some application to 'God', since 'God'- or, more properly 'god'- can be 
used to attribute a role or characteristic; for example 'Zeus was the supreme god in 
Greek mythology'. Clearly, 'God exists' should not be taken in this sense, not least 
because it becomes a fragment, similar to 'baker exists'. It also goes some way to 
explaining the attraction of the approach which attempts to find a coherent and 
consistent set of attributes for God; perhaps there is a distinction to be emphasised 
between 'what is God?' ('what is Mr Baker?') and 'what is [it to be a/the] God?' ('what is 
[it to be a/the] baker?'). In view of this, I would like again to make clear that the issue 
at hand is concerned with 'God' as name, not as attributive concepe04. 
Some possible cause for misunderstanding or criticism hopefully having been 
addressed, I shall now move on to a suggested semantic account for 'God'. Based on 
what has gone before concerning McGinn, Kripke, Gellman and Sainsbury, one might 
argue as follows. First, 'God' can be considered as a rigid designator; the term picks out 
an object (reference) and stands for that object (meaning). Debates concerning the 
attributes of God can be understood in terms of what descriptions ought (consistently, 
coherently or just uniquely) to be associated with the name 'God'. There is a parallel 
here with the 'Hesperus = Phosphorous' example, in that someone might want to say 'In 
fact, Allah and God are the same entity, so Christians and Muslims worship the same 
being'. This would be understood as, first, a statement that two names denote the same 
object (and, incidentally, an identity statement can be an a posteriori discovery of a 
necessary truth, according to Kripke305) and, secondly, as informative on the grounds 
that very different sets of descriptions are associated with the names 'Allah' and 'God'. 
This seems to be an acceptable account of what is occurring in such an instance. 
None of this commits us to asserting that God actually exists, because the object 
picked out by 'God' could be a fictional object. 'God' could fail as a (actual) rigid 
designator when the path and object intended are actual, and this would entail that 'God' 
succeeds as a (fictional) rigid designator when (indeed, probably because) the path and 
object are fictional. A more familiar example of a failure of an actual rigid designator 
entailing success as a fictional rigid designator can be seen in the case of'Vulcan'. The 
failure of the hypothesis that Vulcan exists and explains irregularities in the orbit of 
304 Although it is noteworthy that the path which enables reference in the first place will invariably 
involve some sort of concept. However, this escapes circularity on the grounds that all that is required for 
reference is that there is a path and that it picks out a unique object; so presumably 'the Creator', say, 
could be an inaccurate or imperfect descriptive concept but still succeed in providing the path. 
305 For more on how this works, see Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
1981), particulady p.I00-5 0 
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Mercury entails that 'Vulcan' picks out the fictional object that is the subject of a 
fictional account ofMercury's orbital irregularities. 
Could 'God' fail as a rigid designator for a fictional object? The conditions 
under which this could occur would be when there is no fictional object with that name, 
or no path of referential practice, and no intention to compose a fiction through initial 
baptism. Given the number of models, ideas and historical associations of 'God', this 
could be argued to make 'God' one of the least likely candidates for failed rigid 
designation (as opposed to the problematic Russellian view mentioned in Chapter ill 
[p.74] in which 'God' is one of the most likely candidates for zero semantic and 
referential content). The closest possibility might be a use of 'God' such as 'This is the 
honest-to-God truth.' Presumably there is no intent to create a fictional object here, it is 
uncertain that the name is linked with a referential practice, and there is probably no 
intended fictional (or actual) object. There are problems with employing this example; 
mainly that it makes a foray into the philosophy of metaphor since it could be 
questioned whether 'God' is actually being used here at all. Nevertheless, it gives a 
sense of the scope for exceptions to successful rigid designation. 
Before going on to present the complete suggested model for the meaningfulness 
of 'God exists', I would like to consider some of the detail of how the arguments above 
relate to states of affairs and truth values for 'God exists'. The first and most 
straightforward option is provided by the state of affairs in which God actually does 
exist. Under these circumstances, 'God' names a unique entity picked out by some 
intended path, such as 'the Creator', first thinker, or entity lying at the limit of human 
understanding. The rigid designator actually succeeds. The proposition then comes out 
true because it says of this entity that it is actual. 
The second option is that the rigid designator fails as an actual rigid designator 
(i.e. there is no existing entity picked out by 'God') but that it succeeds as a fictional 
rigid designator. The proposition comes out false because it claims of a fictional entity 
picked out by 'God' that that entity is actual, not fictional. A good example of this 
would be a cynical reading of the first Anselmian path suggested by Gellman; the entity 
picked out by the path 'the original vision of Adam'306. One could argue that the story 
of Adam and Eve is quite literally that- a fiction- and that consequently 'Adam', 'Eve' 
and 'God' are all successfully rigidly designating fictional characters. Indeed, perhaps 
more successful than many because of the combined authority (in the sense both of not 
giving rise to other stories about its characters, and having ecclesiastical authority) and 
306 NNG, p.210 
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uniqueness of the Bible for most language-users. 'God exists' is therefore a serious 
'misfiring ... of the mind'307 on this account, since it entertains the possibility that the 
fictional character 'God' is not in fact a fictional character. 
Technically, there is a third option; that 'God' is a failed rigid designator both in 
fiction and in actuality. However, it is difficult to see how this could apply to the 
sentence 'God exists' since the form of the proposition seems to demand that the speaker 
has some notion of what they mean by 'God'. 
Interestingly, there is a curious fourth option; that God actually exists, but that a 
speaker refers to 'God' using a referential practice and path that picks out a fictional 
object. This would be very similar to Donnellan's Santa Claus example, and affirms its 
insight; as with Santa, we want to say that the person who had been talking about God-
qua-fiction really had been talking about a fictional object, not about actual-God- even 
if all that was said of fiction-God happened to be true of actual-God. Likewise, it would 
be correct (if pedantic) to reply to the now epistemically advantaged individual who 
says 'Ah, so God exists!' by saying 'Well, if you intend to mean the object that you have 
been talking about all this time, then no, it is still a fiction, but if you are referring to 
this new discovery and realising the comparability of its properties with your fiction-
God, then yes.' 
Having covered this detail, I shall now move on to presenting the overall model 
for the meaningfulness of 'God exists', drawing together previous arguments into the 
proper structure and thereby enabling the key points to be seen clearly. 
'God exists': A Model of Meaningfulness 
The premise on which this investigation was built was that, if we wished to 
characterise, or provide criteria for, the meaningfulness of 'God exists' then a 
reasonable starting point was that each term was meaningful and contributed to the 
meaning of the whole: compositionality. This led directly to the problem of deciding 
how existence was to be treated. A second-order view, as championed by Russell, 
would imply that 'God' could be a concept, or- if 'God' was a name- that it was a 
name for one or more concepts (or the satisfier thereof). A first-order view, on the other 
hand, provided the option of 'God' as a name which had an alternative to a conceptual-
descriptive account. Given what has been argued in the thesis since that point, I wish to 
suggest the following model of meaningfulness. 
307 ELP, p.44 
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(1) Existence is to be treated as a logical predicate and a property of objects 
(McGinn's semantic and ontological theses). 
a. This is correlated to the view that objects of thought and language are 
viable and accurately portray our use of language, the way the world is, 
and the relationship between them. In short, we use the concept of 
existence to distinguish between what is 'actual' and what we have made 
up. An object, therefore, is not (logically) necessarily an existent. 
(2) The distinction between existence and non-existence can be understood in 
terms of the thesis of representation-dependence, as follows. 
a. What is mind-independent, exists: the individuation of an existent 
depends upon that existent, and the truth-values of propositions (in the 
general, not entity-invoking, sense) about an existent rely upon the 
existent itself as truth-maker - (putting aside epistemological issues about 
veridical perception). 
b. What is mind-dependent (representation-dependent) does not exist the 
individuation of a non-existent depends upon the mental acts of a 
thinker, and the truth-values of propositions (again in the general sense) 
about a non-existent rely upon the mental acts of language-using thinkers 
as truth-makers. 
(3) Stipulating 'God' as not including the use of 'G/god' as attributive, as in 'x is 
a god' or 'The Lord is our God' - since this would make 'God exists' a 
fragment- 'God exists' may consequently be viewed as a subject-predicate 
sentence. N.B. This does not stipulate that 'God' could not be associated with 
a concept or description. 
( 4) Names are rigid designators. 
a. They pick out (refer to) the same object across all possible worlds 
containing that object, and they stand for (mean) that object. 
b. Names have properties/descriptions associated with them which do not 
contribute to the meaning or reference conditions of names, but are 
separate associated cognitive content of language-users. 
(5) Rigid designator reference is to be understood by way of the following 
mechanism. 
a. Reference is fixed by an initial baptism. 
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1. Initial baptism can be direct, indirect or deferred. Direct 
reference involves the object named being immediately presented 
to experience or ostended. Indirect reference involves the object 
named being presented at some other time. Deferred reference 
involves the object named never being presented. 
n. One object may receive more than one name; two or more 
separate objects may receive the same name. Reference will still 
be successful. In all cases what is required is a path from the 
namer to a unique object, and for the namer to intend a path and a 
unique object. 
b. Reference is sustained by a referential practice, requiring a path from the 
name-user to the initial baptism. 
c. A rigid designator fails if there is no path, or if a path picks out no 
object, or if a path picks out no unique object. 
(6) Rigid designator reference to non-existents is to be understood by way of the 
following development of the mechanism in (5). 
a. Reference is fixed by an initial baptism. 
1. The path for the initial baptism of a non-existent is generally 
instantaneous, because the individuation of the non-existent relies 
on the mental acts of the baptiser. The exception to this is a re-
naming of a fictional character, which requires a path as supplied 
by a referential practice ( cf Gellman's Socrates example). 
u. Note that the one-name-several-objects and several-names-one-
object cases remain, and reference is treated under the same 
conditions as (5) a.ii, b and c. The natures of the paths and the 
objects are such that fictional objects are potentially more 
numerous and more difficult to differentiate. This both tallies 
with our experience of fictional discourse and explains the 
McGinn!Kripke concern with coherent and consistent entities, the 
moderation of which I used to amend McGinn's view of modal 
entities. 
b. Reference is similarly sustained by a referential practice requiring a path 
from the name-user to the initial baptism. 
c. A rigid designator fails in a fictional context if there is no path of 
referential practice, or no object with that name, or no intention to 
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compose or continue a fiction through initial baptism. This makes it 
unlikely, but not impossible, that a fictional rigid designator could fail, 
and this fits with our experience of fictional discourse. 
(7) 'God' as a name can be considered to be a rigid designator. 
a. This requires a path that picks out a unique object. In accordance with 
the points above, this can be in the actual or fictional domains; i.e. 'God' 
could name an actual object or a fictional one. Therefore, 'God' as a 
rigidly designating name does not commit us to God actually existing. 
b. Several options for paths are available. Those that have been considered 
in this thesis are: 
1. 'The vision of Adam': Gellman's first suggestion for Anselm's 
path. 
11. 'The Creator': Gellman's second suggestion for Anselm's path. 
111. 'First Thinker': A path which can be extracted from Anselm's 
theology of language. 
tv. 'The limit of human understanding': A second path which can be 
extracted from Anselm's theology of language and Pros log ion. 
c. The four paths noted above all have the potential to be fictional instead 
of actual. 
1. The Book of Genesis could be purely mythological. 
11. 'The Creator' could be the result a false hypothesis about the 
universe (similar to McGinn's example of Vulcan as an 
'entertaining of existence'). 
111. 'The First Thinker' could be the result of a false hypothesis about 
the nature of human thought and language. 
tv. 'The limit of human understanding' could be criticised for 
assuming a relation between mental acts and the actual world 
which does not obtain; the iterative process need not be actual, it 
could be fictional (i.e. we might be able to understand everything 
in the universe, but be unable to understand some feature arising 
from our own language, making the limit of human 
understanding a non-actual object). 
(8) 'God' may therefore succeed or fail as a rigid designator of an actual object; 
we can characterise this as follows. 
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a. 'God' will succeed in picking out an actual object when a path- for 
instance one of those in (7)b - actually picks out a unique object. 
b. If more than one of the paths actually picks out the same unique object, 
then this may be considered in the same light as, for example, the 
'Hesperus =Phosphorous' case. 
c. If none of the paths pertain, or if one or more pertain but do not pick out 
a unique object (or indeed any object) then the rigid designator actually 
fails. 
(9) The failure of 'God' as an actual rigid designator is likely to entail the success 
of 'God' as a fictional rigid designator (compare the case of 'Vulcan'). We 
can characterise this in the case of 'God' as follows. 
a. 'God' will succeed in picking out a fictional object when some path- for 
instance, one of those in (7)c - fictionally picks out a unique object. 
Note that the stipulative element of fictional discourse reduces or even 
removes the possibility that a path will not pick out a unique object, 
since uniqueness can be built into fiction in a way not available to 
actuality on account of the conditions of individuation (compare 
arguments pertaining to point 6). 
b. More than one path can pick out the same object, although it should be 
noted that this has more to do with the individuating mental acts of the 
namer/name-user. 
c. Given the dependence upon the mental acts of language users for rigid 
designation of fictional objects, the possibility of occurrences of the 
name 'God' as a failed rigid designator seems unlikely, especially in the 
context of an assertion such as 'God exists'. The conditions for the 
possibility of such an occurrence are as specified under point (6)c. 
(10) Given points (4), (7), (8) and (9), we may argue that 'God' means- stands for 
- the object, actual or fictional, picked out by a suitable path. This gives us a 
starting point for attempted accounts of how 'God' functions in language. 
a. Given points (5) and (6), we may argue that there is no reason why more 
than one entity may not carry the name 'God', provided that each is 
picked out by its own path (likewise, if it transpires that two or more 
paths which have given rise to a naming of an object as 'God' in fact 
name the same object, then this is acceptable as seen under points (5)a.2 
and (6)a.2.). This gives us a basis for understanding both how different 
108 
persons can speak meaningfully of 'God', and how disagreements 
between different religions or theological positions can be meaningful. 
b. Given points (3) and (4)b we may argue that certain properties or 
descriptions may be associated with 'God' without contributing to the 
meaning or the reference of the name. This allows us to build upon the 
above in understanding the nature of debates about God's attributes, and 
lends credence to the aim of developing 'models' of God without first 
settling the matter of God's existence. 
(11) Putting aside any more wide-ranging accounts of propositions incorporating 
'God', which might find their foundation in the above argument, in favour of 
concentrating on the more essential and simple proposition 'God exists', I 
suggest the fo11owing account of the different possibilities comprising the 
meaningfulness of this proposition. 
a. 'God' could be an actual rigid designator, with a successful path picking 
out a unique entity. 'Exists' then predicates of this entity that it is actual. 
b. 'God' could fail as an actual rigid designator; with either no path or a 
path picking out no unique object, or no object at all. This entails (11)c. 
'Exists' then predicates of such a non-extant entity that it is actual. 
c. 'God' could succeed as a fictional rigid designator, with a successful 
fictional path picking out a unique fictional entity. 'Exists' then 
predicates ofthis fictional entity that it is actual. 
(12) As a conclusion to (11) the following truth values will follow. 
a. Under (I l)a, 'God exists' predicates actual existence of an actual 
existent; it would therefore come out true. 
b. Under (ll)b and (ll)c, 'God exists' predicates actual existence of a 
fictional entity; it would therefore come out false. 
c. Note that if God actually exists, but someone states 'God exists' with the 
intention to participate in or begin a referential practice employing a 
fictional path, then technically their statement is false even if the 
properties of 'God' happen to be the same as God's properties. This can 
be understood on the same basis as Donne11an's Santa Claus example. 
d. Note also that the above gives rise to a predictable asymmetry of 
existence. If we talk about God, but God doesn't exist, this entails that 
we have been talking about a fiction (it is like a false hypothesis), 
whereas if we talk about God as a fiction when God actually does exist, 
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this does not entail that we have in fact been talking about the actual 
God. This again appears to account accurately for the way in which we 
talk about God. 
Applications and Ramifications 
Clearly, the concern of this thesis has been to show how 'God exists' can be 
considered meaningful whether or not God actually exists - an apparently common-
sensical view that has been comprehensively challenged in the last century. However, 
as I have tried to gesture towards in point (10), the model opens up possibilities of 
discussion which are more extensive than the necessarily restricted treatment that I have 
given for the simple (yet vital) 'God exists'. 
The following three points are worth considering in light of this model of 
meaningfulness. First, there are distinct theological demands made by the requirement 
for a 'path', which stand to be met in any number of ways. Those examples which I 
have given here are simply those which emerge from a discussion of Anselm's 
Pros/ogion. This is no reason to think that a suitable study of other 'arguments for 
God's existence', or of revelatory and Christological theologies, should not be valuable 
in finding other possible paths. 
Secondly, there would appear to be some application to the discussion of 
arguments for the existence of God, in predicating further attributes of God, and in 
clarifying the arguments concerning ineffability. In particular, it could serve as a 
mechanism providing a foundation for constructive theology regarding the arguments of 
'analogy' in speaking of God. 
Finally, I would suggest that this model might be a useful resource in the field of 
the philosophy of comparative religion, since it potentially offers an account, for 
example, of the way in which different religions could have different paths and names 
for their gods, and yet could conceivably and meaningfully be talking about the same 
entity. Likewise, it potentially gives an account of the way in which one religion might 
be 'right' and another 'wrong' - i.e. the way in which one god might be fictional and 
another actual. 
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